CONTEMPORARY BLACK HISTORY

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

Black Power in Bermuda

Quito Swan

The Struggle for Decolonization

Black Power in Bermuda

Contemporary Black History

Manning Marable (Columbia University) and
Peniel Joseph (Tufts University)
Series Editors

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Black Power in Bermuda

The Struggle for Decolonization

Quito Swan

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

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To Pauulu, Habib, Akinwunmi, Ifasadun, Ayah, and
the *beautyful* ones unborn

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Contents

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Figures, Maps, and Tables

Figures

Maps

Tables

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Preface

A critical theme afflicting the African Diaspora seems to be the notion of "invisibility." In other words, having become conceptually marginalized within their own nation-states, many African-descended populations often only become visible to one another by chance; when such communities actively seek to connect with and draw attention to one another; or when issues affecting them develop into "crises" that threaten the interests of globalization and lead to sound bites about these struggles in the international media. A sample roll call of the latter could read as such: Afro-Colombians facing genocide and forced land removal; Blacks in Martinique and Guadeloupe uprising against socioeconomic oppression and French colonialism; Darfur; the African Muslim community in France; Somalian "pirates"; Afro-Brazilians in urban *favelas*; the crisis in the Congo; Haiti; and Afro-Venezuelan social movements.

The island of Bermuda knows this story all too well. She remains a British colony, and primarily leaps into the minds of the external world through advertisements for tourism or calls by U.S. President Barack Obama to address the island's status as a U.S. tax haven. This is unsurprising, for even within Bermuda colonial education has historically served to intellectually erase the voice of Black dissent and disconnect the experiences of Blacks in Bermuda from the wider Black world. The has unfortunately resulted in a certain level of historical amnesia among many Bermudians who are astonished to learn that Blacks have historically resisted colonial rule, slavery, discrimination, and racism and often contextualized these struggles in a larger phenomenon of global Black self-determination.

As would happen across the Diaspora, Bermuda's establishment has marginalized those who wrote about Black struggle. Hence, the documentation of history (through many cultural mediums) has necessarily served as more than an intellectual exercise. As such, Bermuda's Black historian has often had to live the life of an activist scholar and intellectual maroon. However, the recognition of such writers came from their community; their works were known by those who sought to know and not by those who *should* know—namely, Black Bermudians who have benefited from

the struggle of their ancestors—simply because it is their birthright. As such, it is important to recognize that the written works of those such as Nellie Musson, Cyril Packwood, Pauulu Kamarakafego, Ira Philip, Eva Hodgson, and Dale Butler—and freedom fighters of Bermuda, the wider African Diaspora, and indigenous world—have laid the foundation via which this story of Black Power in Bermuda could be written. *Medaase*.

Writing this book has been a journey with a number of spiritual, financial, intellectual, and physical crossroads. At each one, however, I have been blessed with inspiration and guidance from a myriad of sources too numerous to mention. To my parents, Sinclair and Lorraine Swan, I cannot ask for any more than the unconditional love and support that you have given. Nique, Tamisheka, and Kashima—the world's greatest siblings—thanks to you, your families, and friends for everything. Thanks also to Madge Swan—my grandmother—and wider family.

To Manning Marable, Chris Chappell—my editor at Palgrave-McMillan—and Samantha Hasey—thanks for your help and support for the manuscript. Howard University supported financially through a Sasakawa Award and Faculty Research Grant. Thanks to my colleagues and the faculty, students and staff in Howard's History Department, the wider University, and my extended family of artists and activists in the Washington DC metropolitan area who specifically helped and supported this project through various means. This includes students in my lecture and seminar courses, Iyelli Ichibe Hanks, Marcos Bellamy, Kim Howard, Marc Bolden, Melvin Barrolle, Ana Cardoso, Glenn Chambers, Loius Woods, Lafayette Gaston, Kofi Berima, Bob Brown, Banbose Shango, Msomi Moor, Margaret Crosby, Emory Tolbert, Charles Johnson, Gregory Carr, Elizabeth Clarke-Lewis, Joseph Harris, Selywn H. H. Carrington, Daryl Scott, Grace Ansah, Colin Palmer, NSAA, SARAP, the Ubiquity family, *Cimarrones*, Sankofa Bookstore, Highland Café, and Howard's Chess Team.

One of the inherent challenges of this project has been to construct a *written* narrative where one has not existed. Fortunately, the oral tradition in Bermuda remains strong. *Amesege'nallo*' to all those who gave interviews, photographs, and materials and to the entire "Bermie Massive" who helped in a myriad of ways. This includes Joanne Brangman and Michelle Nearon of the Bermuda National Library, Clarence Maxwell, Meryl Brock Swan, the late Pauulu Kamarakafego, Minister Neletha Butterfield, the late Joseph Warren, Fanon Khaldun, Max Hull, Shuaib Worrell, Nicole Stovell and family, Kai Simmons, Senator Marc Bean, Suzanne Smith, Claudine Richardson, Brownlow Place, Lauren Francis, Junior Burchall, Vejay Steede, Iman Gibbons, Nelson Bascome Jr., Andy Birmingham, John Gibbons, Bermuda alumni of FAMU and Howard, PKGC, Bermuda African Dance Company, and the EWF.

Thanks also to my family of maroons in *cumbes* across the world. I want to give thanks to the Tella and Quattlebaum families, Wesley Smith, Asad, Pat, and Kim Kruger, Gary Foley, and ROA. Also to the staff of the British National Archives, Bermuda National Archives, U.S. State Department Archives, Moorland-Spingarn Center and Schomburg Institute. Special recognition must be given to Rronniba Kamarakafego, Laureen Bassett, and Kristy Warren (the documents were a tremendous help). Furqan Khaldun—thanks for listening to the rants of a young professor trying to find his way. To my brother Theodore Francis, I cannot say thanks enough for the many, many groundings about the manuscript and all the assistance along the way; iron truly sharpens iron.

Perhaps most importantly, I have to give praise to the Creator. *Mojuba Oludamare*, the *Orisa*, and to my ancestors. Thanks to the Cadre for its efforts to better Bermuda and to all those who granted me interviews and assistance: Robin Swan, Sinclair Swan, Michelle Khaldun, Calvin Shabazz, Eliyahtsoor Ben Aaharon, and Philip Perinchief; there are a number of Berets who I unfortunately did not have the opportunity to ground with. Maryam—you mean the world to me; *shukran* for the love, balance, and joy that you have brought to my life. Akin, Ifa and Ayah—who wants *injera*? *Asase ye duru*.

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Abbreviations

ABUT	Amalgamated Bermuda Union of Teachers
BBC	Black Beret Cadre
BELCO	Bermuda Electric Light Company
BIC	Bermuda Intelligence Committee
BIU	Bermuda Industrial Union
BPC	Black Power Conference, 1969
BPP	Black Panther Party
BUS	Black Union of Students
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CUAS	Committee for Universal Adult Suffrage
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ISU	Internal Security Unit
IRD	Information Research Department
MP	Member of Parliament
MCP	Member of Colonial Parliament
NOI	Nation of Islam
NYA	National Youth Alliance
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PLP	Progressive Labour Party
RCMP	Royal Canadian Military Police
UBP	United Bermuda Party
WID	West Indian Department

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

Map 0.1 Bermuda.



Map 0.2 Map of Bermuda.



Map 0.3 Bermuda and the Americas.



Figure 0.1 Flag of Bermuda.

Figure 0.2 Black Berets, 1972 (L-R, Dennis Burrows, John (Dionne) Bassett, Philip Perinchief, Jennifer Smith, Calvin Shabazz).

Figure 0.3 Black Berets with Free Panther Sign (L-R, Jerome Perinchief, Eliyahtsoor Ben Aaharon, Cal Shabazz).

Figure 0.4 Pauulu's brother, Pauula, his grandfather, and friend (courtesy of Rronniba Kamarakafego).



Figure 0.5 Pauulu Kamarakafego at the University of Columbia, 1954 (courtesy of Rronniba Kamarakafego).

Figure 0.6 Pauulu Kamarakafego in Liberia, 1960 (courtesy of Rronniba Kamarakafego).

Introduction

The Truth is an Offense: Black Power in a British Colony

On the night of September 9, 1972, in the British colony of Bermuda, British Police Commissioner George Duckett was killed in a "premeditated and well-planned" shooting at his Devonshire home.[1] Approximately six months later, on the evening of March 10, 1973, recently appointed British Governor John Sharples, Aide De-Camp Capt. Hugh Sayers and his dog were gunned down on the grounds of the governor's fifteen-acre estate. Weeks later, two shopkeepers (Victor Rego and Mark Doe, both of Portuguese descent) of the Shopping Center were also killed. Assisted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Royal Canadian Military Police (RCMP), Britain's Scotland Yard launched a major "killer hunt" to solve the murders.[2]

This case clearly had far-reaching political and racial implications. Only White men had been killed in an era of political activism marked by calls for political independence from European colonialism across the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. As such, the Bermuda-based U.S. consul would claim that "Black Power, anti-colonialism and terrorism" were the primary motives for the murders.

This fallacious equation of Black Power with terrorism is unsurprising in light of historical state hostility toward Black protest in Bermuda. Nevertheless, Black Power and anticolonialism were intricately connected. Indeed, a major aim of the Black Power Movement in Bermuda was political independence from Britain. In addition, it sought the socioeconomic and political reconstruction of Bermuda's class-based society, which kept power exclusively in the hands of an elite White minority (known as the Forty Thieves) to the detriment of the majority Black community. Emerging in the late 1960s, the Movement was spearheaded by Pan-Africanist

Roosevelt (Pauulu) Browne Kamarakafego and the revolutionary Black Beret Cadre. Formed in 1969, the Cadre developed into Bermuda's most astute Black Power organization. The Cadre, which the U.S. consul likened to "Che Guevara at his most militant," uncompromisingly demonstrated the plight of Bermuda's majority Black population.

In an effort to destroy Black Power, British Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) officials systematically persecuted, drove underground, and forced into exile numbers of Berets, such as the Cadre's Chief of Staff, John Hilton Bassett. This included an extensive propaganda campaign aimed to suppress the Movement. In addition, Bermuda's mainstream media demonized the Cadre as a group of violent, caustic youths bent on destroying the island for personal gain.

However, by the time of the assassinations, a small cell of the group continued to meet. Having defined the Cadre as a terrorist organization, FCO officials assumed that the Berets were involved in the killings. In the midst of a State of Emergency, several Berets were arrested, detained, and questioned.[3] Investigations eventually pinpointed Erskine "Buck" Burrows, a Beret associate, as the prime murder suspect. Although police officials saw Burrows as a mere criminal, to many Blacks he was a "Black Robin Hood" who stole from the rich to give to the poor.

Eventually captured and tried for the murders, Burrows reportedly wrote a confession letter describing himself as the "Commander-in-Chief of the anti-colonial forces in Bermuda" and stating that the killings were anticolonial protest. Despite mass public protest, Burrows (and Larry Tacklyn, who was convicted for the Shopping Center murders) was executed by hanging on December 2, 1977. Police fired tear gas on demonstrators outside of Bermuda's Supreme Court, sparking a host of clashes with the Black youth during a weeklong State of Emergency. Arson attacks flared throughout the island.[4] British troops were sent in from the United Kingdom and Belize to support the Bermuda Regiment and Police in suppressing the rebellion. This marked the fifth time in less than a decade (1968, 1969, twice in 1970 and 1977) that troops had been brought to Bermuda in response to Black uprisings.

The assassinations sent a political shock through Bermuda that vibrated even the halls of the British Parliament. It was feared that it would be virtually impossible to prevent similar incidents under British colonialism if the White elite continued to refuse to address even the most basic grievances of the island's Black masses. Acting Governor Kinnear saw the murders as a collective and direct challenge to colonialism, which was an "unnatural anachronism" in any country, much less a wealthy island such as Bermuda. He felt that Bermuda's government needed to consider deeply if its colonial relationship with Britain was an asset or burden and to seek political

independence—not as a "cure for the cancer" of Black militancy, but a start in eradicating it.[5]

However, Bermuda's ruling political party, the United Bermuda Party (UBP), was quite wary of independence. Essentially the political organ of the "Forty Thieves," the UBP was more "concerned about internal security" than any external threat, particularly due to the Black Power Movement. Hence, it valued the "actual and potential internal security protection provided by the British presence."[6]

As such, despite the obviousness of independence, Kinnear believed that

> The attitudes of [Black] Bermudians had been conditioned in the past very largely by the interests of the White oligarchy, which saw financial advantages from the link with the sterling and political stability in the colonial relationship with Britain. This has led to a somewhat unreal situation of a viable, highly prosperous community remaining a colony and growing to accept a situation in which it remains dependent upon Britain to look after the not very pleasant task in a small community of maintaining law and order. I believe that independence would bring with it greater self-reliance and give impetus to the movement to bring the races together.[7]

Nevertheless, at the time of writing, Bermuda remains a British colony with limited internal government power; Bermuda's flag, powdered wig-wearing judges, and British names of its parishes are clear reminders of this condition. Britain controls matters of security, internal defense (through a British governor appointed by British Parliament), and foreign affairs. The island shares this distinction with Montserrat, the Cayman Islands and, up to recently, Turks and Caicos islands. However, in perhaps the most blatant display of British colonialism in recent history, the British government is preparing to suspend the constitution of Turks and Caicos for two years amidst an investigation into government corruption and all government responsibilities will be turned over to the British governor. Read another way, this book examines how Black Power intensified the island's sociopolitical pressure to the point that the UBP was unwillingly forced to implement a host of cursory social reforms in an effort to maintain power. It is significant that it took the threat of political violence to force the UBP to make even the most *basic* changes in its socioeconomic policies toward Blacks. This included token constitutional amendments (such as renaming members of Colonial Parliament to ministers)[8] and surface social changes such as the renaming of schools, increased hiring of Blacks in areas of employment generally reserved for Whites, and the creation of new holidays (such as Bermuda Day).

Placed within the rubric of an extensive and long-term propaganda campaign launched by the FCO to discredit and destroy Black Power,

these reforms were part of an intense program of *social engineering* implemented by the White elite during the decline of the Black Power movement (1970s–80s) in order to quell further Black protest, particularly among the island's youth.

A major undercurrent of this project was the creation of an integrationist narrative of Black progress intended to convey the notion that the history of Blacks in Bermuda has been relatively devoid of political struggle because race relations in the island have always been good (this includes other hegemonic themes as well that are addressed later). These narratives were founded upon the idea that slavery in Bermuda was benign and Blacks were treated relatively well by Whites as opposed to Blacks in the wider Black Diaspora. Likewise, colonialism and White paternalism were responsible for the relative material affluence of Black Bermuda as opposed to Black struggle against oppression. Furthermore, after desegregation in the 1960s Blacks no longer had to struggle and as integration had brought Blacks into the "promised" land of social equity with Whites, the races continued to work together to craft Bermuda into a tranquil paradise acceptable for the tourism and international business industries.

Under the umbrella of integration, this social engineering project stimulated the growth of the Black (upper)middle class, which has served as a moderating influence on Black activism and self-sufficiency and as a buffer group between grassroots Blacks and the White elite.[9] Bermuda's education system would play a major role in this program by contributing to serious consequences in terms of Black identity, affecting the ways in which Blacks in Bermuda view themselves in relation to Africa, the wider West Indies and people of African descent across the world. This sociocultural counterintelligence initiative also led to a vacuum in the historical consciousness of the island about Black protest in the 1970s, so much to the extent that many Bermudians do not know that a Black Power Movement had even existed in the island.

Despite its intensity, the Black Power Movement in Bermuda has received scant attention in the historiographies of the Modern Caribbean, African Diaspora, and Black Power studies. Utilizing Bermudian, U.S., Canadian, and British archival sources, documents and interviews with former activists, this study inserts the experience of Black Power in Bermuda into the existing literature that has placed more emphasis on the Movement in larger West Indian countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, or Guyana.[10] As in Bermuda, the impact of Black Power in islands such as Dominica, British Honduras, and Antigua has not been fully appreciated. There is also room to examine overlaps with Black political activism in non-Anglophone countries such as Aruba, Curacao, Martinique, and Guadeloupe.

This work demonstrates the multifaceted relationships that existed between Black Power activists in Bermuda, the United States, and the wider Americas. It compliments a host of contemporary studies that call for (re)evaluations of the transnational dimensions of the Black Power.[11] The Movement drew from the ideological highways that connected the African Diaspora and global protest struggles; this allowed for cross-fertilization of ideas and the sharing of experiences between protest struggles. For example, Bermuda's media frequently reported on African liberation struggles and Black protest in the Caribbean and the United States. In addition, several Black Bermudians attended Universities in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom and were involved in the U.S. Civil Rights and Black Power Movements. This process encouraged Black activists to embrace more international identities as opposed to narrow perceptions of nationalism.[12]

It also raises key questions about the Movement in the West Indies that suggest a need for more scholarly projects to further explore the regional dimensions of the Movement in the area. For example, how and to what extent were advocates and organizations connected across the Caribbean? Furthermore, do such relationships suggest that Black Power could be defined as a singular, regional Movement (intellectually or otherwise) with various currents across the Caribbean as opposed to multiple Movements dispersed among various islands? In addition, what other connections existed between Black Power in the West Indies and the wider world? With the exception of Walters (1993), few monographs have attempted to contextualize the Movement within a global pan-African struggle.

Critics of Black Power fallaciously questioned the Movement's validity in the West Indies by stating that it was simply based on a U.S. experience where Blacks were a demographic minority. They claimed it was impractical in the Caribbean where Blacks were in a numerical majority, some countries were independent and oppressed peoples were not only those classified as Black. However, the Movement was greatly influenced by the region's radical tradition and revolutionary ideology. This would include the experiences of those such as C.L.R. James, Richard B. Moore, Claudia Jones, Ame Jacques, and Amy Ashwood Garvey, George Padmore, Paul Bogle, Garveyism, Claude McKay, Rastafari, Hubert Harrison, Sally Bassett, Nanny, Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, and the Haitian and Cuban Revolutions.[13]

Furthermore, the dynamics of neocolonialism and class oppression greatly marked the Movement in the West Indies, where Black Power represented discontent with an array of political, economic, and social contradictions that bound the region to former and new colonial masters. It questioned class and racial structures of the island's "pigmentocracries" and

simultaneously wrestled with the legacy of Eurocentric cultural boundaries in the Caribbean. Indeed, Rasta, Islam, *Babalawos*, Hebrew Israelites, Reggae, Afros, and dashikis were as visible as were the constraints of colonialism and unfulfilled promises of independence in the region.

In Bermuda, as in the wider region, Blacks could easily identify with the class, anti-imperialist, and anti-colonialist elements of Black Power. Such analyses were arguably more easily demonstrated in an undistinguishable British colony such as Bermuda than in the United States. In other words, African-American Black Power advocates had to argue that their communities were colonized within a larger U.S. context; in colonial Bermuda, no such debate was necessary. In fact, while in the United States critics of Black Power denied the existence of colonialism, in Bermuda colonialism was being cited as a necessity.

Obi Egbuna (leader of England's Black Panther Party) defined Black Power as "anti-exploitation, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist."[14] Walter Rodney—one of the Caribbean's most prolific Black Power theoreticians—also expressed this essential tenet of Black Power, and called for Black Power to challenge White power in majority Black and so-called independent countries if Blacks did not share in that power. For Rodney, Black Power in the Caribbean included breaking with imperialism; the claiming of power by Black masses; and the cultural reconstructing of these societies in the image of those masses. It was also to challenge White cultural imperialism and transform intellectuals into servants of the masses.[15]

Indeed, Bermuda's White oligarchy possessed a firm political and economic grip on the island's major industries and institutions, such as shipping, commerce, agriculture, and education, to the exclusion of Blacks. As such, Black Power was not a contradiction on the island. Furthermore, in Bermuda Black Power sought to establish connections with other liberation struggles in the African Diaspora. Its leaders were intent on eliminating the island's economic and political support of global imperialism; transforming the island's capitalist economic base to a socialist structure; and using armed struggle to achieve such aims if necessary.[16]

Hence, Black Power was not simply "anti-White." In fact, because Black Power raised concerns about the facilitative role of the Black elite in a system that oppressed Black people, this elite often elicited a similar response to Black Power as did Whites. Many of these elites were affiliated with the UBP, and often claimed that Black Power was "messing it up for everyone," and "destroying all the social progress that had been made." What they really expressed were fears that Black Power would upset their *individual* progress and precarious class position as compradors.

Black Power referred to Black self-determination. One fourteen-year-old Bermudian girl defined it as "the Black's control over his own destiny."

It also described the collective ability of Blacks to resist a racist system that had been imposed on them by White people through *White power*. This system had surrounded Black people with a set of environmental conditions that exploited and damaged Black labor and energy while stifling Black life.[17]

Steven Biko asserted that an intricate relationship exists between power and racism, defining racism as "discrimination by a group against another for the purposes of subjugation" and, as such, one could not be racist if one did not have the *power* to subjugate.[18] This is essential to understand Bermuda's situation where racism was, as in most European colonies, built into its colonial system *by default*. In oligarchic Bermuda racism was "legalized" in the sense that it rested upon a host of racially discriminatory laws that helped maintain the status quo and "legitimized" White power, while simultaneously deeming Black protest as illegal, offensive, and, hence, illegitimate. Thus, Black Power challenged the very basis of racism in Bermuda, namely the entire *system* or *White power structure* of colonialism, capitalism, and White supremacy. This was in contrast to previous reformist Black protest, which had often only addressed the manner in which White Bermudians *exercised* power, and not that power in and of itself.[19]

Whites in Bermuda were generally hostile to the Movement. Unlike in the United States, there was no White liberal Left that would support Black Power groups such as the Panthers. For most Blacks, Black Power represented freedom from White oppression. However, as White people had used power to abuse others for personal gain, they saw Black Power as a messenger of karma, and in it the possibility that Blacks would do to them as they had done to Blacks. To some degree, their negative and often ignorant perceptions of the Movement reflected their own guilt-ridden self-images. More historically conscious Whites probably recognized—as did the government—that Black Power truly posed a challenge to White privilege, which was based on Black oppression. Their attack on the Movement was also a refusal to part with the material and/or social wealth that they had accumulated over the centuries. The response of Whites to the Movement in the *Royal Gazette* (Bermuda's daily newspaper) oft times amounted to tirades bordering on fanatical paranoia, displaying a White population grossly ignorant of Black people, Bermuda, and Africa's history yet profoundly arrogant enough to believe that they actually knew what was best for Blacks in the island.

Bermuda's White elite, mainstream media, and the government have historically demonized and/or criminalized Black protest. Their response to Black Power was no different. The politically conscious youth who directed the Movement were labeled as "delinquent hooligans" and echoed

a refusal by the establishment to recognize the political essence of the island's Black youth.

This White elite actively sought to stifle communication between Blacks in Bermuda and those abroad. In the 1920s, the British governor of Bermuda attempted to suppress the *Negro World;* in the 1960s literature such as the Nation of Islam's *Muhammad Speaks* and Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* were banned. They also attempted to prevent West Indian "militants" and Black Power advocates, such as Kwame Toure and Rodney, from entering the island.

Black Power in the West Indies was seen as a threat to U.S., Canadian, and British interests (marked by NATO's military presence) in the region. The United States, as did Canada, maintained bases in Bermuda. Interested in the development of Black Power on the island and the wider Americas, these forces monitored the Movement via an extensive transnational network of intelligence. This dynamic of cooperation between colonial and neocolonial intelligence organizations needs to be further explored. The experiences of Black Power advocates in Bermuda draw attention to the geopolitical significance of the Movement in the eyes of their international observers.

The establishment denounced Black Power in Bermuda as an African-American phenomenon based on U.S. racial politics and hence inappropriate for Bermuda's social climate. However, as chapter 1 demonstrates, while Black Power clearly influenced the spread of the Movement from the United States into the wider Diaspora, it was also an extension of Bermuda's Black radical tradition. Black protest in Bermuda began in the era of enslavement, marked by revolts against the institution. In the aftermath of emancipation, Blacks sought to build independent communities. More specifically, the local Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), Bermuda's labor movement and early 1960s Black political activism helped create the context for Black Power. In 1959, a Theatre Boycott occurred during a major dockworker's strike and resulted in the desegregation of Bermuda's hotels and restaurants. Racial tensions flared in 1965 when predominantly Black strikers of the Bermuda Electric Light Company (BELCO) clashed with British Police. In 1968, British troops were flown in to suppress a major uprising led by politically motivated Black youth.

Chapter 2 focuses on Bermuda's most renowned Black Power activist, Pauulu Kamarakafego. Mentored by C.L.R. James, Kamarakafego was involved in the Pan-African Movement, and was also the primary organizer and chair of the 1969 First International Regional Black Power Conference (BPC), which was held in Bermuda. Kamarakafego and other organizers were politically harassed for these efforts.

Chapter 3 discusses how Bermuda's local White government attempted to disrupt the 1969 Conference. It was given extensive logistic support by British, U.S., and Canadian authorities that viewed the meeting as a threat to their interests and NATO security in the Americas. Such tactics included the passing of a Race Relations Bill to target Black protest; new immigration restrictions on travelers to Bermuda; the surveillance of Kamarakafego and his contacts across the Americas; and the stationing of British and Canadian troops in the island during the Conference.

Despite government hostility, the 1969 Conference critically impacted Black Power in Bermuda and the Caribbean region. Demonstrated in chapter 4, the meeting was attended by a cross-section of local Blacks and international activists such as Acklyn Lynch, Queen Mother Moore, C.L.R. James, and Yosef Ben-Jochannan. Relatively large numbers of local Black youth attended, including those who had been involved in the 1968 uprising.

Chapter 5 discusses the Cadre's formation in the aftermath of the BPC, and its aims, objectives, organizational structure, activities, and programs. It also details its influences and connections with other liberation movements, such as that of the Black Panther Party (United States). The Berets were intelligent, diverse, and passionate. Far from being "alienated youth," "spoiled brats," "terrorists," or "evil hate-mongers" (a sample of epitaphs erroneously used to describe them), their backgrounds included university and high school students, middle- and working-class Blacks and members of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) Youth Wing. While popular attention has focused on the Cadre's calls for armed struggle, its primary operations were educational and outreach programs, such as Liberation schools, rallies, public lectures, visits to local schools, antidrug programs, and publications such as the *Black Beret*.

As the Cadre developed into Bermuda's "vanguard of Black Power," it emphatically challenged Bermuda's oligarchic and colonial government. Chapter 6 reveals how FCO officials suppressed the Cadre in an effort to stifle Black Power's growth in Bermuda—in particular the public school system—and the wider Caribbean. The Berets were persecuted through heavy surveillance, infiltration, petty arrests, laws specifically targeting their activities and publications, and an extensive propaganda campaign.

In the summer of 1970, the Cadre burned the Union Jack to mark South Africa's Sharpeville Massacre and in protest of apartheid and colonialism. Chapter 7 details this critical moment for the Cadre, when key Berets were arrested and incarcerated on charges including a newly implemented "Offensive Behavior Bill." Bermuda's Black youth responded to these and other arrests through a string of uprisings and clashes with Bermuda's Police Force. While in prison, a new Cadre leadership emerged.

Chapter 8 is focused on the aforementioned 1972–73 assassinations and the trial of Burrows-Tacklyn. While overt Cadre activity had waned, colonial officials focused efforts on monitoring groups such as the Nation of Islam and the local Rastafari community. As stated, however, the FCO strongly believed that the Cadre was involved; key Berets escaped the island to avoid possible prosecution despite the FCO's lack of conclusive evidence.

1

Negroes Dressed in Insolence: Boycotts, Black Muslims, and Racial Uprisings

Throughout Bermuda's 400-year history, power in Bermuda has been tightly vested in the island's White elite. Through piracy, racketeering, and the enslavement of African people, these "Forty Thieves" generated an insurmountable quantity of eco-political power that allowed them to continue to dominate the island's Black majority well after the abolition of chattel slavery. A 1834 Voting Act was one of the most crippling methods employed by Whites to maintain political control of the island well into the twentieth century. It was based on a dramatic increase of already rigid property qualifications for participation in civil matters such as voting, serving on juries, and standing for elections.[1]

This power was manifested through a rigid system of racial segregation. Blacks could not rent or own properties in areas reserved for Whites and were excluded from cinemas, golf courses, and any clubs or functions frequented by Whites. Racially segregated sports leagues were also maintained.[2] Blacks could not work on Front Street. Bermuda's tourist industry was developed on the predicate that wealthy White North Americans would not come to Bermuda if the island was not segregated. Blacks were also not allowed to work in the Post Office, on the grounds that Whites would be offended at the site of Blacks "licking postage stamps." The 1930 Hotel-Keepers Protection Act allowed hotel, restaurant, and guesthouse owners to refuse persons on their premises on any grounds. This enforced a policy of racial discrimination that excluded "many Jews, most Asiatics and all Negroes."[3]

Segregation cut across class lines. In 1953, Guyanese legislator Sir Edwin McDavid, CMG, CBE, was refused accommodations while on his way to London to be knighted by the Queen of England.[4] When a representative

of the British Overseas Airline Carrier questioned Bermuda's Tourism Development Board about these policies, he was told that his airline carried Mau-Maus and that if they "liked to run flying 'cattle ships' with niggers on them then it was purely [their] concern." Even the likes of Eric Williams and Grantley Adams were refused accommodations in White hotels.[5]

Blacks responded to segregation by developing self-sustaining communities. This was the case in the Tucker's Town area, where Blacks lived as primarily farmers and fisherman. However, in 1920 the government forcibly removed Blacks from this area to construct a tourist resort.

Independent mutual aid institutions—such as churches, friendly societies, schools, and lodges became the backbones of these communities. For example, in 1920 Agnes May Robinson formed the Sunshine League for the "social, moral and spiritual uplift of the [black] community." Its first task was to "rehabilitate the number of illiterate, unkempt lads of no fixed abode who frequented the docks in Hamilton often sleeping on the bales of hay and bags of feed found under the sheds at that time."[6] Poverty had led several young blacks to live among packing crates along the docks of Front Street. Living amongst vermin, these boys were known as "wharf rats." They survived off the scraps that they could beg from people coming off ships[7] and "entertained arriving and departing visitors by diving into the water to recover coins thrown in by them."[8]

The League faced pressing concerns. For example, the 1919 report of the Registrar General placed the infantile death rate (under twelve months) per hundred living births at 20.5 for "Coloreds" and 6.1 for Whites.[9] In 1923, Andrew Balfour, a foreign consultant, completed a *Report on Medical and Sanitary Matters in Bermuda*. His finds concluded that the high death rate of black children was due to the existence of "unhygienic surroundings" and that Bermuda was "systematically putting its future labor force underground."[10]

This was especially true in Pembroke parish, the most densely populated area of Bermuda. Musson fittingly labeled this area the "Great Black Belt," due to its large mass of Black residents.[11] In 1921, approximately 39 percent of black people lived in Pembroke (4,833 out of 13,121).[12] This area was surrounded by the Pembroke marsh that spanned about 94.3 acres and swarmed with mosquitoes. To make matters worse, Hamilton's sewage system dumped all its waste behind Pembroke Church. Two infectious wells with drinking water were found in the parish and, in fact, the drinking of such water was the cause of many deaths. Some of these were due to stomach and intestinal inflammations such as enteritis and gastroenteritis. Schoolchildren "suffered from enlarged tonsils, bad teeth, adenoid growths, verminous infestations and growth defects (Balfour 40)." The only health facilities available to the Black community were those

provided by the League. Indeed, Pembroke's poorhouse had "inadequate ventilation" and was swarmed with rats and roaches. It functioned as a "hospital for the aged and infirm." Inmates were verminous, diagnosed with scabies, and bedridden. The floors "were in bad condition and soaked with the urine of patients."[13]

In 1920, the Pembroke Parish Board of Health prepared the Public Health Act, which stated that "infected people could not enter any public place," including taking ferryboats. Those infected with various diseases were to be reported in the local daily, the *Royal Gazette* and *Daily Colonist*.[14] This Act would have surely restrained the movement of impoverished Blacks into Hamilton.

Also in 1920, a racially motivated "riot" broke out at the St. George's army barracks between the Black Bermuda Militia Artillery (BMA)—fresh from service in World War I—and the British Guard. The *Gazette* stated that "a spirit of unrest had taken possession" of members of the BMA when one of their "comrades had been arrested." While trying to break him out, they were arrested. One of these men escaped arrest, and along with others reportedly "attacked the Guard with rifles and fixed bayonets." The Guard fired upon them, killing one and seriously wounding two others. A coroner's jury found that the attack by the BMA was unlawful and that the Guard was justifiable in firing upon them.[15] British Governor Willcocks took "all military measures" to ensure that the ringleaders were "very severely punished" as "richly" deserved. He also felt that there would be no further trouble, since the Corps was "glad to have its ranks purged of some very undesirable persons."[16]

Interesting to note, the Bermuda Division of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was also formed in the same year. It thrived under the leadership of Antiguan Reverends Hilton Tobitt and E.B. Grant and Barbadian George Morris, who had all married into Bermudian families. Blacks were logically drawn to Garvey's calls for self-determination and the UNIA found life in the organizational structures of Bermuda's churches and friendly societies.

As a maritime community, Blacks were interested in and joined the UNIA's shipping company, the Black Star Line. In addition, Whites involved in farming also controlled the shipping industry. This enabled them to quickly ship their own goods off the island, while forcing the produce of Black farmers to remain in Customs House or on the wharf, until they nearly rotted. The Black Star Line was seen as a practical solution to this problem.[17]

The Bermuda Division organized parades, lectures, rallies, and marches and flourished through its Juvenile divisions, African Legions, Black Cross Nurses, and Silver Cross Band. It helped spark a cultural "Black

Renaissance" in the island. Several Black businesses and cultural institutions were offshoots of the Movement, as was the stalwart newspaper *Bermuda Recorder* (formed by A.B. Place and other Garveyites). Despite attacks on the UNIA—which included the government's refusal to let Garvey enter the island on at least four occasions, the suppression of the *Negro World*, and political attacks on its leaders—the energy that it stimulated segued into the 1940s labor movement, which was championed by Dr. E.F. Gordon.[18]

Blacks also challenged segregation through unsuccessful appeals to the Bermuda and British governments. In fact, a 1953 Select Committee on Racial Relations found segregation to be an economic and social necessity. The Committee decided that Black doctors should continue to be prohibited from practicing in the King Edward hospital; Black nurses would be given separate living facilities from Whites; the hiring of Blacks in civil service positions should be kept to a minimum; the segregated tennis stadium should remain as such, with separate facilities to be built for Blacks; employers would not be forced to hire employees not of their choice; schools would remain segregated; and Blacks would be placed on the Executive Councils and legislative boards only upon "proper training and education."[19]

However, in 1959, a major Theatre Boycott of the Island Theatre (a wide Bermuda chain of theatres) forced the desegregation of Bermuda's hotels and restaurants. Central to the island's social activities, the theatre was a microcosm of Bermudian society. Seating was assigned along racial lines. Blacks had to "sit very close to the screen" or high up in a balcony, which was called "Niggers' Heaven." Blacks were also not allowed in the theatre if the spots allotted for them were full even if there was available space in the White section.[20]

An anonymous group of young Blacks, the "Progressive Group," organized the Boycott. Mostly students who had recently returned from university, they secretly circulated a letter throughout the community urging a boycott of all of the island's theatres on July 15, 1959.[21] Blacks emphatically responded to this call. Three days into the Boycott Kingsley Tweed and Richard Lynch addressed the crowds, stating that Blacks spent about £3,500 a week in the theatres and with that much money could have "bought their own theater within six months."[22]

A year before the event, the Progressive Group had covertly released a document entitled "An Analysis of Bermuda's Social Problems" that discussed issues such as race prejudice, discrimination, and limited franchise." To their surprise, Tweed read the document from an "ingeniously rigged public address system" set up by other boycotters. Others also spoke; one stated that he was one of the thousands of young folk who were "angry and

fed up with a dehumanizing system" that regulated them to "second-class citizenship" because they were Black.[23]

Tweed had been a founder of the Bermuda Workers Association. He had also formed his own covert organization (the "Brotherhood") and was subsequently self-exiled to England because of threats to his life. Colonial authorities monitored his activities in Bermuda and noted that he was an anticolonialist, reportedly socialist, and maintained contact with leftists such as Claudia Jones.[24]

In approximately two weeks of boycotting, hotels, restaurants, theatres, and cinemas changed their segregationist policies.[25] This decision was surely encouraged by a major dock strike simultaneously taking place. In fact, the strike led to the calling of the Riot Act, the first time in Bermuda's history. The majority White Police Force was brought out to subdue the strikers. This was a prelude to the clashes that would occur between Blacks and the Police Force throughout the following decades.[26]

Responses about the Boycott through the daily newspapers reveal much about the island's racial atmosphere. Led by head journalist Ira Philip, the *Recorder* staunchly supported the Boycott and published statements made by the Progressive Group.[27] In contrast, the *Gazette* was an outlet for Whites to denounce the Boycott. For example, one Sydney Clemens stated that he knew of no place in the British Empire where Blacks were as prosperous as they were in Bermuda and saw no need for the boycott. This was the typical White view at the time. One letter to the editor called on the Progressive Group to "exercise some degree of civilized culture and patience."[28]

Marc Greene, a White American journalist, questioned whether Blacks were "behaved enough" to mingle "freely" with Whites: "…the majority of coloured people [in Bermuda], the younger ones for the most part are the worst-behaved, the most impudent, familiar, disrespectful and generally obnoxious I have encountered in any part of the world. To admit them to full social parity…is the worst mistake you in Bermuda have made since you admitted motorized vehicles."

Greene expressed surprise at the hotels and restaurants for admitting Blacks to their establishments, asking whether Bermudian Whites were scared of Blacks:

> Are you not aware that this business of permitting coloured people in every hotel will be noticed in every newspaper in the American South and not improbably commented upon editorially? Are you not also aware that there are hundreds of people in the Southern States who will not even enter a room in which there is a person of any shade of African hue unless he is

> there as a servant?…no Southerner will come here and spend one hour in any of your hotels, or restaurants either, if he finds he has to mingle therein with Negroes, half-castes, quarter-castes or any other.[29]

In response, local Blacks suggested that he "mind his own business" and either keep his "big mouth shut or get out."[30] Walter Robinson stated: "I am personally not in the least worried about the feelings of any American, be he tourist or anybody else. I was born here, in these islands, and so far as I am concerned my civil rights come first." The words of another teenager are quite poignant, "Negroes are tired of being pushed around. You people should realize that you are dealing with a different generation."[31]

The Boycott reflected tactics used in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, which Blacks in Bermuda were well aware of. For example, Wilfred Mose Allen, an organizer of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), attracted people to political lectures by playing speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. As did some in the Progressive Group, many Blacks attended U.S. schools.[32]

The *Recorder* extensively covered and supported the Movement, perhaps best revealed by its detailed coverage of the 1963 March on Washington and those such as A. Philip Randolph, Roy Wilkins, Bayard Rustin, and James Farmer.[33] It saw the March as "perhaps the biggest thing that Negroes in America had ever done," with "more than twice [Bermuda's] population…parading through the streets singing." It asserted that it was about economic empowerment, fighting for one's rights and obtaining freedom and morality." In addition, some eighty-odd Bermudians attended the March. It reminded one Sinclair Blakeney of Bermuda's Cup Match.[34]

In the aftermath of the March, the *Recorder* continued to discuss Civil Rights leaders and organizations such as the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Congress on Racial Equality, and John Lewis and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.[35] It felt that King possessed a "magnetic personality" and printed an extensive excerpt from his "I Have a Dream Speech." King was extensively highlighted, in addition to topics such as desegregation in the South, the Birmingham church bombing in Alabama, prior Marches on Washington, and a letter about the March written by the High Commissioner of the UNIA, Canada Division.[36]

Within a few weeks, the Boycott accomplished what years of parliamentary procedures, White papers, and committees had failed to do. The Boycott was bigger than the issue of theatre seats; it was an assault on the cultural fabric of Bermuda that deemed Whites as physically superior to Blacks. Along with the labor strike, it demonstrated that Bermuda's Black masses had the potential power to orchestrate change beyond the halls of

Table 1.1 Number of resident Blacks and Whites in Bermuda, 1834–1970.

Year	*Total resident population*	*Blacks*	*Whites*	*Portuguese*	*Chinese*	*Percent Black*
1834	8,857	4,678	4,181	N/A	N/A	53
1901	17,535	11,152	6,383	N/A	N/A	64
1921	20,127	13,121	7,006	N/A	N/A	65
1939	30,814	19,318	8,859	2622	15	63
1950	37,403	22,638	14,765	N/A		61
1960	42,640	26,863	15,957	N/A		63
1970	52,330	30,897	21,375	N/A		59

Source: Adapted from Bermuda government, *Bermuda Blue Book*, 1834; Bermuda government, *Bermuda Census*, 1901–1970; Bermuda Ministry of Finance, *Bermuda Digest of Statistics 1996*, 3–4.

Parliament. It is significant that these nonviolent Black youth were criminalized via the same pattern in which Black Power advocates would be. It also marked the government's transition from a policy that claimed that segregation was a necessity to maintain tourism to one that boasted of a commitment to integration. However, official desegregation could not completely eradicate racism; segregation was a symptom of racism, not the cause itself. *White power merely shifted shape to maintain itself*. Numbers of Blacks would perceptively argue that integration without power among Blacks could not solve the core problems of the Black community.

Many Blacks remained disenfranchised. Bermuda's voting boundaries had not been altered since the seventeenth century.[37] In 1946, registered voters had comprised only 7 percent of Bermuda's adult population, representing only those who owned land assessed at $144 USD. When even Whites complained about disenfranchisement they were told that the land requirement was necessary to keep political power among Whites. In 1949, Bermuda's population consisted of approximately 36,770 persons. This included 13, 310 Whites and 23, 460 Blacks. However, Bermuda's electorate consisted of 2,290 *Whites* and 1,920 *Blacks*. So despite representing about two-third of Bermuda's population, Blacks were still outnumbered at the polls.[38]

As table 1.1 shows, in 1960, there were 26,863 Blacks on the island—representing 61 percent of the population—while Whites numbered 15,957. Only individuals above twenty-five years of age who owned property accessed at more than £60 pounds were allowed to vote and, until 1966, only males who met the aforementioned requirements could serve as jurors. Land assessors were all White, and they often devalued Black-owned property below the voting requirements while often inflating the value of White-owned land. As individuals gained a vote for every constituency in which they owned land, Senior Magistrate L.M. Minty remarked

that he knew of a White male who owned land across all nine parishes and obtained thirty-six votes. After having registered his wife and five adult children as property coowners, his family collectively held 216 votes.[39]

In 1960, in response to such injustices, a young Roosevelt Browne Kamarakafego helped organize the Committee for Universal Adult Suffrage (CUAS). CUAS held island-wide public meetings and circulated a petition in favor of universal suffrage. The British governor rejected these calls.[40]

Kamarakafego also challenged Bermuda's status as a British colony. In 1961, he took Bermuda's case for independence before the United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four. Following this attempt, in 1963, Walton Brown and Barbara Ball both addressed the UN Subcommittee on Colonialism about the plight of Blacks on the island. However, the British government quickly dismissed the claims to grant self-determination to Bermuda.[41]

In 1963, the PLP was formed. From its inception, it was viewed as the party of the Black working class. As part of its political platform, it consistently advocated national independence and the revision of voting acts and districts. In response, in 1964 the "Forty Thieves" formed the United Bermuda Party (UBP) to protect the interests of the White elite.[42] The UBP found it pertinent to place middle-class Blacks within its ranks to create an image of racial inclusiveness (such as E.T. Richards and Lancelot Swan, and in later years, John Swan and Pamela Gordon). Through various dubious means, such as the Party's close ties with the British government, Bermuda's corrupt voting system, biased support of the Party through the media, insufficient support for the PLP by Blacks, and the UBP's economic prowess (often utilized to intimidate Black dissidents and buy Black support), the UBP would not lose a political election until 1998.

By 1963, Bermuda's government had passed a series of controversial Acts that reflected its concern with growing racial tensions throughout the island. These included the Parliamentary, Prohibited Publications, Emergency Powers, and Public Order Acts. The Parliamentary Act stated that any persons over the age of twenty-five could vote, but if they met landownership requirements then they would be given an extra vote. This limited the voting potential of PLP supporters, for Blacks aged eighteen–twenty-five were highly likely to vote for the Party. The Prohibited Publications Act allowed the governor to ban any publication that he deemed "undesirable," while the Emergency Powers Act invested in him practically absolute legislative power if he declared a State of Emergency. The Public Order Act required that persons had to obtain legal permission for any public demonstrations or gatherings.[43]

The last three acts were utilized by Bermuda's British Governor Martonmere (Roland Robinson) to restrain the growth of Black activism.

For example, in July 1965 he used the Prohibited Publications Act to ban the Nation of Islam's (NOI) newspaper, *Muhammad Speaks*, on the grounds that it was "calculated to incite racial hatred," that it undesirably "advocated racial segregation," and since it was widely circulated among "young and impressionable people… [they were] adversely influenced by it." The police were ordered to seize all copies of the paper.[44]

Martonmere had been concerned about the increased circulation of the paper (since May 1965, some twelve thousand copies had been imported and sold in the island, initially by Ramadin Matthews) and the Black Muslims (NOI) in general. Along with the Intelligence Committee (comprising Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO], Police and Special Branch officials), he felt that there was a danger in the effect that "the doctrine of black supremacy and non-cooperation with the white community" could have on "less-responsible coloured Bermudians." Though he had discussed banning the paper with Bermuda's Executive Council, the governor stated:

> I would have preferred the coloured leaders to condemn the literature themselves in the hope that this would be more effective than an official ban. With this object I called a meeting of all the coloured members of the House of Assembly yesterday.… Despite the fact that the members were unanimous that the Black Muslims' doctrines were harmful, none of them was prepared to speak against them. They said that though much of the propaganda was trash some of it stuck a sympathetic chord in every coloured person's heart, and if the Black Muslims had any success here the only reason would be that they appealed to a sense of grievance felt by all coloured persons who had suffered the present white oligarchy for too long. *I consider that the Black Muslims are a danger to the peace and harmony of this colony and their activities will have to be carefully watched.* (Emphasis added)[45]

In actuality, British authorities had placed the Black Muslim Movement under surveillance since 1960, when a F.R. Rollocks sold copies of a pamphlet entitled "The Negro: Man or Myth" from his book store. Also, in 1961 Black Moslem Earl Wilson had brought copies of the record "White Man's Paradise—Black Man's Hell" to the island, which was frequently played at CUAS meetings. The record was produced by Muhammed's Temple No. 11–35, Boston.

In August 1963, a report for the Bermuda Police's Special Branch concluded: "The Black Moslems are not properly organized or financed, but that they should be considered a potential security threat insofar as they contain among their members a high proportion of hardened criminals, dealers in narcotics and possible saboteurs, all who are motivated by racial

hatred." Special Branch further stated that if the group continued to grow, then it would attempt to penetrate it.

At the time, the Black Muslims contained between 100 and 200 members. They were also connected with various labor organizations, such as the Bermuda Industrial Union (BIU) and Bermuda United Worker's Party (BUWP). They also maintained close communication with the NOI in the United States.

The Report contained biographies of ten Black Muslim members, which also included Matthews, Wilfred Allen, David Robinson, and the late Kenneth Ebbin. Matthews was imprisoned in the United States for illegal entry and there were concerns that his deportation back to Bermuda would cause disturbances. He had ten convictions in Bermuda, ranging from "offensive behavior" to stealing to unlawful possession of a firearm.

The Report claimed that, in 1962, a few members had discussed using incendiary devices and bombs on private property, while another had instructed others on the use of such weapons. Special Branch thus believed that the Moslems were connected with other bombings and shootings that had occurred on the island. For example, during a November 1962 BIU strike against the Bermuda Aviation Service (BAS), the BAS office was bombed and considerably damaged. In the spring of 1963, five or six shots were fired at the home of a German hotel manager who had a "reputation for disliking Black people" and being over-strict with his staff; the next month his house was dynamite bombed. Members had also been convicted for marijuana use.[46]

For its part, however, the Black Muslims created a number of self-sufficient institutions. This included laundromats, bakeries, mosques, and stores, as opposed to "criminal activities." Their activities would ebb and flow into the 1970s.

In 1965, Bermuda experienced its first major uprising of the decade, known as the BELCO riots. This so-called riot possessed serious racial undertones. On January 19, 1965, over eighty workers went on strike to protest BELCO's refusal to allow the BIU to represent its workers. Strikers were also concerned with BELCO'S racist policies, such as the hiring of Blacks only as laborers and not mechanics or operators.[47] The Black community supported the strike; other sectors of labor joined and children also "skipped" school to witness it.[48]

The Police Force eventually attacked the strikers on the grounds that the latter were obstructing employees from attending work. According to some, it was the Police who rioted. The riot squad fired tear gas on the crowd, who armed themselves. A long and arduous fight ensued and several were injured, including a number of officers. A White union leader and also Judo practitioner, Dr. Barbara Ball, apparently injured a few

officers. The majority of those affected by tear gas were women and children who were serving food or merely observing the clashes. Strikers were arrested and convicted for breaking the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act, 1946, which stated that it was unlawful to picket in manners deemed to be intimidating. Later that evening, the British governor called out the Bermuda Militia and Rifle squad to support the police.[49]

The strike was eventually settled on February 18. It exuberated preexisting tensions that existed between Blacks and the Bermuda Police. In actuality, this Force was only "Bermudian" in name, for it consisted mostly of British officers who had served in other colonial territories such as Palestine, Cyprus, South Africa, and Rhodesia.[50]

In 1966, a Bermuda Constitutional Conference reaffirmed Bermuda's colonial status. At the time, Bermuda's Constitution remained the same as those of Britain's original American colonies. The new Constitution differed little, and stipulated that the queen of England would continue to appoint a governor to Bermuda on the "advice" of British ministers. This governor controlled the island's Executive Government and was responsible for Bermuda's external affairs, defense, and internal security; hence, he was the head of the Bermuda Regiment and Police Force. Though Bermuda's legislation allowed the local government to create its own laws, the governor could veto any laws at his discretion. He also appointed the chief justice, the Public Service Commission, and the chief of police, and was allowed to utilize government funds for purposes unauthorized by Bermuda's Parliament.[51]

The PLP opposed the resolutions of the Conference, and primarily those decisions that affected the island's colonial status and electoral processes. It rejected the creation of constitutional boundaries that would continue to "almost certainly lead to the election of a House of Assembly not representative of the electorate"; in other words, increasing White voting power while decreasing that of Blacks. For example, the three largest parishes (Pembroke, Sandy's, and Devonshire) contained 23,672 persons out of 42,640 and sent 18 members to Parliament, while the other 6 parishes contained 18,868 persons and sent 24 members to Parliament. Furthermore, in 1960, Pembroke contained 33 percent of Bermuda's population. As the most densely populated working-class and Black parish, Pembroke contained constituencies that averaged 3,534 inhabitants. Meanwhile, the predominantly wealthy and White parish of Smith contained two constituencies of 1,151 inhabitants each yet had the same voting power as Pembroke. The PLP also rejected the amendment that allowed those without Bermuda status to vote in the island after only three years of residency. With these factors in mind, PLP delegates Lois Browne-Evans, Walter Robinson, and Dorothy Thompson refused to sign the report.[52]

In January 1967, the PLP announced its political platform, calling for: compulsory government hospital insurance; full employment and effective training programs for Bermudian workers; an end to "the present retrogressive system of taxation"; a low-cost housing program allowing all Bermudians to have decent homes; a fully integrated education system; economic equality for businesses through the creation of antimonopoly laws; government boards to reflect Bermuda's demographics; full political independence; the establishment of an Arts Council and Fund to help develop local creative arts; and a system of socialized medicine and free medical health scheme. Despite these aims, the UBP claimed that the PLP had "nothing to offer" the people of Bermuda.

In response, the PLP stated that it recognized that the "present power structure" and the UBP were "one and the same" and UBP leaders "sought the enlargement of their own economic empire and personal fortune to the detriment of the Bermuda working man." The government collected import duties primarily to benefit the "merchants of Front Street." Despite the UBP's verbal praise of human liberty and "free enterprise," its Parliamentary Acts economically suppressed those who were not a part of the Forty Thieves or their "Uncle Tom allies." Hence, the average Bermudian was still enslaved, for

> a man who is hungry because the Government has failed to create enough jobs or set up unemployment insurance, or who cannot educate his children for their future happiness because the Government has not provided satisfactory schools, or who is labouring under heavy mortgages because the Government has not seen to it that he is receiving a proper wage which he can spend on…fairly-priced necessities of life and low cost housing rents—such a man is not fully free. (*Recorder*, January 27, 1967)

The Party felt that the "pirate-ancestored aristocrats" of the UBP maintained a "vile attitude of segregation" in schools, golf courses, tennis courts, and jobs, while advancing the "selfish interests of their outrageous oligarchy." It also denounced the UBP's opposition to the creation of labor unions. It further remarked: "Let this little bank of narrow egoists who have the nerve and the insolence to say publicly that they represent Bermuda take note now that we of the [PLP] are going to expose before all Bermuda and the world…the scandalous manner in which they have run this island's economy for their own personal benefit."

The PLP appealed to Black working-class Bermudians for support. It promised to better Bermuda through social legislation led by representatives of the working class, integration, and social progress to give "economic power to the people of Bermuda."[53] These proposals had a strong

socialist element and the UBP and White media quickly labeled the Party as Communist.

In March 1967, nearly a month later, the emperor of Ethiopia, His Imperial Majesty Haile Sellassie I, visited Bermuda. His first trip to the island had been in 1963, a few days after his return from the United Nations, where he gave the prolific speech that would be internationally popularized by the late Robert Nestor Marley in his song, *War*: "That until the philosophy which holds one race superior and another inferior is finally and permanently discredited and abandoned…[t]here will be war…." Sellassie had initially spoken these words at the convening of the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). At the United Nations he spoke about the problems of racial discrimination and colonialism. Is it not then ironic, that when he disembarked in the *colony* of Bermuda he was greeted by Bermuda's two local regiments—the all-White Rifles and the all-Black Bermuda Militia Artillery? Bermuda's military forces would remain segregated until the 1965 formation of the Bermuda Regiment.[54]

It is also paradoxical that the Conquering Lion was welcomed by British Governor Julian Gascoigne while simultaneously greeted by large Black crowds expressing affinity toward the emperor. As Ethiopia was a long-hailed symbol of African sovereignty, these visits occurred in the midst of a political situation which, according to Austin Thomas, was the result of "a vicious, diabolical, political machine operated and serviced by a skillful team of bigots for over three hundred years."[55] Perhaps the height of this bigotry was that the governor—a clear representative of European imperialism—could treat Sellassie as a guest at his mansion while local Blacks suffered from the oppression that the emperor himself denounced.

This "diabolic" dynamic would also inform the PLP's complex relationship with Black Power. On the surface, some of the Party's ideals (such as its stance on independence) seemed to reflect those of the Movement. In addition, a number of PLP leaders, such as Kamarakafego, Arthur Hodgson, and Freddy Wade, were actively involved in the Movement. However, others did not openly support Black Power for varying reasons, one being its confrontational nature of protest. Nevertheless, neither did they publically condemn the Movement. They were well aware of the potential the Movement possessed and that to not empathize with it was to reject Bermuda's Black youth. For example, future leader of the Party, Lois Browne-Evans, initially felt that Bermuda did not need Black Power, because Blacks, in contrast to African-Americans, were in a majority.[56] She eventually became a staunch supporter of the Movement.

In May 1967, the PLP selected African-American economist Benjamin Wright to be the keynote speaker at its annual conference. A former advisor to the U.S. State Department, Wright was a Professor of Urban

Affairs at New York University. He was also the Planning Committee Chairman for the 1967 and 1968 Black Power Conferences held in Newark and Philadelphia, respectively. Wright, "a conservative Republican," and Harvard graduate, was hailed by Bermuda's media as the "nation's leading Black Power theoretician."[57] During his address about Black Power, Wright asked Whites to leave the meeting. He then stated that "if they loved colored people, permit us to talk intimately among ourselves about problems which only we had experienced," as Blacks could "only be empowered by Blacks."[58]

For this action, Wright and the PLP were rebuked in the media. The recently established Bermuda Democratic Party (BDP) and the UBP condemned the Conference and its "Black Power" procedures. BDP chairperson Charles Mayne called it a "heinous" act, stating, "Let us together reject those doctrines that are foreign to Bermuda. Let us together reject the people responsible for bringing them here. Let us reject this thing called Black power and if there is a thing called White power let us reject that too." Mayne claimed that the PLP had "imported" Black Power into Bermuda to "divide the country racially" and was "prepared to lie and cheat the people of Bermuda" so that it could force on them a government that would in the end "enslave" them.

The UBP echoed this sentiment, and claimed opposition to Black Power, which would "set neighbor against neighbor." The Party deplored "this practice of foreign countries being invited to [Bermuda] by the PLP apparently for the express purpose of dividing the community on racial lines.... We are confident that Bermudians who are concerned about their country can be relied upon to condemn this kind of racial segregation."[59] These statements are somewhat humorous—Bermuda was already racially divided and, as a colony, influenced by a foreign country.

In response, Eva Hodgson remarked that Black Bermudians would not get as excited by Wright's request as Whites did, because they had been "brought up on a 'White power' policy which regulated them from 'public places and events' all of their lives." In contrast, this had never happened to Whites before. Furthermore, if Blacks had never been told to leave White establishments, it was because they had never been allowed in.[60]

Months later, seven PLP leaders attended the National Conference on Black Power held in Newark. Delegates included Robinson, Allen and Elvina Warner, and were joined by a BIU representative, Reid Simmons.[61] Browne-Evans declined to go, because she felt that associating with the Movement would "set the Party back." Concerned about how the ideal of Black consciousness would affect the PLP's few White supporters, she attempted to dissuade the other members from going, stating, "We mustn't go to New Jersey.... We're just about reeling away from the communist

label. Now we're going for this American ideal: 'We're all Black and we want power.' "[62]

Undaunted, the delegates still attended what the media claimed was the "largest and most varied assemblage of civil rights leaders" ever. Two hundred and eighty-six Black organizations from across the United States, Bermuda, and Nigeria were represented. The chairperson was Rev. Nathan Wright, Benjamin Wright's brother; in 1966 Nathan Wright had spoken at an African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) Conference in the island.[63]

In the aftermath of the Conference, racial uprisings broke out in New Jersey. Twenty-five persons were killed and nearly one thousand injured. Similar incidents were occurring across the United States and were precursors to forthcoming events in Bermuda itself. Upon returning to Bermuda, the PLP group was questioned about their involvements in the Conference.[64]

The Black Power Manifesto was the only resolution officially passed by the New Jersey Conference. It called for the creation of an International Black Congress that would reflect the "new sense of power and revolution blossoming" throughout the Black world. This would include the convening of regional Black Power Conferences in America and the Black Diaspora.[65] This proclamation helped lead to the 1969 Conference in Bermuda.

Governor Martonmere was concerned that the PLP's "flirtations" with Black Power would include invitations to other Black Power leaders, such as Stokely Carmicheal and Adam Clayton Powell to visit Bermuda. As such, he recommended that these men, in addition to Nathan Wright, be placed on Bermuda's stop list as "undesirable immigrants." Carmichael was already banned from entering the United Kingdom.[66]

On Thursday, April 25, three seemingly unrelated events took place in Bermuda: the annual Floral Pageant, typically a parade for tourists that attracted residents; the Fair for All, which took place at the Hamilton Hall to raise funds for children with disabilities; and a PLP meeting held in preparation of the upcoming Parliamentary elections. The Pageant and the Fair both attracted crowds to Front Street. After a White police officer refused to allow a crowd of Black youths to enter the Fair—on the grounds that it was full—he allowed a White couple with children to enter. When questioned about this, the officer told the crowd to move along. When they refused to do so a brief fight with the police broke out.[67]

Shortly afterward, a Kitchener Galloway was allowed entry by a Black officer. Nevertheless, a White ex-policeman Butterworth shouted at him to leave. When Galloway refused, Butterworth took hold of him. Galloway swore at the officer, who then punched him in the face. Along with another youth, he was arrested. An outraged crowd comprising mostly Black youth aged between seventeen and twenty-five surged toward the

police station. They banged on its windows and threw Molotov cocktails at the building. Riot squads forced them away from the affluent Front Street area and pushed the crowd into the most impoverished and Black-owned sections of Hamilton—the Court and Union Street areas (Back-a-Town). Utilizing "hit-and-run tactics" and Molotov cocktails, these youth (perhaps numbering between hundred and three hundred persons) clashed with Bermuda's riot squad until the early hours of the next morning. Utilizing dogs, riot shields, steel-helmets, and three-foot-long truncheons, it used at least ninety-four shells and five grenades of tear gas on the crowds. Seventeen youth were arrested and the police sustained five injuries.[68]

Incidents continued the next day, fueled by further police aggression. Officers roved through the Court Street area, supposedly searching homes for "riot" suspects. Later that evening, police fired tear gas on a crowd of youth that had congregated on Court Street—as they would usually do on a Friday night. According to these youth, this directly instigated further rebellion, and incidents of "window smashing, extensive arson and personal violence" rapidly spread across Hamilton.[69]

Contrasting the previous night the youth matched police attacks with coordinated action, using arson as their weapon of choice. They placed large boulders and barricades across Court, King, and Brunswick Streets, blocking off "Back-a-Town" from large police vehicles.[70] Several establishments throughout the city, including the City Hall and the Roman Catholic Church rectory, were attacked. Blazes broke out in rapid succession and the Motoblock, Cooper's Warehouse, Ideal Furniture, and Court Street Variety stores were hit the worst. A car was also set on fire and firefighters reportedly attacked.[71]

Martonmere declared a State of Emergency, and police were instructed to arrest anyone in the city during these hours without imposing a 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew. The Regiment was embodied but Martonmere requested the assistance of British troops, prompting the arrival of a British frigate and a company of 180 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers from Britain.[72] A. Hodgson, PLP deputy chairman, blasted Martonmere as a violent "racist white supremacist," and the Fusiliers as an army "of occupation" brought in to "intimidate the people."[73]

The next day crowds of Black youth gathered in the Back-a-Town area without incident. However, during the evening, further arson attempts occurred outside of the city; explosives were set at the Warwick bowling alley and, in Devonshire, the homes of police officers were attacked by arson. By the next day, things had quietened down.[74]

This uprising was a direct response to racism. Only White-owned establishments in Hamilton were attacked, with damages assessed at £412,150.

This is telling, for the police had attempted to keep the fighting centered in the Black-owned area of the city. All ten civilians injured were White. This included a member of the House of Assembly and John Hasting, one of the organizers of the fair, who was apparently beaten "within inches of death." One officer was hit by a piece of galvanized iron pipe thrown into his car and sustained a laceration while another required stitches after being hit by a bottle.

There were a few recorded occurrences of injuries sustained by the youth: the male who was punched at the fair; another was beaten in the police station after being arrested, receiving severe head injuries; and one Eugene Samuels was bitten by a police dog while in custody at the police station.[75]

The White media castigated these youth as instigators and the police as hapless victims. For example, the *Gazette* printed a front-page shot of the riot squad, discussing how these "steel-helmeted riot police braved a barrage of blazing Molotov cocktails and flying bottles" in order to "cordon off a gang of almost 300 rioters." It claimed that the fights occurred as youth ran at the police, who the latter then felled with their truncheons. One youth was alleged to have said, "This is only half of the action right here. Wait until a couple of months." The *Gazette* also falsely stated that tear gas had not been used.[76]

The paper described the uprising as "the worst civil disturbances in the Colony's history." The "hostile mobs" had clearly acted under the "orders of a mastermind" as they were "skillfully able to keep the police officers off balance." It further claimed that "older persons" incited the violence through "inflammatory speeches" made on Court Street.[77]

In contrast to this report, PLP members such as Kamarakafego and Browne-Evans had taken to the streets to calm the crowds down. The Party also stated that it did not only condone the incidents, but also objected to any form of police brutality. Nevertheless, the UBP accused the PLP of inciting the riots. During the rebellion, one of the PLP "fireballs," A. Thomas, was claimed to have stated: "It's going to get real hot this summer and its going to be a PLP heat."[78] However, A. Hodgson felt that in the light of Bermuda's social and political conditions the rebellions were almost inevitable, in that "when you try to contain a river that is still alive, the water will build up. No one is going to stop the march of progress." He added that only the PLP could bring about these changes peacefully.[79]

At the PLP's instigation, the government launched an official investigation of the uprising through a "nonpartial" Wooding Commission. This committee consisted of Hugh Wooding, chief justice of Trinidad and Tobago, Hugh Springer, CBE assistant secretary-general of the

Commonwealth Secretariat, University of West Indies, and LPP Bowny, advisor to the South East Asia Police Training Scheme and former police commissioner of Jamaica. The Commission was to inquire about the direct and indirect causes of the riots and recommend steps to solve them.[80] From August through September, it interviewed publicly a host of persons and organizations knowledgeable about the uprisings. This included Member of Colonial Parliament (MCPs), students, residents, and business owners of Court Street, police officers and a number of youth who had participated in the "disturbances."

The *Recorder* felt that the Commission brought "many things to light that would have remained hidden" and could have led to "a decisive change in the attitudes of some people who are hard-boiled in their ways towards a changing Bermuda."[81] Indeed, the Report was quite telling, if not obvious. For starters, it found that the "disorders" resulted from historic "racial tensions," including negative relations between the police and the Black population; the banning of publications such as *Muhammad Speaks*; Black Power; the "cult" of Black Muslims; the slow pace of integration; the PLP 1968 campaign; immigration policies and their effect on employment; party politics; independence movements in Africa; and the rise of Black militancy and nationalists.[82]

However, while Wooding admitted that economic and political power was vested in Bermuda's oligarchy, the official Commission Report failed to state that White hegemony—in essence racism and colonialism—lay at the core of the uprising. Indeed, as long as Whites economically and politically exploited African people in Bermuda then there would be racial tensions. In essence, the Report merely paid lip service to the symptoms of the problem rather than the root causes.

For example, the Commission stressed that "misunderstanding" existed between the police and the Black youth. However, it did not discuss the innate role of the police in defending the establishment. Instead it pathologized Black protest, asserting that Black youth were the problem and that if their frustrations could only be curbed then outbreaks of violence would dissolve.

It was not for want of knowing that the Commission did so, for several interviewees stated clearly the grievances of Black Bermuda. For example, A. Hodgson told the Committee that colonialism was the root of the problem. The police were pawns in the "battle to maintain colonialism" and the courts "instruments of revenge" on those who challenged the system. When cross-examined by Attorney General Summerfield, Hodgson promptly reminded him that he himself had come to Bermuda from East Africa and had been "a more efficient colonial master than any of his predecessors."[83]

I. Philip, news director of ZFB television, agreed that the British colonial system was the cause of the uprisings. When he asserted that the expatriate community in Bermuda influenced the local government, "worked overtime to maintain the status quo," comprised dangerous extremists, and had the most to lose from changes in Bermuda, the Commission attacked his analysis as "illogical" and lacking credibility.

Wade linked the island's immigration policy to colonialism, which brought in a higher ratio of White immigrants than Blacks and particularly affected the Police Force. West Indians were often not allowed to hold jobs with permits while Europeans frequently held positions illegally. In addition to a birth control scheme that targeted Blacks, he saw the policy as a plan to increase the White population. A. Hodgson added that Dr. Frazer, director of Health Services, had once boasted about reducing the Black birthrate by birth control.[84]

Philip also remarked that police had tried to kill his sixteen-year-old son. While innocently watching the incidents, his son was apparently "cracked over the head" by an officer. He was then arrested for resisting arrest, using offensive words, and assaulting an officer, and further "roughed up" before being taken to the hospital to receive stitches. He was fined £70.[85]

Browne-Evans also commented on the "rank hostility" of the police toward Blacks. The older generations were able to "control themselves" but the younger generation had "no sense of Uncle Tomism" and was "determined to shake off the colonial oppressors." Kamarakafego added that as long as Bermuda was a dumping ground for colonials the people would remain frustrated.[86]

In fact, Bermuda's Police Force operated quite underhandedly. In one case, a Gershwin Smith had sent a letter abroad to England detailing his involvements in the clashes. The police obtained the letter and had Smith arrested, claiming to have received the package from Bermuda's Criminal Investigations Department; it is well known that Special Branch has covert methods of opening and resealing mail.[87]

According to Thomas, a faulty education system was to blame and was part of a calculated plan to keep Blacks from being "politically enlightened."[88] Members of the Amalgamated Bermuda Union of Teachers (ABUT), such as Mansfield Brock and Aurelia Burch, expressed similar opinions. Burch stated that expatriates to Bermuda often came with attitudes of superiority. Brock felt that Howard Academy (a popular grassroots school) had been closed for political reasons because it was "really educating people." Such factors encouraged the youth to "turn towards violence." R. Simmons added that Blacks often could not get bank loans.[89]

The Commission stressed that attention be given to "long-neglected" low-cost housing, and called for a recreation center in the Court Street area.

It also suggested developing the Police Cadet scheme and that Bermuda's schools be canvassed for recruits. Furthermore, it felt that a professional public relations firm was needed to advice the government and police on how to enhance the department's image (which included replacing the police "bobby helmets" to "less alien" headwear).

It also claimed that the rebellion was connected to the rise of Black Power and affirmed the involvement of Black Power advocates. It asserted that "gangs" of "Court Street Boys" had committed the uprisings, while Black Muslims and Black Power "militants" were "fomenting or encouraging their continuance." This was either a failure or refusal of the Commission to realize or admit that the "Court Street Boys" could have had a political consciousness and had actually been the "Black Power militants."[90]

But just who were these youth? Many were from the area of northern Hamilton known as Back-a-Town, which extended to Parsons Road in Bermuda's Black Belt, Pembroke Parish. Back-a-Town was and remains the most impoverished area in the city and includes Court Street, the "antithesis" of affluent and "White" Front Street. To some, the mere mention of Court Street conjures up images of crime, poverty, drugs, and violence. At the time of the uprising, most residents of Back-a-Town could not maintain households without working at least two jobs. Furthermore, northern Hamilton had only received a sewage system in 1966 and daily garbage collection in 1968. Governor Ted Leather would later describe Back-a-Town as one of the island's most "undulating and broken areas," containing over "five hundred homes, tumble down old shops, garages, shacks and warehouses." Throughout the area were open spaces, empty lots, and earth densely covered with semitropical vegetation.[91]

But Back-a-Town was much more than a "slum." It had historically been a hotbed for Black political, cultural, and economic activity, akin to the African-American "Harlem" of Black Bermuda. Blacks were able to control the area's real estate throughout the twentieth century and this greatly helped to facilitate the creation of independent Black businesses, independent and self-help organizations (e.g., the UNIA, Cadre, PLP, and BIU headquarters were located in the area).[92]

The testimonies of about fifteen of these "Court Street Boys"—as they were derogatorily labeled (most were at least young adults)—reveal that many were very much politically minded. One regarded "Haile Selassie as his God" and was believed to have repatriated to Ethiopia in the aftermath of the incidents. Others joined the PLP Youth Wing.[93] Another told Summersfield that he was a Black Nationalist. Most affirmed that they believed in Black Power, and one had begun to read books about the Movement while incarcerated. Several wanted a recreation center formed that would include a library, so they could learn more about African history.[94]

These youth stated that the general racist attitude of the Police Force instigated the "disturbances." This Force (which was 72 percent British, and 19 out of its 24 officers ranked above the rank of sergeant were British) was not seen as "preservers of peace but as instruments for maintaining White supremacy."[95] As did the PLP the youth accused the officers of brutality, stating that the latter often called them "Black bastards, nigger and everything else" and harassed youth for simply congregating around Court Street.[96] Marvel Simmons, spokesperson for the youths, stated that "a person can hold back so much and no more. You can push a person once or twice, but if you continue to push him on several occasions, he is going to fight back. And if he doesn't fight back he is not well in the head."[97]

They were also upset at the banning of Black Power and NOI literature, particularly when White Supremacist material such as the *Track*, the *Truth Seeker*, and *Insider* and "adult" newspapers such as the *Enquirer* were legal. They felt that they should be allowed to read works such as *Muhammad Speaks*, which they concluded had been banned "because it told the truth about the White man." In disagreement, the Report justified the banning of the paper, stating that those who followed the teachings of Elijah Muhammad were potentially dangerous, some of whom were Back-a-Town youths.[98]

The White media attacked and criminalized these youth, just as it had done the 1959 Theatre boycotters. The *Gazette* held the negative stereotypes and connotations associated with Court Street in its arsenal. The paper used terms such as "hooligans," "scum," "half-crazed," "filth," and "nondecent" to describe them. It also portrayed them as spoiled delinquents who had "complete disregard for law and order"[99] because their parents had not raised them properly. This insinuated that Black youth resistance to oppression was a sociological problem that needed to be fixed. Essentially this was an attack on the entire Black family.

The *Mid-Ocean* printed a front-page story and large photo of six young Blacks captioned, "We are the Rioters." However, not all of the youth actually stated that they were involved in the incident. They had also been told that the article would reflect their position.[100] Instead, it was used against them.

Twenty-eight of these youth were brought before court during the midst of the revolt. One had been told that he would be charged with attempted murder if he did not make a false statement naming several supposedly involved in the riots.[101] Most had been arrested for "offensive behavior and offensive words," as well as possession of offensive weapons and willful damage. The *Gazette* printed all of their names, and a written tirade denouncing these youth followed in the paper.

One writer stated that the youth felt "so self important, that they [had] no respect for law and common decency." They were "trying out what [was] happening in the U.S." and if they were allowed to get away with it "there would be more trouble, for every time these babies feel they can't have their way they will throw tantrums." She continued: "…parents, what is wrong with you? Are you so scared of your little boys you will let them have their way every time? Do we bow down to these spoiled brats or are you going to start acting like decent parents and discipline these youths like they should have been done a long time ago?"

Another claimed that these "hooligans" were doing untold harm to Bermuda, themselves, and [the PLP]" and another was disgusted with the way that the government was handling the "riots." He felt that the government's response was to only slap some half-crazed youth on the hand and say, "Naughty–naughty." These youth were being bowed to and "pampered," but needed to be "manhandled." The incidents were frustrating for the decent people of Bermuda, which excluded the "scum that were burning the shops, and maiming people, young and old" and the PLP, which was "inciting this filth to riot."

The Bermuda Ministerial Association expressed shock that an "irresponsible fringe" of Bermuda's population, "possibly inflamed by intoxicants, drugs and unwise guidance could cause so much distress" and called for the repression of such civil disobedience and "anti-social action." The Chamber of Commerce warned the UBP not to bargain with people who were "attempting to coerce and intimidate…law abiding citizens." The rebels needed to be brought before the courts, for the island belonged "to all Bermudians and not to rioters who…step outside the law." It commended the Bermuda Police Force, Regiment, Special Constabulary, and the Fire Brigade for their performances in the "face of grave personal danger." This call came just as a prayer was being said for "the Bermuda Police Force, the Forces of the Crown and all who seek to preserve the Queen's peace."[102]

In contrast, the Black community supported the youth, but also reflected misunderstanding about the root causes of the uprising, and disagreement across class lines. For example, Walter Roberts, in an attempt to defend the "rioters," claimed that they were products of Bermuda's poor education system. This implies that the revolt was not an intelligent response to Bermuda's social conditions.

In a position that would waver over the duration of the Black Power Movement, the *Recorder* approved of the Court Street youth's actions:

> The rising generations are no longer like the five foolish virgins, going around without any oil in their lamps. After years of being pushed about, and having to gather up the crumbs that fell from their master's table. That

> is now a thing of the past. And this does not only apply to Bermuda, but to other parts of the world where people are fighting for their just rights to live as human beings and not slaves as in past years.[103]

The PLP, in particular Kamarakafego, embraced these youth. In February 1968 he had begun to organize the PLP Youth Wing, because he felt that the Party needed a "source of political workers, candidates and supporters to grow with the Party."[104] After the revolt Kamarakafego publicly announced this initiative, stating that the Wing was to be run by the youth under the guidance of the PLP to help foster responsibility among them.[105] This move would play a critical role in the Black Power Movement and subsequent political activity in the island.

Segregation was part of a larger project by Whites to keep Blacks *politically powerless.* For example, Black disenfranchisement was directly connected to the fraudulent voting constituencies created by racial segregation. Hence, while the Theatre Boycott was a catalyst for desegregation, Bermuda's White power structure remained intact; the White elite was forced to change its *expression* of power without relinquishing it. As Amos Wilson informs us, *power is a chameleon* and the system shrewdly shifted from a position of segregationist politics to an integrationist stance aimed at taking some of the "steam" from Black activists.[106]

However, the Boycott significantly impacted Black protest in the 1960s. The political capital generated from its relative success influenced the continued struggle against colonialism, racism, disenfranchisement, and economic powerlessness. This included head-on clashes between strikers, the Black youth, and the Police Force. While the PLP fought the establishment in the echelons of Parliament, others clashed with these forces on Bermuda's concrete streets. Black Power emerged in this context, and by 1969 would be a household name in the island.

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2

Another Unknown Soldier: Pauulu

Roosevelt Pauulu Nelson Osiris Browne Kamarakafego was a living phenomenon. One of the Caribbean's most astute Black Power activists, his life reads like a pan-African epic. His experiences included teaching at the University of Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania), participating in anti-Batista demonstrations in Cuba, clashes with the Ku Klux Klan while a student at South Carolina State, relationships with continental African liberation struggles and leaders (such as Cabral and Nkrumah), working with indigenous communities as a scientist via UNESCO, involvement in the Black Power activities of Australia's Koorie, assisting in the decolonization of Vanuatu and leadership roles in the Pan-African Movement. Kamarakafego was harassed for his activities; he was prevented from entering a number of Caribbean countries and placed under surveillance by U.S., Canadian, and British authorities while traveling abroad.[1] Perhaps the only thing more remarkable than his global activism is that he has remained virtually invisible in the historiography of twentieth-century Black activism.

Kamarakafego was extremely politically active in Bermuda during the 1960s. As stated, he was a Member of Colonial Parliament (MCP), Progressive Labour Party (PLP), and was also active in the Committee for Universal Adult Suffrage (CUAS). In 1969, Kamarakafego chaired the First Regional Black Power Conference (BPC) in Bermuda. In response, he was elevated to the status of "public enemy number one" by Bermuda's establishment. This placed him among the ranks of other notable activists across the Americas who were persecuted for their involvement with Black Power.

This chapter analyzes the public response to Kamarakafego's announcement that the BPC was to be held in Bermuda. Kamarakafego, Black Power, and the BPC were vehemently denounced and attacked through the media.

White and Black elites claimed that Black Power would destroy Bermuda's tourist industry. In response, many Blacks aptly defended the need for the Movement. Kamarakafego was personally harassed for his activism, by Bermuda's civil servants, reflecting a larger process in which Black Power was criminalized by the establishment.

Born in Bermuda in 1932, Kamarakafego's parents had migrated to Bermuda from St. Kitt's in 1917. His father had been an agricultural worker and maritime mechanic. His paternal family extended also from Liberia and Guyana, weaving an ancestral tapestry quite reflective of Diasporic migration in the Americas. His grandparents, uncle, and father constantly spoke about Garvey, and his childhood experiences prepared him for a life of global activism.

Kamarakafego, an engineer by trade (he studied at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena), spent years in Africa as a teacher, revolutionary, and consultant. In 1964, while teaching in Kenya, he met Malcolm X for the second time. In 1968, he was invited by the Black Power Organizing Committee to attend the Philadelphia Black Power Conference. While there, Benjamin and Nathan Wright and Chuck Stone requested that he address the Conference because Malcolm X had told them about the work he was doing in East Africa. He eventually suggested that Black Power meetings also be held outside of the United States (e.g., in Bermuda) as this would help spread awareness about Black liberation struggles.[2]

His speech had larger ramifications than he perhaps had foreseen. In December, the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover briefed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson about the growing "menace" of Black Power, the Black Panther Party, and the Civil Rights Movement. He stated that this "danger" had moved overseas, because an MCP of Bermuda was organizing a Black Power Conference on the island. At the time Kamarakafego was unaware of any such Conference. Days later, he was told to listen to an FBI radio broadcast discussing his involvement in the Conference. He immediately contacted Stone and Wright, who confirmed that they had decided to hold the Conference in Bermuda. Kamarakafego informed them that if it was to be held on the island, then he would organize it. Shortly afterward, he was hounded by the local media in regard to its details.[3]

The *Recorder* soon announced a claim that PLP members had invited Black Power extremists to meet on the island. A Black United Bermuda Party (UBP) MCP, Jim Woolridge, immediately demanded an explanation from the PLP, claiming that this would not be a "boon" to tourism. In response, Browne-Evans stated that she had "wondered which Uncle Tom would raise the issue," questioning whether Woolridge still belonged to the Black race.[4]

Kamarakafego announced that he had invited the group as the Registrar of the Central Planning Committee for the Philadelphia Black Power Conference. He was responsible for organizing a representative delegation from the Caribbean and Atlantic region. The regional conference would serve this purpose and "consider the educational, political, social and cultural aspects of Black Power" in the area.[5]

Furthermore, the BPC aimed to "establish a variety of techniques, workable methods and alternate strategies to help Black people achieve political, economic, educational and cultural Black power in their respective communities." He saw no need for the Bermuda government not to cooperate, but was not going to be surprised if they tried to declare some of the participants as "person a non grata" as they had done to Garvey and deny them entry into the island. Hence, he refused to list the names of hundreds of delegates who were expected to come for the "talks."[6]

He further stated that Whites were antagonistic to Black Power because of their own fears, racial attitudes, and desire to maintain their own power. Hence, they used their influence in colonial countries such as Bermuda to create misunderstanding among Blacks. Hence, some Blacks were afraid of being identified as such and were also apprehensive about Black Power.

For Kamarakafego, Black Power implied Black empowerment—and social, political, and economic equity, particularly in a majority-Black country. It also meant thinking in terms of Black-owned institutions. The BPC aimed to give people in Bermuda a chance to understand Black Power and educate people to "be responsible to themselves and not to burn up the place." He also linked Black Power to Bermuda's struggle against colonialism: "It is the firm conviction of the people of Bermuda that Bermuda must one day be free, that Bermuda cannot and must not be a colonial country and people, forever under the domination and control of White or British exploitation and oppression. This must not last much longer in Bermuda."

However, Black Power was opposed to any forms of economic or political oppression and to replace the "White Front Street with a Black Front Street crowd would be dangerous and against the objectives of Black Power." This comment reflected an important economic and class analysis of Black Power thinkers, one that is often overlooked by its critics. Indeed, Black Power implied a fundamental change of the system that produced exploitation.

Kamarakafego called on Whites to recognize that they had abused Blacks for generations and had "made fortunes at the expense of Black people's dignity, pride and labour." In particular, the "Forty Thieves" were responsible for several areas of discontent and owed Black people a debt. Whites sincerely interested in helping Blacks to achieve self-determination

were to be accepted and encouraged, but those seeking to isolate and separate Black people by labeling those who came together as extremists were themselves extremists.

Black Power was to particularly benefit Bermuda's Black youth, who "comprised the Black Power force of Bermuda's future." It viewed Bermuda's current system as hypocritical and representing White financial superiority over non-Whites. Token, "window-dressing steps had been made to involve Blacks in areas of Government, business and education, but Black representation in these areas needed to reflect their demographically majority status."

Kamarakafego also remarked that in Kenya it had taken the uprisings of the Land and Freedom Army (so-called Mau Mau) to force Whites to recognize that Africans intended to rule themselves. In Detroit, Watts, Newark, and Harlem, it had taken "Burn Baby Burn" for the establishment to understand that Blacks refused to be exploited in such ghettos. Hence, the world's militant and alert youth were not willing to be submissive to White power,[7] and this included Bermuda.

Kamarakafego felt that Blacks needed to get together "in countries where the trend towards Black genocide was growing." Hence, Black people who represented sizeable numbers of their communities were encouraged to attend. However, the press and Whites would not be allowed to enter and only one press Conference would be given at its conclusion.

In response to questions about outbreaks of "violence" at the Conference, Kamarakafego did not expect it to "cause any problems." However, he noted that one could expect anything from the government. At the least, he expected that "Black stooges" would be planted at the Conference by the CIA and Britain's M16. Nevertheless, even "God couldn't come down… and stop [the] conference."

He also urged prospective delegates not to engage in

> (a) Your "I'm Blacker than you" speech. All of us are in the same psychological Black bag regardless of colour. (b) Your passionate "Let's get guns and undo our castration" speech. The biggest struggle we have right now is getting ourselves together. (c) Your… "Black is Beautiful" speech. All of us are committed to the task of strengthening our identity. (d) Your… "If you're over thirty, then forget it" speech. For we know if it were not for the dedicated troops over thirty who fought to desegregate our communities, [the desire] to be separate in any way would never have had any validity.[8]

On January 18, 1969, Kamarakafego attended the prestigious annual Speaker's Dinner. A tuxedo, tie, and gown affair, PLP MCPs A. Hodgson (PLP deputy chairman) and F. Wade wore blue Nehru (as in the former prime minister of India) formal outfits. Both were vocal Black Power

supporters; by 1967 the U.S. State Department considered Hodgson to be one of the most radical officials of the PLP. He also was reported to be a socialist and maintained close contact with London-based communist front groups.[9]

For his part Kamarakafego was dressed in the traditional paramount chief's gown of the Kpelle people of Liberia, which had been given to him by a relative Kpelle chief. In an attempt to ridicule Kamarakafego, MCP Quinton Edness (a Black MCP, UBP) asked him, "Where are you going in your pajamas?" Kamarakafego replied, "Let me tell you something, all of Africa is on my back and all of you should be f***ing lucky that I wear this to a dumb a** event like this." Kamarakafego was seated at a table that included the commissioner of police, the American consul, and the head of the Regiment, which he felt was done purposely to intimidate him. Nevertheless, he refused to stand to toast the queen and after the playing of the customary "God Bless the Queen" he stood up and said, "God Bless my Ma." In addition, he slept loudly through the governor's keynote address.[10]

Shortly afterward, one letter to the *Gazette* suggested that Kamarakafego should have been served "fish, rice and bombo" for attending the dinner in Kpelle dress. This was followed by further racist comments that recipes for the dish could be obtained from either the U.S. State Department, Firestone Rubber Company, or the United Nations as they were the only organizations responsible for "whatever progress" that had been made in Liberia.[11] To say the least, this statement completely contrasted Firestone's exploitation of the region's resources and people.

Kamarakafego's harassment continued beyond the media. When attempting to build a home along South Shore, the director of planning refused to give him a building permit without any explanation. Undismayed, he decided to build on another piece of family property. In designing and building his new house, he had broken all of the planning codes. Shortly after completion the Planning Department sent him a letter with aerial photographs, stating that he had to break down the house or face prosecution. Planning officers eventually investigated his home and refused to pass it. A few days later he went to BELCO to have an electric meter installed, but was told that they could not do so because Planning had not given him an assessment number. Hence, he went to the director of planning and told him that if he could not have electricity, then no one in Bermuda would. Two days later, BELCO installed the meter.

He also received threatening phone calls and was often stopped by the police for trivial reasons, such as to check his car's indicators. For example, on June 4, the *Gazette* reported that a warrant had been issued for his arrest because he had not appeared in court for a £5 traffic violation. It

claimed that he had driven a car without proper authorization (though it was owned by a friend) and told the serving officer that he refused to appear in court. However, on the said day, he had informed the police that he was scheduled to leave the country on his court date and the attorney general's offices had agreed to postpone his trial.[12]

While organizing for the Conference, he canvassed several countries in the Americas, including Anguilla, Antigua, Guyana, St. Kitts, Guadeloupe, Barbados, Grenada, Caracas, Curacao, Martinique, St. Vincent, Mexico, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, Canada, and the United States. His activities in these countries were closely monitored; for example, British authorities noted that in Guyana, he met with Janet Jagan and Eusi Kwayana, president of the Africa Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA).[13]

Upon his return, he was often hassled by airport customs officers. In one incident, officers examined the lining of his clothes, his suitcases, and even his case of toothpaste. He was carrying books about African history, Che Guevara, and Swahili, and copies of Eldridge Cleaver's *Soul on Ice*. These were searched and Kamarakafego was questioned by a Black detective, Dudley Swan (nephew of MCP Lancelot Swan, UBP), about his possession of such "Black books." Swan attempted to seize them, but as none was banned in Bermuda he had no legal basis to do so.

A fight nearly ensued when they attempted to search his briefcase:

> They took my briefcase, opened it and started to read my personal letters. I told them to put the letters down, as they had no right to read my personal mail. They ignored me, so I slammed down the top of my briefcase, almost jamming their fingers. One policeman . . . proceeded to re-open the briefcase. . . . This time, when I slammed down the briefcase lid, I caught his fingers in the briefcase. . . . I then kicked my shoes off and was about to punch them when they backed off and told me that I was free to go.[14]

Kamarakafego questioned Martonmere and government leader Henry Tucker about the search. While the governor claimed that he would look into it, Tucker informed Kamarakafego that he could do whatever he "damned well liked."[15] Finance MCP J.H. Sharpe (UBP), responsible for the Customs Department, justified the incident, claiming that the officers had received reliable information that justified their exercise of "powers conferred on them by law."

D. Thompson, a White PLP MCP, felt that Kamarakafego should have anticipated such treatment. Upon her return from the 1966 Constitutional Conference UBP members were given the "red carpet" treatment at the airport, while she was treated quite differently. To be an Opposition MCP

one had to "expect to be insulted by the White ruling oligarchy." Her own "race in power" frightened her and she was well aware how the PLP "suffered from the White man's malice."[16]

This "malice" is clearly revealed through the *Gazette*, which was extremely hostile toward the Conference and reflected the views of the island's White elite. It repeatedly argued that the Conference would interrupt tourism and bring "animosity" between the races—as if such animosity did not already exist due to White antagonism. Kamarakafego was portrayed as an irresponsible, hate-mongering political demagogue.

The *Gazette* claimed that the Conference threatened law and order in Bermuda and deemed it "wise that the Government take action before rather than after the Conference." It questioned whether the Conference should have been held in Cuba instead, for it was "impossible" to see how it could be useful to Bermuda. Furthermore, "in such a gathering . . . there are bound to be the rabid extremists. . . . We do not think Bermuda should be asked to be host to these dissidents. . . . Well-known extremists of undoubted subversive character should be told they are not welcome in Bermuda, where our problems need no compounding by alien incitement."[17]

White Bermudians consistently attacked the Conference through the paper. While instrumental in understanding the White perception of the Movement, only a sample of these letters is presented here. Whites collectively asserted that the Conference was dangerous to White stability; called for the government to stop the BPC; reiterated the theme of the "outsider" who enters the society to stir up trouble; denounced Black Power as "reverse racism" or evil; claimed that Blacks were "doing fine" in Bermuda and there was no need for Black Power; declared that Blacks were imaging oppression; called for extremist recommendations such as imprisoning political protestors; and condescendingly referred to Blacks as "*our* coloured people."

One "LDG" was "completely horrored" [*sic*] that the "unsavory" BPC was to be hosted in Bermuda. He/she expected a "storm of letters of protest" about this "threat" and "imminent danger . . . to the health of the colony," which would affect the island's tourism economy and leave everyone unemployed, including "our colored people." If Kamarakafego, a "dangerous Black Power advocate," was allowed to have his way, Bermuda would be "exposed to bitterness and antagonism far beyond anything experienced . . . in the past." How then would Bermuda rid itself of the overseas "troublemakers" that would not want to leave the island once they "saw how much better off our colored people [were]?" They would "naturally want to stay and continue to sow their seeds of destruction among our fine mature Bermudians." LDG pondered "what sudden conceit" had caused "colored people" to "feel in some undefined way 'abused.'" Any statements about such abuse needed to be substantiated or else the accusers should be

punished for libel or slander. Furthermore, why was Bermuda unable to "banish or imprison dangerous political extremists"?

"Civis Bermudiensis" felt that it would be unacceptable if the government did not pass legislation to "prevent Bermuda from being exploited by political crackpots from elsewhere who could do great harm by introducing subversive doctrines designed to destroy our harmonious atmosphere." It was all right for Britain and United States to hold political meetings on the island, for under the government's invitation they would not interfere with Bermuda's political affairs (as if Bermuda was not a British colony!). In contrast, foreign Black Power "agitators" would be as out of place as the "appearance of that person at a formal dinner party clad in a most unattractive 'nightie' badly in need of laundry and ironing." This was obviously a pun on Kamarakafego's presence at the Speaker's Dinner.

He further stated that those dissatisfied with Bermuda were not compelled to live on the island and could move "to a place more to their liking" and leave those who liked Bermuda to get along without them. In addition, he claimed that "we" did not want power groups of any colour in the island and recognized only the power of God, which was "to be administered by those Servants of His to be selected by us who live here in free elections for the spiritual and material benefit of us all."[18]

It must be reiterated that Bermuda held its first elections under supposed Universal Adult Suffrage in May 1968, less than a year before the letter's printing. These elections were not free, much less for the benefit of the island's masses. To equate this to the works of God is borderline sacrilegious.

One writer claimed that the PLP and Kamarakafego had an historical relationship with the Fidel Castro "regime." This was ironic, he/she claimed, because Black Cubans had much less voice than Blacks had in other White countries. In addition, Castro financed the Black Panther Party for his own "sinister purposes" and if a Black Power Movement started in Cuba its advocates would wind up in front of a firing squad.

One Canadian visitor asked Bermudians to realize the extent of the "evils" of Black Power that were beginning to "take hold" on the island. Black Power "evildoers" were willing to go to great lengths to revenge themselves against any who dared to oppose them. Furthermore, they would "terrorize the timid and the unreasoning into going along with their power take-over schemes [*sic*]."

A Jona Welch, from Iceland, claimed to have lived in Bermuda for eight years and loved it as her "own country." No other place on Earth possessed "such open friendliness" and Bermudians of all shades were "beautiful…and a joy to live amongst." Hence, she hoped that Kamarakafego and his associates would not be successful in "poisoning the very air" that they breathed.

She compared the ideals of Black Power to those of Hitler, stating that the latter's had also sounded very good but "hate turned them into disaster" just as "anything based on hate is destructive." Kamarakafego needed to "look into his soul" to see whether he was "motivated more by love for the Black man or hate for the White man." Furthermore, Welch asked whether Bermudians were to be considered Bermudians first and Black second, or were they African first and Bermudian second?

"A Fifth Generation Black Bermudian" challenged Welch, stating that she spoke as an expatriate unprepared to leave Bermuda to settle its own affairs. Welch was oblivious to the problems of Black Bermudians and was simply one of thousands of expatriates who found Bermuda's social and material atmosphere "far superior" to their own countries. Regarding her questions of identity, "Fifth Generation" told her to pose these to the expatriate societies of Bermuda, such as the Canadian American and Sons of Italy, and even the Portuguese who had recently celebrated their National Day.

Some Blacks attacked Black Power. One "Coloured Bermudian youth" expressed concern that there were people in Bermuda trying to destroy the island and its youth. These people were also providing the youth with drugs (such as LSD, opium, heroin, and marijuana) and filling "the minds of coloured boys" with "foolish ideas of hatred for the White man."

An H.H. Brown suggested that the term "Black Power" be substituted by one such as "Amalgamated Power," which would be "more conducive to the aims of democracy." Furthermore, unlike America, Bermuda did not need the assistance of the Armed Forces to escort children to predominantly White schools (indeed—for in response to calls for educational integration Whites privatized their schools). Private establishments had "opened their doors to qualified personnel" and the races were "working in harmony side by side." Problems remained, but Bermuda had progressed without the instructions of outsiders.

Brown had attended the 1967 PLP Conference in which Wright had asked Whites to leave the room. He felt that his request was "not only a slap to White people but to all sensible people" in Bermuda and he would support the BPC only if it brought forth the "true principles of democracy." Furthermore, no one was responsible for their grandfather's actions and, since there were more educated Blacks Bermudians than before, he was convinced that the racist conditions of the past were eradicated.[19]

Brown missed the point. The Conference organizers were not appealing to the consciousness of Whites to encourage them to support the Conference; in fact it was expected that Whites *would not*. By the same token, Black Power advocates were not asking Whites to address their concerns—they were trying to solve them themselves.

One "Shark Oil" expressed alarm at the "racist tone of every member of the PLP" who acted as if they were in a "bar room brawl" instead of the House of Assembly. In contrast, the UBP displayed "great restraint and patience" at such "uncouth and discourteous remarks." It was alarming that the PLP was influencing the youth, who would soon be of voting age. If they were gullible enough to believe the lies and propaganda of the PLP and had "been taught to hate as much as some of these power-seeking racists" did, then "God help Bermuda."

He further felt that Black Power advocates sought to "separate the Black race from the White," wanted "revenge for past injustices done to Black people," and would make it "impossible for a White man of goodwill to remain in [Bermuda]." After Whites were driven out, Bermuda would be "left like most of the West Indies . . . without hardly a White face to look upon." Tourists would not want to come to a place where they were unappreciated, and then where would the finances come from to pay for schools, roads, and hospitals? Shark Oil claimed that the disappearance of Whites from the West Indies had negatively affected the region. One former British colony once boasted of beautiful roads that it had built for tourists, but now, with less than one hundred White residents, the majority of the island was unemployed and could not afford to "paint even their little wooden huts." Fortunately, the island had lush resources for food, so the people need not starve. However, after the "hate-mongers came to power" in Bermuda, how would it get money to buy food? Hence, he behooved Bermudians to develop a "friendly" reputation, embrace values such as "trustworthiness, integrity, generosity [and] compassion," and stop hating like Kamarakafego and A. Hodgson.[20]

Albeit unintentionally, Shark Oil highlighted the connection between Black Power and decolonization. He implied that Black Power would lead to the same consequences as defenders for colonialism claimed political independence would—economic poverty and political mayhem. However, Black Power and independence both represented self-determination. Furthermore, it was perhaps a misnomer to label Caribbean nations that were politically independent but economically neocolonies of their former colonizers or the United States as independent. "Shark Oil" also unknowingly pointed out the precarious economic position of Bermuda under tourism. Bermuda's land was utilized for golf courses, hotels, and other facilities for tourism. As remains currently true, portions of this land could have been used for farming, housing, or even educational institutions (i.e., a university) to serve the island's basic needs in the areas of medicine (doctors and nurses), finance (economists), education (teachers), engineering, and science (marine biologists).

Bermuda's Black youth supported the BPC. They keenly challenged attacks on Black Power through the press. For example, in response to

one writer's claim that the "reign of Black Power" would be like repeating slavery, a Thelma Morgan stated that Blacks were already in slavery and stood "to gain when perpetuating Black power." She further wrote that if Bermuda was a free society there would be no need to fear the Conference. However, as Bermuda was a White Power society there was never any issues of "imported divisiveness" when White Power Conferences were held in Bermuda, such as the Anglo-American Summits. It was not asked whether Blacks would be allowed to attend or if the conferences would promote racial harmony. Hence, why was it a big issue when Blacks gathered to discuss Black Power?[21]

To a large extent, the Movement was driven via a youth culture different from their elders. Partially due to its cultural and political appeal, Black Power often crossed class barriers among Bermuda's youth. For example, Bob Richards, son of the conservative future MCP E.T. Richards (UBP), described himself as "a child of the sixties" who was, "like any Black teenage kid," into Black Power. Aware of Carmichael, Bobby Seale, and Malcolm X, he attended the BPC.[22]

While Blacks in general recognized the problems of Black Bermuda, there were generational differences in the *methods* and *aims* of protest. As Bermuda's Black youth began to develop a culture centered on the tenets of Black Power, these differences were more visibly pronounced. Indeed, as Cabral asserts, culture is often a critical element of resistance and a manifestation of the history of a dominated society. Thus, the seeds of resistance to oppression can often be found in the culture of the oppressed.[23]

The *Recorder* reflected the progressive views of older Blacks, who emerged from their own tradition of resistance. It expressed support for the goals of Black Power, but it was cautiously concerned that Movement might "get out of control." The paper gave consistent coverage about the Conference. In April, it conducted several on-the-spot interviews about the BPC. Most agreed that the Conference should occur, but felt that Whites should be allowed to attend. While a thirty-nine-year-old Black bank porter and a twenty-nine-year-old chambermaid agreed that the BPC would encourage racial progress, another Black female did not think it was a good idea and not necessary if hate was to be preached. A White insurance salesman, aged thirty-nine, felt that if participants "carried on as they had" in other places, the Conference should not be held in Bermuda. Another White male felt that if Whites were allowed to go they should "pay attention to what the man was saying and not . . . mock."[24]

The *Recorder* also kept Bermuda's Black population abreast of news across the Diaspora. Throughout 1969, it ran an editorial and photo column entitled "Black Profiles of Courage," which highlighted the "notable achievements" of primarily African-Americans. The paper published

articles on topics and individuals such as Julian Bond, Whitney Young, African missionaries working in the United States, Gunnar Myrdal's views on the Black Revolution, the relevance of Black Studies in the United States, Roy Wilkins, Nathan Hare, Bayard Rustin's boycott of IBM on grounds of racial discrimination, racial tensions between Blacks and Jews in New York, the relationship between Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure, U.S. segregation, Bermudian Earle Sedon—the UN representative to Tanzania and Judge of Tanzania High Court—Ralph Abernathy and the Memphis Day March commemorating King's assassination, Tom Mboya and African-American repatriation to Africa, Muhammad Ali, the bombing of a Black church in New York, the Biafra Civil War, and armed struggle in Northern Ireland.[25] Such coverage countered the White media's refusal to positively discuss Black people.

The *Recorder* also published an article about Black Power by Rev. Ashley Smith of the United Church of Jamaica and the Grand Cayman Islands. Smith stated that many questioned the relevance of Black Power to Jamaica because it was a Black, independent country. However, most Jamaicans did not have access to power and Blacks had to be either submissive or outstanding to "get to the top." Afro-Jamaicans were confused about their identity and used cosmetics to lighten their skin and straighten their hair in an effort to be presentable to the "defining and ruling class." Most professionals refused to marry "darker" Jamaicans" and "upgraded" the complexion of their offspring and others. In addition, the Black church did not accept leaders of a certain complexion. Since Black people "felt the need to upgrade" themselves for acceptance," Blacks "squandered…earnings on non-essentials as if one's worth depended upon how much or what one consumed." Hence, Black Power meant "a positive approach to one's self" and would help reduce the "intergroup hostility that…poisoned" Black relationships.[26]

This analysis was (and in fact, *is*) quite relevant for Bermuda. Indeed, most Black people *knew* that they were Black—they had been repeatedly reminded of this for hundreds of years. However, many—elites and non-elites alike—possessed negative views of *what being Black meant*, because Whites had negatively defined Africa and *blackness*. In essence, just because someone knew they were Black did not mean they were *happy* about that; hence, you could find someone who professed to be Black but still used lightening cream. However, Black Power sought to address such contradictory behavior patterns.

The Conference also received support, though at times somewhat cautiously, from the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church. For example, in an article posted to the *Gazette*, Rev. Thomas Dyer (the White rector of St. Mary's Church) stated that Black Power had religious significance. The

Black man searched for a new identity and a rejection of everything connected with an old identity given to them by Whites. He felt that Whites needed to

> realize that there are occasions when responsibility for others does not take and cannot take an active form. In personal relationships most of us have experienced moments when others seemingly are not ready to have us help them even when we strongly desire to do so. Out of a sense of independence, or pride, or unreadiness, they seem to resist our openness to them. Under such circumstances, our availability to them becomes the form responsibility takes.[27]

However, Dyer could not accept Black Power's "narrow nationalism," "heavy-handed remythologisation and its exclusive concern with the present."

The article received rave reviews; one writer hailed it as the most illuminating article on Black Power that he had seen.[28] However, the piece is insultingly paternalistic and assumes that Whites had the best interests of Blacks in mind in the first place. Furthermore, Black Power was not simply about reidentification—it implied self-determination. In addition, Dyer did not mention any need for Whites—White Christians even—to accord themselves to supposedly Christian beliefs.

Perhaps in response to Dyer, John Brandon, pastor of Allen AME and a staunch supporter of Black Power, offered the following explanation. He felt, as Garvey had recommended, that Blacks needed to get as much power as possible, because a race without power was due to be bound by the will of another. There was nothing wrong with power, but its unequal distribution was "repugnant to God." The Gospel demanded "repentance to God of White people" and it was not enough for White church leaders to simply state that they would accept the good in Black Power; this rejected the paternalistic attitude of White people. The "White man" could not understand that he could not "pat as many 'ole Johns' on the back as he used to and slip a few shillings in his pocket for his soul." Black Power *did not seek to be understood by White people and probably never would be*. For too long the "White man" had decided what was good and bad for the "Black man." In agreement with Malcolm X, Brandon stated that Black Power was part of a global rebellion of the "oppressed against the oppressor, the exploited against the exploiter." Furthermore, there appeared to be no hope that Whites would somehow make a drastic change in their treatment of Blacks, for White power had "mainly been an agent of oppression and enslavement."[29]

Former Pastor of St. Paul's AME, Rev. Vernon Byrd, felt that "well-disciplined" Black Power demonstrations could help to bring change in

racially biased communities. He felt that Bermuda was merely catching up "with the pace of change" of global race relations and hoped that the Conference would be conducted peacefully.[30]

In June 1969, AME Bishop Rev. John Bright, who presided over 600 AME churches throughout the North American east coast and Bermuda, announced that he would speak at the Conference. While in Bermuda for the annual AME Church Conference, he was invited by Kamarakafego to address the BPC. He accepted with the intention to clear up the "groundless fears that surrounded the phrase." Having attended the Black Power conferences in Newark and Philadelphia, he saw Black Power as a "good and healthy thing" that taught the Black man self-pride and to seek independence from Whites.

The fifty-two-year-old Bright saw himself as a "leader of the people and an ambassador of God," and felt it important to use his influence to "lead and help . . . and give support for those things that spell progress." He urged AME members and all Bermudians to support the Conference. Such people needed to help to create a social climate that would allow Conference delegates to seek solutions to the problems of Black people.[31]

White Bermudians immediately attacked the bishop. They claimed that his prestige in the United States would boost the PLP's fortune and the bishop was coming close to "meddling in the political affairs of a friendly state." Furthermore, as Bermuda was "far ahead of [America] in solving its social and racial problems" it was foolish to link Bermuda's racial issues with that of the violently extremist United States. There was no racially mixed community in the entire world doing better than Bermuda and it would be fitting if foreigners who enjoyed Bermuda's hospitality "refrained from involving themselves in Bermuda's affairs." When their own countries approached Bermuda's success in solving its racial and social problems, then perhaps Bermuda would follow their advice.[32]

However, if Bermuda was so far beyond America in terms of race relations, then why was the UBP, as is shown later, covertly seeking the advice and support of the United States in thwarting the Conference? Furthermore, Blacks in Bermuda did not look to other countries for support in challenging racism. They looked toward other *Black people* in those countries because of a common experience, just as Blacks had historically done so, and as Whites had historically denounced. Furthermore, as racial antagonists, who were Whites to claim that things were racially "all right" in the island?

According to the *Gazette*, the bishop would increase the respectability of the Conference because he was a "highly able man" and the AME church one of the most important institutions in the community. However, his decision to attend was not "solely based on Bermuda considerations."

Rather, it was affected by the ghetto situations of American cities where "poverty and frustration [provided] a mainspring for the Black Power Movement."

The paper also claimed that his presence would lead to the closing of a "number of opening doors" that had led to "happily increasing" racial harmony. Blacks and Whites were losing "that dangerous feeling that members of the other race thought alike, acted alike and were alike." They now perceived people as individuals and it was hoped that this would eventually eliminate "instinctive racial relations." Black Power threatened this progress and would lead to tragedies similar to that of Guyana, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland.[33]

As Whites were oft to do, the *Gazette* implied that Blacks in Bermuda and the United States had nothing in common, and, as such, Black Power was not relevant in Bermuda and emerged from imagined circumstances of racism. Furthermore, for Whites racial harmony implied the absence of visible Black protest against racism. This assumed that Bermuda's entire sociopolitical system was not racist in and of itself.

However, the *Gazette* did not dissuade nineteen-year-old Michael Bean from intending to attend "all the Black power sessions." An AME member, Bean saw Bright as concerned about the AME church, Bermuda, and the "advancement of the Black person." Bermuda was full of injustices and the church could "no longer stand by and watch man destroy and go against those things which God through his son Jesus Christ had called it to do." The bishop was led by God and "members of God's flock" needed to follow his example and become more active.

In addition, Bermuda's "opened doors" would never have been opened without "pressure put on the doorman." Young people would not wait as long as their forefathers did with substitutions or bribes to keep them quiet. They wanted change, such as more opportunities in local and overseas education. The UBP needed to address racism and "stop stalling and making excuses," for it was "creating…a storm which [would] turn into a destructive hurricane."

For Maxwell Smith, the *Gazette*'s editorial was just "another glaring example of the reactionary…thinking of Bermuda's news media." The paper insultingly presumed that a gathering of Black people to "discuss problems peculiar to Black people" was not in the community's best interests. He questioned the implication that the Conference would be less respectable without the presence of the bishop and hoped that all "right thinking Bermudians" placed the editorial in the trash.[34]

The *Gazette* keenly reproduced international news that supported its position on Black Power, namely sources from White and conservative Black governments or media. For example, it reprinted an article from the

London *Daily Telegraph* stating that Castro was showing increased interest in the Black Power Movement and the Conference, further stating that the United States had recently expelled two Cuban diplomats from America engaged in "financial and directional" assistance to the Black Panthers. The *Telegraph* also claimed that Kamarakafego had attended the Philadelphia BPC with "several of the more bizarre Black nationalists" and had recently visited Cuba as a "guest of the Communist regime." Nevertheless, the *Telegraph* felt that many FBI agents would attend the Conference as genuine delegates as this had become standard procedure. In response, PLP spokesman Wade acutely stated that there had been no objections when Henry Tucker visited apartheid South Africa.[35]

In another case, the *Belize Billboard* claimed that the Conference would endanger Bermuda's tourist industry in the short- and long term and create a "backlash of panic and rumor" in the height of the tourist season. Hence "In making the distinction between support for the American Negro in his struggle for racial equality at home, and the acceptance of the relevance of Black power precepts in their own island, Bermudians are influenced by the knowledge that 90 percent of the island's tourist trade is American. Hence, Black Power is a luxury they can ill afford."[36] It further argued that Kamarakafego's position to still have the Conference reflected either naivety or hypocrisy, and that he must have "forgotten the rioting and looting which accompanied" the 1968 elections because of the PLP's "flaunting" of Black Power and the consequent tourist cancelations.[37] This was perhaps also a "warning" to Black Power advocates in Belize.

The *Recorder* published a letter written by a Renold E. Browne, of the University of West Indies (UWI), who felt it unfortunate that the Conference had become associated with "violence, destruction and hate." Black Power was about the organization of "Blacks economically, socially and politically," something that Whites had been doing for ages. As "blackness" had been associated with negativity, Blacks were not proud of themselves, their features, and also Africa. They were taught about Whites such as Drake and Raleigh to the exclusion of Blacks such as Charles Drew and Matthew Henson. In essence, Black Power helped to dispel Black inferiority that stemmed from such mis-education. Nevertheless, Browne still felt that the exclusion of Whites from the Conference was "a form of Jim Crow in reverse," as Whites needed to learn about Black people. Furthermore, he could not support Black Power in Bermuda if it encouraged "race hatred, violence and further divisions in race in Bermuda."

However, the most instrumental theme of his letter was his concern that a ban might be imposed on some of the speakers due to attend the Conference. He forwarded the *Gazette* an account of the Jamaican government's banning of Walter Rodney from the island and the "repercussions

that followed." Rodney, an avid Black Power advocate, was "dedicated to teaching the Black man his history and achievement"; Browne felt that the Bermuda government could learn something from the Rodney affair.[38]

In 1968, Rodney, on return from a Black Writer's Conference in Montreal, was prevented from reentering Jamaica by the Hugh Shearer regime. While teaching History at UWI, Mona, Rodney became a popular off-campus lecturer. He was banned because of his Black Power activities and the positive relationships that he had established with Jamaica's grassroots youth, particularly the Rastafari community, and institutionally academic populations. Roy McNeil, Jamaican minister of home affairs stated that he had "never come across a man who [offered] a greater threat to the security" of Jamaica than did Rodney. This ban spurred widespread protest and students and urban youth demonstrated together and inflicted considerable damage of property in response to police repression. Two lives were lost, thirteen buses destroyed, twenty-three arrested, and eleven police officers injured. The government blamed Rodney and other "radical" foreign elements at UWI for the outbreak.[39] As will be seen, Bermuda's government had its own plans in the making for dealing with such "foreign elements."

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3

A Bermuda Triangle of Imperialism

The implications of Black Power in Bermuda stretched far beyond its twenty-two-square miles. Just as local elites feared that racial uprisings would challenge their control of the island, U.S., Canadian, and British officials saw the 1969 BPC as a threat to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security. Each government maintained a strategically significant naval presence on the island and embarked on a series of well-calculated and covert plans to disrupt the Conference. Britain played a central role in these measures, as under Bermuda's 1966 Constitution it was responsible for Bermuda's internal defense and security matters; it also used the island to police its West Indian interests.

Since at least 1961, British and U.S. officials had annually met in the island to discuss collective foreign policy resolutions at an annual Anglo-American Conference. For example, in 1967, the Conference focused on U.S. and British aid and trade with Africa, political and military trends in Africa, and public opinion about these policies. It was sponsored by Johns Hopkins School of International Studies and financed by the Carnegie Fund and the Barracuda Tanker Company (a Bermuda-registered Liberian-based company owned by Union Oil of California).[1] In essence, the Anglo-American Conference was a neocolonial think-tank.

U.S. concerns with Black Power in Bermuda reflected its post–World War II foreign policy in the Caribbean, in which it increased its military control and intelligence in the region due to growing resistance toward Western imperialism. Since 1945 the United States had consolidated hegemony in the area and enforced a policy of containing decolonization to inhibit the creation of independent states that could upset its regional interests. U.S. control of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were examples of this policy.[2]

In a 1940 wartime agreement, the British government granted the United States rent-free ninety-nine-year land leases for the construction of bases in select British colonies in exchange for American warships. Although Bermuda never officially agreed, two such bases were built on the island. By 1966, the United States had also failed to honor a commitment to build a bridge from the Ferry Reach area to the mainland.[3]

The land agreement comprised property annexes slightly in excess of two miles. One was the Kindley Air Force Base, located on the eastern end of the island; it was used to maintain a Bermuda-based NASA station. The other was a naval station, which supported antisubmarine forces deployed to Bermuda. In 1965 the Base provided logistic support to 278 vessels. To maintain these facilities, in 1966, 6,381 personnel were stationed in Bermuda, totaling about one-eighth of Bermuda's civil population of 48,750.

Adjacent to the Naval Station was a Naval Underwater Sound Laboratory and Naval Facility, which developed submarine detection systems using underwater sound. This Underwater Sound Laboratory operated in Argus Island, a "Texas Tower" thirty miles southwest of Bermuda on Argus Bank. The testing area spanned over 300,000 square miles south of the island, and utilized extremely large acoustic equipment on the seabed connected by cables to Bermuda-based labs.[4]

These bases were considered vital to the overall Atlantic defense planning of the United States and its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) systems. Bermuda's strategic location (760 miles southeast of New York and 660 miles due east of Cape Hatteras) gave the island a "significance disproportionate to its small size…and population."[5]Hence, in 1966, basic U.S. policy toward Bermuda included protecting its "rights" to the two bases, ensuring that Bermuda had a "moderate and friendly disposed Government," and promoting labor and political development along the supposed "democratic ways of the free world." In other words, the United States aimed to prevent the possible development of socialism in Bermuda and/or a local government that did not comply with its regional agenda.

The United States also hoped to expand its trade with Bermuda. In 1965, from revenue generated from tourism, U.S. military bases and tax-exempt companies in the island, Bermuda was the largest dollar earner in the British Commonwealth relative to its size and population. Ninety-five percent of its tourist income came from the United States and Canada. Bermuda received no financial assistance from abroad and purchased more from the United States than it did from any other country. Its imports totaled $58,847,517, 46.9 percent of which ($27, 613, 332) came from the United States. This dependency on tourism and the bases made Bermuda's economy a fragile one.[6]

To maintain its interests, the United States promoted good relations between Base personnel and the local population. Service employees were encouraged to take part in local sports and such events, and occasionally opened the base to the Bermuda public. For example, the Base entered a float in the annual April Floral de and the Navy Band, the Kindley High School Band, and a contingent of marines also participated.[7]

The United States "encouraged" the Bermuda government to meet its requirements in the interests of NATO and itself, as the defense of the Western Atlantic was based on the U.S. forces in the region. By 1959, America was also in need of a global communications center for the Air Force and a High Frequency Direction Finding Station for the Navy. However, it believed that if it "pushed" too much it would jeopardize U.S.-Bermuda relations, for the granting of more land to America would have accented Bermuda's overpopulation concerns. Hence, the United States suggested that Canada submit a proposal to construct the needed defense facilities, which the United States could then use without public uproar. The Canadian authorities followed suit and the stations were built in Bermuda's Daniel's Head and Boaz Island. This was expected to spark local criticism, as Daniel's Head was one of the few remaining "unspoiled" areas in Bermuda.[8]

Hence, in 1966 the U.S. State Department noted that fraternal relations existed between itself and the United Bermuda Party (UBP). It also noted little public support for the Afro-Asian resolutions passed by the United Nations Trusteeship Committee of December 1965, which called for political self-determination and the closing of military bases in the West Indies. However, it was concerned that a change in government would affect the status of its bases and watched Bermuda's political developments closely.[9]

Worried about the possible impact of communism in Bermuda, the Bermuda-based American consul documented a list of all Cuban nationals who passed through the island in the 1960s. In addition, in 1965, when a "rift" began to appear between "radical" and "conservative" elements in the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), the consul was worried about possible formation of a Communist Party due to a split. E.A.R. Dismont, former PLP public relations officer, claimed that there was a Communist cell operating in the ranks and the Central Committee of the Party and it was felt that Wilfred Allen was a "well informed radical…sympathetic to Communist doctrine." The State Department also noted that a small nucleus of Bermudians had become involved with the Nation of Islam (NOI) during visits to the United States. This "potentially dangerous situation" was under the watch of the Bermuda Police Force, which placed members of the Nation with "records of criminal violence" and strong anti-White sentiment under surveillance.[10]

British officials felt that the growing Black radicalism in the Caribbean would create several problems for U.S. financial interests in the region, with private investments amounting to well over $2.5 billion in the English-speaking Caribbean. They also felt that the "days of unbridled investment in the Caribbean, with tax concessions and little local governmental demands" could not continue as before without conflicts with West Indian economic nationalists. It was expected that further investment would be based on stricter controls set by local government, including local equity participation, training of local personnel to take over top management positions, heavier corporate taxes or abolishment of tax concessions, higher salaries for locals, and requirements that U.S. companies turn over substantial equity to local governments to continue to operate in the Caribbean. It was also possible that the region's economies would shift from an overemphasis on tourism to local manufacturing and even agriculture, for "cries that tourism was 'subservient' (to White-moneyed tourists) had already been heard throughout the Caribbean."[11]

Caribbean economic nationalism would also mean "serious changes" in Britain's "business posture" in the region. If it took a "leftward turn," calls for the "complete eradication of any further American military installations" were to be expected. Hence, the British government felt it needed to be prepared to accept "an increased price to pay for the continuation of these installations."[12]

In 1969, the Caribbean was perhaps one the most unstable areas of the world, marked by imperialism, military activity, and political upheaval.[13] The British government planned to double its military presence in the region, evidenced by its military intervention in Anguilla. The PLP deplored this act, noting that Bermuda's Constitution allowed for the same kind of incident to occur in the island. Furthermore, British warships headed toward Anguilla passed through Bermuda, while Cuban aircraft were not allowed to refuel on the island. In February 1969, a Bermuda-based frigate had been sent to St. Vincent after tensions emerged with the arrest of Opposition Leader Ebenezer Joshua's wife, Ivy Joshua, for politically related reasons. In essence, Bermuda played a key role in Britain's plans for prolonged hegemony in the West Indies.[14]

Meanwhile, Canada maintained dramatic financial interests in the Caribbean. In 1971, 60–70 percent of banks in the Caribbean were Canadian controlled. In 1968 Bermuda's First National Bank was created by the Canadian-based Kirkland Corporation. The Bank of Nova Scotia owned 40 percent of its shares, and five out of its twelve directors were Nova Scotian. The Bank's chairman was M.A. Gibbons, a stalwart of the "Forty Thieves."[15]

Canada's concerns with Black Power in the West Indies stemmed from the Movement's presence in its own backyard. Afro-Caribbean students had launched a significant sit-in at Sir George Williams College in Montreal. Many were from Trinidad and Tobago, but possessed close ties with U.S. Black Power leaders. They had taken over the school's Computer Center in response to institutional and Canadian racism perpetuated against Black West Indians. Supported by Black immigrants in Montreal, the students were arrested, tried, and deported.[16]

The UBP government was extremely antagonistic toward Black Power, claiming that it would be a "springboard for racial disturbances" and lead to an uprising "because of underlying frustration just beneath the surface" of Bermuda's "extremist-minded Black youth." Immediately after the announcement of the BPC, UBP leader Henry Tucker declared that "any extreme racial organization whose philosophy was to create racial division was not welcome in Bermuda," for "we" did not want groups that preached "racial disturbance" in the island. Furthermore, he remarked that it was the government's responsibility to ensure that "Bermuda controlled its own destiny and social and economic future."[17]

If the UBP was truly concerned about Bermuda controlling its own destiny, then the island would have since been independent. Tucker reiterated the notion among Whites that foreign Blacks would "stir up trouble" among the "good and mild-tempered Negroes" of Bermuda. This dubiously suggested that Blacks in Bermuda either had no reason to resist White hegemony, or were not aware of their oppression.[18]

It is obvious that Tucker's "we" referred to Bermuda's oligarchy. Tucker hailed from early White settlers of Bermuda (including Governor Daniel Tucker [1616–19]), and epitomized the legacy of the Forty Thieves that had built its wealth on the backs of Africans enslaved in Bermuda.[19] From positions as colonial governors to presidents of the Governor's Council, the Tuckers had historically played a leading role in the oppression of Blacks. Tucker had been chairman of the aforementioned 1953 Select Committee on Racial Relations that stated that racial segregation was an economic necessity for Bermuda. Ironically, Tucker's leadership was key to implementing a UBP policy of using integration to stifle Black militancy. Under his direction, the UBP emphatically publicized its "deep-seated opposition to the racial separatism implicit in Black Power" and criticism of Kamarakafego. As government leader Tucker was particularly vocal, stating that he was disturbed by those who "attempted to seize naked power" by "underground processes vs. constitutional" means. Such people would deplorably influence Bermuda's susceptible youth, who needed to be taught that hate was not an "essential weapon for success" and that the way that Bermuda's "coloured" group could be bettered

was not through "hate and suppression of White people." Bermuda could better its race relations, increase its economic prosperity, and achieve higher employment and "the best things in life," or "go down the dark path which meant…violence, misery and poverty." These "very serious dangers" could only be overcome through the efforts of "right thinking people who believed in religion, the church" and "the elementary values." Furthermore, the Church and State needed to help save Bermuda from such "deteriorating propaganda," "hate campaigns," and from being torn apart by "hatred and race violence."[20]

While traveling to Canada, he informed 350 of the city's leading businessmen at the affluent Club of Montreal that race relations in Bermuda dwarfed "all other problems." He expressed regret at the recent student "unrest" at Sir Williams College.[21] Tucker further stated that the UBP would not tolerate organizations that fostered "racial hatred and discord" and would "stamp out subversive influences" by those who wished to "achieve racial supremacy and naked power by violent" means. Integration was the only key to prosperity, and Bermuda could be a model place in regard to race relations. It was not important to dwell on the evils of the past, as Whites and Blacks had participated in slavery. Hence, it was unrealistic to assert that Anglo-Saxons be held guilty for the "savage punishments" of slavery. The 1965 and April 1968 riots had racial undertones, but were primarily due to the youth's natural tendency to rebel against authority. The answer was to increase education, recreational facilities, cultural activities, and job opportunities for the Black youth.

Tucker erroneously claimed that Bermuda had been "bi-racial for three hundred and fifty years" and, due to Bermuda's isolation, race relations had historically been good. A "few, brilliant and dedicated colored individuals" had contributed to Bermudian society, but Black progress was accompanied by a rising militancy as a small minority of "coloreds" were becoming impatient about change. Bermudians had generally not been exposed to the influences of foreign propaganda, but recent technological changes allowed the island to be visited by people from North America, Europe, and the Caribbean, and to be "exposed to the influences of radio and television, to foreign newspapers and magazines" and vicious left-wing propaganda." Hence, Bermuda's racial conflicts were due to outside forces.[22]

Tucker's racism leaps through the text. His attempt to "white-wash" slavery is outlandish. The primary beneficiaries of the enslavement of African people were Europeans, Europe, and the elites of the so-called New World. Africa did not benefit from the Atlantic "slave" trade, which immensely damaged its population growth and economic, political, and social systems.[23] His implication that Whites and Blacks historically "got along" reasonable well is ludicrous given the island's history of slavery,

colonialism, and his own flirtatious relationship with apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, the notion that the Church could stifle Black Power was part of a larger process of demonizing the Movement.

The government leader was apparently attempting to allay the fears of Canadian businessmen about Black Power's possible disruption of their financial ventures in Bermuda. He gave the impression that Black Power had only a small minority of supporters and was directly driven by external factors. He downplayed the racial element of the island's unrest, attributing it to general "youth unrest." As stated, the UBP was using the notion of integration as a tool to *maintain* their power, not to *balance* power between Black and White populations; it also was an instrument used to divide the Black community.[24] In addition, it would take much more than a recreational center to control the Black youth, for the core problem was *not these youth* but Bermuda's social system itself. Nevertheless, Tucker continued to stress the need to better race relations while refusing to truly do so in the best interest of Black people.

Led by Tucker, the UBP planned to ban the Black Power Conference (BPC) on the grounds that it would harm tourism and race relations in the island. However, this decision was questioned by Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which recommended that legislative powers enabling the government to ban the BPC needed to be "part of a broader legislative measure designed to promote racial cooperation and outlaw racial discrimination." Furthermore, under the Emergency Powers Act, the governor could only impose such a ban during a State of Emergency, which would be "difficult to apply" in advance of the Conference.[25]

The FCO also felt that a ban would have damaging political and racial effects that could generate antigovernment feeling among even moderate Blacks and further support for the PLP; unify the PLP against the government; or drive Black Power underground and create further security threats. Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson also agreed with the decision to not ban the Conference. Hence, the FCO recommended other measures to thwart the BPC: "place any notorious undesirables on the stop list"; introduce legislation to outlaw racial discrimination (such as Britain's own Race Relations Act); and use propaganda to discredit Black Power.[26]

It also suggested that the UBP amend the 1963 Bermuda Public Order Act to empower the governor to "prohibit public meetings if he was of the opinion that it was to be attended by people not from Bermuda" and if the meeting would breach the stipulations of the forthcoming Race Relations Bill. The police were to be given the ability to prevent and halt such activities.[27]

FCO officials proceeded to assess the level of local and regional Black Power activity, so that it could implement "informed" countermeasures. Its

Information and Research Department (IRD) requested further information from the Security Service, Century House, and U.S. officials about the "operation and…finances of Black Power organizations, advocates and activities in the Caribbean and U.S.," and those who might attend the Conference. Placed under heavy surveillance, Kamarakafego and A. Hodgson were said to have made contact with a number of "subversive" elements and several African-American nationalists as they traveled throughout the Americas organizing for the BPC.[28]

U.S. authorities played a key role in this process. In early 1969 the United States instigated a "Potential Leader Biographic Reporting Program" to identify "those likely to play a significant role in [Bermuda's] political future and to focus post collection attention on them" to build an adequate biographical database about the island.[29] This is key, as C. Manning, U.S. consul to Bermuda, believed that the UBP was faced with "a cruel dilemma," as stopping the Conference would "play into the hands of Bermuda's Black extremists," link Bermuda "in blazoned headlines with…South Africa," and garner the BPC more support.[30]

In May, Manning noted that Kamarakafego had visited Cuba to organize for the BPC. He further reported that he had a large following among Bermuda's "Negro youth" and was actively teaching groups of "young people how to hate." However, the source of the funds for the Conference and Kamarakafego's personal income remained unknown, though he drove an expensive sports car and frequently traveled.[31]

In addition, Kamarakafego had been actively recruiting potential participants from the United States, many who were "known militants." Furthermore, the FCO had compiled a list of about forty individuals that he had contacted in the District of Columbia area and had word that he was attempting to arrange a chartered air flight to bring delegates from the Los Angeles area.[32]

On May 15, after months of intelligence gathering, the FCO met in Barbados with a Bermuda delegation (which included Tucker, E.T. Richards, and Martonmere) and Lord Shepherd (British minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs) to consolidate plans to suppress the Conference. It was decided that, in addition to the implementation of a Race Relations Bill, Bermuda's immigration controls would be steeply increased and a military presence stationed off the island. Shepherd was certain that the Defense Department would be happy to provide them with a vessel, and perhaps one from Antigua could be "arranged" to have engine trouble in the area of Bermuda and give it a legitimate reason to dock in the island.[33]

Henceforth, Tucker publicly claimed that the government would not ban the BPC because it had always recognized Bermuda's need for "complete

freedom of speech, assembly and opportunity." He further remarked that the UBP saw no trouble arising from the Conference and was relying on the "good sense of the promoters" and participants to see that "nothing untoward" happened at the "get-together." However, certain legislative powers would be used to assure that "law and order" was preserved and to protect Bermuda from being disrupted by external forces that could "take over the island." As expected, there was no mention about military intervention.[34]

However, the UBP was not on accord with this decision; UBP Member of Colonial Parliament (MCP) Harry Viera claimed that the Department of Tourism was receiving letters of concern from prospective visitors. He felt it unfortunate that "Negro separatists" were dominating the discussion on race and would soon justify White "resistance and hostility to legitimate Negro aspirations." Hence, the government needed to stop the BPC.[35] In a classic example of blaming the victim for the aggression of the victimizer, Viera asserted that in protesting racism, Blacks would create further racism.

MCP Sharpe felt that the days were filled with hate and separateness, unlike the "old days of togetherness." Other UBP MCPs claimed that they were being pressured to take action against the BPC. Lancelot Swan told his concerned constituents of St. George's South that while Black Power had two definitions—the harnessing of Black resources to invest in businesses or the desire for "independent Black separation"—he disagreed with both.[36] He further retorted,

> [E]very little rock in the ocean seems to be crying out for independence, even places with no real economy to back up such a move. Some people are crying out for it here, giving as their reason, pride. Well, I say we already have pride in what we are. Many will say "what can England or America do for us?" To them I say: They can protect us. So many countries want their own flag and anthem but they should examine what they stand to gain before taking such a step.... Here in Bermuda we enjoy the luxury of choice, and we should be very thankful for it.[37]

Such comments were typical of Bermuda's Black elite. In reality, Bermuda remained segregated; this was evidenced by the public debate over desegregation in the education system and the privatization of White schools to keep out Black students. Swan's views represented the quintessential essence of a colonized mind trained to reiterate what Whites had been trying to convince Blacks for decades: that they needed to be thankful for enjoying the economic status associated with colonialism and sacrifice self-determination in exchange for questionable short-term promises of economic opportunity. However, as colonialism supported the White oligarchy, it inhibited the island's collective economic growth for it did not

allow Black Bermudians to maximize on the profits generated through industries such as tourism and international business. In addition, from whom was Bermuda to be protected? As British forces had historically been used to quell internal Black uprisings, was colonialism designed to protect Bermuda against itself?

In March 1969 the highly anticipated Wooding Commission Report of the 1968 riots was released. The Report helped keep the discussion of race in the public arena, for it found that the so-called riots were racially motivated. It led to a number of heated debates about race relations in the House of Parliament and was part of the context in which the UBP, as instructed by the FCO, implemented the Race Relations Bill. It was obvious that such legislation targeted Black protest. In fact, the UBP stated in the Report that it would take "strong measures" against those causing "racial unrest"[38] and planned to "strengthen…legislation…to promote integration and make incitement to racial hatred a criminal offense." Surmising the UBP's official position on Black Power, it continued, "The Government wishes to make it absolutely clear, both inside and outside Bermuda, that it will not tolerate attempts by any groups or individuals to foment racial discord; and that vigorous action will be taken…against those who seek to disrupt our society."[39]

The UBP agreed with a number of the Report's opinions, such as its claims that Bermuda's historic racism and segregation had been arrested and integration was the key to Bermuda's future; the racial imbalance on the Police Force was a major cause of the riots (which the government claimed to be Bermudianizing); several of the rioters were surrounded by "illegitimacy…[were] slaves to narcotics, had venereal diseases and came from broken homes"; and that there were no cases of police brutality.[40]

However, the UBP government rejected other finds and refused to implement several recommendations made by the Commission to help solve Bermuda's racial problems.[41] For example, it disagreed with the Report's findings that the PLP helped to control the riots. In fact, Tucker claimed that Black Power and the PLP influenced the riots through remarks that "exalted" Black Power and claimed that Martonmere was a "racist and supremacist" and Black supporters of the UBP Uncle Toms. He also (contrary to the recommendations) refused to lift the ban on *Muhammad Speaks* because the paper "preached hate"[42] and it was the government's policy to keep "anti-White and anti-coloured" publications outside of Bermuda (such as the White supremacist *Truth Seeker*, which had been banned in 1968 at the instigation of Bermuda's Black youth).

Tucker claimed that Bermuda's youth "problems" were simply of a generational matter, and that the government was officially creating a body to oversee youth activities.[43] He then denounced the Report's finds

that racial discrimination existed in areas such as immigration and employment.[44] Other Whites, one of whom attacked suggestions by the PLP that Bermudians be trained for all managerial positions, shared this position.

One letter to the *Gazette* questioned the ability to train someone to be a manager "whose education had stopped at thirteen." Several attempts to train local Bermudians to work at the TV and radio stations had only led to "sad results": "To have to listen to the ZBM news announcements via radio by an obviously uneducated announcer is an example of the lowering of standards that would have to follow any attempt to substitute Bermudians for trained expatriates." The author also claimed that Bermudians were used to high standards: politeness, uninterrupted supply of electricity, first-class treatment in restaurants, courteousness at the airport, and efficiency in the shops—if Bermudians were pushed "into jobs for which they were neither suited nor trained for" such high standards would be lowered, the tourist trade jeopardized, and Bermuda would sink "to the dreadful level of misery" of "nearly every island in the West Indies."[45]

However, Black Bermudians were continually discriminated against and rejected from jobs for which they were educationally qualified on the grounds that they lacked experience. How could they have been expected to gain experience when they were not hired? One "Trained Inexperienced," was a victim of this policy, which the hotels and large businesses used to turn down Black Bermudians. After this slap in the face, "Trained Inexperienced" backed Black Power and the PLP "all the way." "Another Trained Inexperienced" had spent about £1,000 on study abroad only to face the same cold reception as "Trained Experience" when applying for a job. He/she found that Black Power Movement, the PLP, and the Bermuda Industrial Union (BIU) were the only options for young Blacks since the administrators of most businesses were UBP oriented.[46]

The PLP felt that the Report called for sweeping changes. Roberts, deputy opposition leader, noted that the Commission "came down heavy" on the UBP for controlling Bermuda's banks and politics and showed that they were truly responsible for the uprising. In disagreement, Dudley Spurling (UBP MCP for Education) argued that it would be a "disservice to education" to implement the measures recommended by the Commission (such as tight zoning for primary school attendance and island-wide common syllabi). Spurling felt that zoning would deprive parents (read, White parents) of the choice to send their children to preferred institutions. Eugene Cox (PLP) noted that Spurling neglected to mention the biased racial and national composition of schoolteachers and remarked that the UBP was attempting to deal with the symptoms rather than the root causes of the uprisings. Wade accepted blame for the disturbances in that the PLP had

simply informed people about Bermuda's social injustices but remarked that it was ludicrous to say that the PLP set out to start the "riots."

The House also discussed the proposed Race Relations Bill, which was supposed to "prohibit discrimination on racial grounds and to penalize incitement to racial hatred and racial acts." As stated however, this Bill was actually a legal mechanism in which the UBP codified its opposition to Black Power. Based on Britain's 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts, it read

> (1) A Person shall be guilty of an offense under this section if, with intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public in Bermuda distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic or national origins (a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting;… being matter or words likely to stir up hatred against that section on grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins.[47]

The Bill made it a *criminal* offense to verbally or physically "incite racial hatred" at a public place or meeting. This was punishable by a maximum penalty of £1,000 and two years imprisonment and included unlawful advertisements and notices indicating intent to discriminate. It also deemed it illegal to publish or distribute written matter or to use "in any public place or at any public meeting words" that were racially "threatening, abusive or insulting" with the "intent to excite or promote ill-will or hostility against any section of the public distinguished by colour, race or national origins." This included a maximum sentence of one-year imprisonment and a £200 fine.

It also deemed it a *civil* offense to racially discriminate in areas related to joining licensed clubs, trade unions, employers and trade organizations; housing and accommodations; providing goods, facilities, and services; employment; banking; insurance; education, instruction, or training; transport or travel, entertainment; and the services of any business, profession, or trade. It also amended the Hotel and Inn Keeper's Act, implementing stricter regulations for the accommodations of visitors to Bermuda and requiring establishments that catered to more than six people to be licensed.[48] This was probably an attempt to hinder housing arrangements for the Conference participants and document those who provided them with accommodations.

Kamarakafego strongly opposed the Bill. While Tucker spoke about its terms, Kamarakafego raised a clenched fist above his head. He then reprimanded Tucker for using the term "colored" to describe Blacks, stating "Black people… I am a Black man, not colored."[49] He noted several biased clauses in the proposed Bill, correctly recognizing that criminal offenses under the Act specifically targeted Blacks[50] while those considered civil

related to Whites. For example, it would be criminal to call someone a "Black or White bastard," punishable by jail time and a fine. Blacks were likely to protest verbally against oppression in this manner. Yet, White institutional racism, such as racial discrimination in job hiring, would only be a civil offense, and result in a fine. In his opinion, racial offenses needed to be both civil and criminal. As implied by U.S. Consul Manning, the Bill was surrounded by such nuances:

> To make all forms of racial discrimination in education and in the economic field unlawful (thereby stealing some of the opposition's political thunder); and to impose severe penalties for any person "inciting ill will or hostility against any section of the public in these Islands distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic or national origins." *This latter provision will give the Government the power to imprison violators (e.g., Black Power extremists) up to two years*. (Emphasis mine)[51]

During the debate, Swan (UBP) proposed that the government ban the BPC because it would lead to riots. Kamarakafego raised his hand for a Point of Order and was recognized by the speaker of the House, Col. Astwood. As he spoke members of the UBP told him to "shut up and sit down." The House became very noisy and Kamarakafego's calls to Astwood to quieten the crowd went unheeded. In fact, Astwood told him to sit down, which he refused to do because the speaker had recognized him. Kamarakafego then moved to the center of the House and loudly remarked, "Which one of you b******s is going to sit me down?" He walked over to Tucker and said, "Are you going to sit me down, an old shriveled up b*****d like you?" Kamarakafego recalled that years previously he had heard Tucker call E.F. Gordon a "monkey" in Parliament and he had wanted to "hit Tucker on Gordon's behalf." According to Kamarakafego,

> [Tucker] looked at the floor for if he had looked at me I would have punched him in the face. When he raised his head and looked challengingly at me, I put my fist in his face and he ducked under the desk. Moving from desk to desk, I asked several people the same question. No one said anything. Then I went to where the mace was and knocked it off the desk…with all the papers. Eventually, I went to my seat…and put my feet up on the desk. The Speaker…said, "Mr. Browne, your conduct is atrocious, it is outrageous! I must ask you to leave the House. So I…started to walk out…Dr. Master's sang out…"Look at him, that arrogant thing swearing in the Queen's House"…I turned around and said loudly, "f*** the Queen, that syphilitic whore! And who needs to be here with you f***ing ass-hole creepers anyhow?"… The House…went into an uproar…and found what I had said extremely offensive.[52]

Kamarakafego was suspended from the House, which Tucker claimed had a "history of tradition and dignity," for several weeks for "using un-Parliamentary language."[53]

The *Recorder* conducted a sample "On the Spot" poll in his constituency of Pembroke East and Hamilton city to see how people felt about his "behavior in the House." Most interviewees who agreed with Kamarakafego refused to be identified. The typical response was that he should not have been suspended and been allowed to speak. However, some stated that he was letting the people down and should not have sworn, was "very rude," a bad example for the public, and not "a good person to be a youth organizer"; that he carried on in a ridiculous manner and should not have been in charge of Black Power; should have abided by the rules of the House and needed to apologize; and should have been kicked out of Parliament, never have been allowed to enter, or his suspension extended because nothing like that had previously happened to "coloured" MCPs. Furthermore, his disobedience displayed no respect for the House and his actions hurt himself, the PLP, and the Conference after which there might be a riot. Only one White person responded, simply stating that his "outburst was very bad behavior" and he/she disliked his "communist leanings."

Others felt that Kamarakafego had been suspended because he was a Black Power advocate; he had been provoked into saying the truth; there was nothing wrong with the Conference; Parliamentary leaders aggravated him and deserved it; and he was right in walking out of Parliament. This included the *Recorder*, which stated that people had put up with unfair treatment for so long, and when ignited, one "loses one's head." However, it still felt that Tucker had made a "brilliant speech" deploring Kamarakafego's actions and that the speaker of the House was "most lenient" on him.[54]

Nevertheless, under the charge of John Plowman (UBP), the House debated the Bill for weeks. MCP Clarence James (UBP) called it a "milestone in legislation." However, the PLP reiterated the views of Kamarakafego and found the Bill to be a bad and untimely one. Ball (PLP) found that the sections likely to be violated by Blacks carried the heaviest penalties while those affecting Whites were "lenient and full of loopholes." Wade remarked that if it was necessary to call anyone in the UBP a "house-nigger or a cracker," then he would do it despite the risk of imprisonment.[55]

Arnold Francis (Bermuda Democratic Party) noted that the Bill merely reiterated the rights of individuals as defined in Bermuda's Constitution and needed "teeth." It could not quickly address discrimination against Blacks in areas such as housing. Blacks were often prevented from renting or buying homes in certain areas by Whites who were often non-Bermudian. For example, he had once successfully negotiated to buy

property in Warwick from an anxious seller. When delays occurred, he discovered that certain White neighbors did not want "a coloured family next door, and most objections came from an English woman." Thus, he felt it was more important to address racial discrimination in areas such as housing or employment as opposed to punishing individuals for stating racial epitaphs. Francis suggested that a Race Relations Board be created to deal with such discrimination.

A. Hodgson felt that the Bill would only allow a few elite Blacks to gain relief from discrimination. Also, the government needed to "set the pace for racial harmony," and amend the Bill to prohibit discrimination based upon sex, religion, political affiliation as well as that of race, color, ethnic and national origin, and make it illegal for private organizations to discriminate racially. Yet the government's own racism was clearly obvious: government building contracts were awarded to White companies to the exclusion of Black-run firms; police officers and educators were recruited from primarily White countries; Blacks were searched at Bermuda's airport in ways that Whites were not; and White schools continued to receive greater funds than Black schools.

He called on Plowman to provide a summary of current race relations, such as the following: how many Blacks as opposed to White occupied management positions?; how did the government intend on dealing with the disproportion of wealth between Whites and Blacks?; and what plans did it have to integrate housing? He "dared" Plowman to produce statistics showing racial income distribution and asked how many Blacks were directors of Holmes, William and Purvey (HW&P—of which Plowman was employed), the Banks of Bermuda and Butterfield, and the Gibbons Company?

Plowman denounced Hodgson's "wild . . . hashing over the past," claiming that it was "generally accepted" that considerable progress had been made in Bermuda. Rejecting Francis's "radical" suggestion for a Race Relations Committee he claimed that offended persons could "take action as they saw fit" and find other organizations to take up their cases, as this was fairly easy and inexpensive to do in the lower courts. However, Francis contended that people discriminated against in these areas were more than likely of little means financially and could not do so.

Yet Plowman claimed that the government was "determined to do everything to bring the races together, have them working in harmony and goodwill . . . and living where their means applied." A new bank had been opened up by Black "gentlemen" with White senior officials, who were the best-qualified people for the available posts. Hence, "if Mr. Hodgson suggested that senior jobs should be filled on the basis of race only" then Bermuda was in serious trouble.

Hodgson responded by saying look toward the future: "Let [Plowman] not classify the wealthy districts, let him project them for next year. Let him not tell me how many Black people live in the back of town, let him project it for next year. Let's go to the future." Hugh Richardson (PLP) asserted that Plowman could not convince his own staff that he was not a bigot. Employees of HW&P had remarked that Plowman had employed an "incompetent Englishman" for over a year while refusing to promote a Bermudian to the post until the situation deteriorated to a point where he was forced to do so.[56]

Whites felt that the Bill infringed on their rights. One felt that the government had no right to place racial stipulations upon people's homes: integration of the schools was understandable "but to invade our homes is going too far." Another equated Hodgson's "senseless" amendment to the suggestion of a former MCP that fathers of illegitimate children be castrated. For him, the ability to invite people into private associations was a "human right reserved to the individual in free society." He continued: "I find it difficult not to recognize the fox-like cunning with which the [UBP] sprung to the support and evidence of the blind-moused amendment proposed by the [PLP]. [Tucker] will find it difficult to exonerate himself and his party from just criticism, and possible condemnation, if that amendment…becomes law." To his dismay, the amended Bill was passed on June 7.[57]

Some Blacks felt that a Bill would not be enough to address racism. One Alexander Romeo stated that the legislation did nothing more than "give a legal definition of the word 'coloured.'" The Bill was "one hundred years behind the social, cultural, and intellectual achievements of the Black man." In addition, where did "the White man get the idea the Black man wants to go to his clubs?" Blacks needed to be placed in positions of "leadership" in Bermuda, as in the Trust Department of the Bank of Bermuda, as lawyers in the attorney general's office, and acting governor. He further stated that the "Black man alone would, when he is good and ready, decide whether he will keep the advantages he has made of segregation or look into the pertinacious excuses the UBP is selling him as integration."

An M.J.H. felt that the Race Bill would stifle "free speech." In England, citizens could make fun of the queen, but "in little Bermuda…you can be fined…if you speak the truth about such people as the Governor, Sir Henry, E.T. Richards or Clarence James." As opposed to a Bill, better race relations would stem from knowing the history of various ethnic groups, and as White history had been taught for centuries in Bermuda it was long due that Black history was in the curricula of Bermuda's schools: "Perhaps now that we have a coloured man as Chairman of the Board of Education, he would show that he is not completely brainwashed, by insisting that Black

history be introduced into the school curricula no later than September, 1969. And when we say Black history we do not mean the White man's version but that written by Blacks."

According to a Dawson Swan, the Bill was "designed to stifle Black minds." It was erroneous to think that someone could be persecuted for stating that someone was racist, and if any Black person supported the UBP after this act, "heaven help them." Swan also questioned whether the UBP was attempting to turn Bermuda into another Rhodesia, "but with Black puppets included to mask alternative purposes."[58]

Seemingly on cue, June 7, 1969 marked the anniversary of Bermuda's new Constitution. As usual, Bermuda's leaders gave addresses. Martonmere felt that the anniversary marked one year of responsible government "under which Bermudians…had the direct responsibility of running the every-day affairs" of the island. He looked forward to a "long period of good government under leaders democratically elected by the people of Bermuda."[59] This is ironic, for Martonmere himself was not elected by the "people of Bermuda" but appointed by the queen of England on the advice of the British Parliament. Tucker shared the governor's sentiment on this "significant occasion in the political history of this colony." The new Constitution, a "good document," had passed the test of the past year, and the "best interests of qualified Bermudians" had been protected in the public, governmental, and private domains.

In contrast, Browne-Evans demanded that the Constitution be changed immediately. She disagreed with Tucker, as the government had not taken responsibility to Bermudianize the civil service. Exposing Martonmere's supposed "democracy," she stated that under the Constitution less than 75 percent of the adult population was allowed to vote. Furthermore, it allowed the governor to make appointments to the Legislative Council, which was a "sham" contrary to "self Government." Hence, the PLP felt that the document was fundamentally flawed. She continued: "Of course if one takes the view that the Constitution is designed to preserve the Colonial status quo then we admit that the Constitution has worked very well. But, we believe that the Constitution should be designed to promote the interest of Bermudians and in this regard it has failed."[60]

Browne-Evans was correct. From the perspective of the British government and the UBP, the Constitution *was* exceptional because colonialism was the aim. It would have been unrealistic to expect any other response from Tucker, whose class marked him as a benefactor of colonialism rather than a victim. However, for progressive Blacks, colonialism was unacceptable because it helped maintain the oppression of local Blacks. Furthermore, while several African countries and the Caribbean had gained independence, in 1969 Bermuda one letter to the *Gazette* could

tell Blacks in Bermuda "not to bite the hand that feeds you," or, in less colloquial terms, Black Bermudians needed to be grateful colonial subjects to a diminishing British Empire. The governor's leading role in attempting to thwart the BPC was perhaps the most obvious example of the island's colonial status.

On June 17, the British FCO summoned Martonmere to London to discuss Bermuda's internal security during the BPC and logistics regarding British military assistance to be sent to Bermuda as "a precautionary measure." It was then decided that "the best guarantee for a quiet Conference [was] to keep extremists' attendance to a minimum, while at the same time letting it leak out quietly and continuously that the Government [was] taking meaningful precautions in case of trouble."[61]

Furthermore, the Latin America and Caribbean Current Intelligence Group, a joint Intelligence body that included the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had also been discussing the Conference. The group found that there were Black Power supporters in the Bermuda Police Force and the Regiment. It also questioned whether local forces would be able to contain major disturbances that could occur before, during, and after the Conference as Kamarakafego was "violently disposed" and militant extremists from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Caribbean were expected to attend.[62]

Hence, the British government decided to send eighty officers and forty-five marine commandoes to reinforce the seamen and marines of the *H.M.S. Arethusa* and *H.M.S. Mohawk*, which were to be standing by Bermuda over the "danger period." These troops were to be brought into operation if the local forces could not contain any "disturbances." To minimize the publicity about the positioning of the troops, the marines were to be flown on July 3 to Freeport, Bahamas, and placed on a frigate that would take them to Bermuda by July 5, and "accommodated as inconspicuously as possible in the Naval station." The governor of Barbados was instructed to answer questions by stating that the marines were only boarding the *Arethusa* for routine exercises and by not revealing the destination of the frigate.[63]

The *Gazette* assumed that Martonmere's trip was related to the Conference:

> Perhaps the reputations of the more militant group who may be coming are sufficient to cause the British Government to lay on certain security precautions—and indeed not to do so when we suffered riots a year ago, and when emotions have been running high in the U.S. for some years now, would be careless of the interests and desires of the *great majority* of Bermudians. (Emphasis added)[64]

Upon his return, the governor refused to discuss the meeting. Browne-Evans criticized this secrecy, as "responsible Government" implied that such information was kept public.

A week later, the *Gazette* did indeed report that the *Mohawk* and *Arethusa*, carrying about five hundred marines, would be in Bermuda for the duration of the BPC. Interestingly, the *Arethusa* was on return from Anguilla, having just left Bermuda a week before to support the British military intervention in the island. As ordered by the FCO, the UBP claimed that the marines were simply en route to the Caribbean via Bermuda and had nothing to do with the Conference.[65]

In a television interview, Kamarakafego stated that he had seen British troops at the Regiment's headquarters at Warwick Camp and near the airport. He concluded that certain "White elements," which were to be excluded from the BPC, were using them to cause hysteria. He himself had turned down an "offer" for police "protection" from the commissioner of police.[66]

Col. J.A. Marsh, commanding officer of the Bermuda Regiment, stated that since 1968, approximately five hundred British troops had utilized the Warwick Camp facilities for periods of a few days due to political unrest in the Caribbean. Troops were to land in Bermuda during the BPC "only if it coincided with a routine stop-over or if a plane suffers mechanical trouble."

However, it was soon revealed that the troops had arrived because of an "internal security" risk. As planned, the *Gazette* obtained this information through a London news leak. The force included four Royal Air Force helicopters and forty-eight airmen. According to the paper, they were wearing civilian clothes and spending their time "swimming and relaxing."

The PLP offered a different image:

> Tourists arriving at the airport are greeted by riot squad. Armed policeman are scattered throughout the airport. The CIA, M15, M16 and Interpol are amongst the officials greeting the tourists at the airport. There are two battleships with British killers aboard. The Bermuda Army stands alert. All police leave has been cancelled. Military helicopters patrol the island every hour. British killers drive through the streets in plain clothes getting familiar with back of town. Are…these precautions necessary for internal security, or are they designed to incite or to intimidate?

Kamarakafego stated that "gun-carrying intelligence men from Britain and America" were also on the island. When asked how he knew this, he replied that "the Black Power Movement had its sources of information just like other organizations."[67]

In addition, helicopters made occasional flights over the island, while desert army land rovers, mounted with submachine guns, moved through the city. Also, throughout the duration of the BPC, U.S., Canadian, and British warships were in the Hamilton Harbor and generally in Bermuda's waters. The presence of two Canadian destroyers had been encouraged by the Sir William Stephenson's Organization, which included prominent Bermudians with personal Canadian connections and influence. For example, Henry Butterfield and others had contributed £50,000 to the group.[68]

The UBP dubiously argued for the presence of the troops. Tucker claimed that it was "necessary to take precautions in the interests of everyone." The marines, who would only be put into action once "local" forces (comprising mostly White British nationals) had retired, had been kept secret for "fear of provocation." Bayard Dill (UBP), who claimed that there would have been no need to reinforce the police if previous BPCs had not always led to "trouble," even admitted that the force looked larger than necessary, and that the UBP appeared to be using "a sledgehammer to kill a fly."

In response, A. Hodgson stated that the three BPCs in Washington D.C., New Orleans, and Philadelphia had not included violence. The Newark Conference had been preceded by unrelated rioting, as most major U.S. cities were experiencing at the time, and city leaders had remarked that the Conference had actually helped calm the city. In contrast, while the Royal Navy commodore pontificated about his "peacekeeping duties," Britain was a warring country and "there was hardly a time when she [had not] been killing people somewhere." Bermuda was supposed to possess "responsible Government," but in a crisis "immediately the whole thing passed out of the hands of Bermudians into those of Englishmen."

Martonmere maintained that the troops were necessary because the UBP's decision not to ban the Conference caused certain risks. However, Kamarakafego described the presence of the troops as "stupid, just like Anguilla." While Whites welcomed them, they "brought unnecessary tension." He further felt that if trouble did occur at the Conference, it would be brought about by Whites.

According to the PLP, the BPC had given the UBP an "excellent opportunity to display the respect" that they claimed to have for Blacks in Bermuda. However, they had instead "resorted to open intimidation and rule by guns, bullets and clubs." Surely the gathering of Blacks for a conference did not "require that the entire Black population be placed under siege."[69]

According to Francis, such measures were "warlike" and secretive; and if a Jewish defamatory organization had held a conference in the island, similar precautions would not have been taken. H. Richardson stated that such insulting practices would continue as long as the governor had the

constitutional right to draw funds from the Bermuda treasury as he saw fit. The UBP's attitude was affecting the rest of the island; the presence of these "professional killers" caused the youth to act more rebellious and, in addition, the police were acting more "haughty."[70]

Interesting to note, Manning stated that the intelligence agencies did not possess any intelligence that violence was planned. Furthermore, the UBP was satisfied with the wide spectrum of "precautionary security measures" that it had implemented. This included the cancelation of all previously approved vacations for the Bermuda Police Force.[71]

In addition, "more extreme Black Power advocates" were to be prevented from entering Bermuda through tightened immigration laws, despite concerns about the latter's impact on tourism (this was reminiscent of the implementation of the 1931 Immigration Act that sought to restrict West Indian immigrants into Bermuda). This included the Bermuda Immigration's use of a sizeable "stop-list" to identify "militants." At the UBP's request, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) would help strengthen Bermuda's immigration procedures, and Bermuda officers were subsequently sent to the United States for training.

Weeks prior to the Conference, immigration officials possessed a list of about three hundred and sixty "undesirables" (persons not to be allowed to enter the island); these names were to be committed to memory by customs officers. This system was deemed to be "too weak" to use for the BPC and new immigration controls were implemented by the Police Force under Deputy Inspector Frederick C. Bean of narcotics control. For the first time, police were to assist immigration officials in their activities. Bean had made an unofficial request that related to

> the surveillance which the Bermuda Police are maintaining over Roosevelt Brown and other members of the PLP. Although the police are kept informed of the departures of such persons from Bermuda by plane through passenger lists supplied by the airlines, in the normal course the Bermuda authorities have difficulty in obtaining direct knowledge of an outgoing passenger's total itinerary or plans for activity during his trip abroad. Because INS does ascertain these facts for its own use in the case where an outgoing Bermudian's first stop on his trip is the United States, Bean wondered whether INS might not provide such information to the Bermuda Police in selected cases where the police are interested in the passenger for political reasons.... there has long been a free interchange with the Bermuda authorities regarding persons with criminal records.[72]

These controls were solidified through U.S., British, and Canadian intelligence efforts. The FBI and Canadians "had been very cooperative in furnishing information and...providing names and data on that

country's listed undesirables to flesh out Bermuda's stop-list." Officials felt that their total efforts were "likely to be successful," for few moderates had seemed to accept invitations to the Conference and the government would be able to prevent the "bulk of the extremists" from entering Bermuda.[73]

The immigration changes were enacted literally days before the Conference. Black visitors were immediately searched, harassed, and interrogated at length at the airport. One woman had left the airport, was followed to Paget, and had her bags searched in the street. Wade noted that while the UBP constantly expressed fear at upsetting tourism, no action was taken when negative things happened to Black visitors.[74]

While entering Bermuda, PLP MCP Walter Roberts was unusually asked for his passport. He also inquired about the presence of fourteen detectives and immigration officers. He was then falsely told that a new system was being tested in preparation of the arrival of Boeing 747 jets to Bermuda in the next year.

Conference delegates were intensively questioned, including a couple aged in their seventies who had been involved in the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Numbers of others, such as Omar Ahmed, were not allowed to remain in Bermuda. Ahmed, a member of the Black Power Central Committee, was sent back to New York. Ahmed attempted to reenter Bermuda disguised as a Rev. James H. Thomas, but was again turned back along with a Al Sultan Nassar Ahmed of San Francisco. According to Manning, these first apparent uses of the stop-list caused certain "extremist Black Power advocates" to cancel their "flight plans at the last minute." Such was the case with Maluana Karenga, the founder of the California-based US and Kwanzaa, after one of his bodyguards was denied entry.[75]

Others prevented from entering Bermuda included Norman S. Cook (from Canada) and Paul Boutelle (Socialist Workers Party candidate for mayor of New York). Cook was put on an Air Canada flight to Montreal, which had to return after a false bomb threat was suspiciously made. Other delegates were prevented from leaving various airports external to Bermuda, such as in the Caribbean. These included Trevor Monroe and George Beckford (both economists at the University of the West Indies (UWI, Mona).

Some delegates used disguise in entering Bermuda. Officers often stopped delegates that donned Afros and wore dashikis. Others who dressed in a suit, tie, and hat (as did Yosef Ben-Jochannan) were sometimes not associated with the BPC and entered with little difficulty.[76]

The UBP denied these incidents. It now claimed to support the Conference by providing Kamarakafego with a desk at the airport and two

school halls for the BPC. It also boasted a "responsibility to protect the lives and property of all citizens of Bermuda, including those taking part in the Conference."[77]

While it had been purported that the Conference would have an adverse affect on tourism, Tucker was forced to admit that tourism had been "quite unaffected by the conference." The *Gazette* reported that the tourist trade was doing even better than the previous year.[78] Though things seemed "okay," Chief Secretary J. Sykes saw the greater problem as the "*possibility that some of Bermuda's Black youth might be stimulated by the Conference to 'demonstrate against authority' later in the summer or in September at school opening time*" (emphasis added).[79]

This apprehension with the growth of Black militancy reflected anxiety by NATO leaders with Black Power's emergence in the wider West Indies. Indeed, the Conference was perceived as a threat to U.S., British, and Canadian hegemony in the entire region. The flying in of British troops to Bermuda (for the second time in just over a year) reflected tactics to suppress the Movement in the Caribbean. paralleling such state action, local Whites expressed extreme antagonism toward the BPC. This collective response set the tone for further repression of Bermuda's Black Power Movement. However, as chapter 4 demonstrates, the Conference was nevertheless successful and officially confirmed that Black Power was entrenched in the Bermuda.

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4

Blueprint for Freedom: Bermuda's Black Power Conference of 1969

From July 10 to July13, 1969, the First Regional International Black Power Conference (BPC) was held in Bermuda. Local Blacks and the wider African Diaspora supported the meeting, which signified the growth of Black Power in the West Indies. As were other Black Power Conferences in the region, it was seen as an opportunity to address the concerns of the Blacks across the world.

The pan-African unity displayed by the Conference simultaneously represented a major concern for the island's neocolonialist orchestrators. It reminded Whites of what Blacks had never forgotten: that Garveyism was not dead despite the attempts of colonial elites to burn it out from its roots, and just as the Black masses shunned chemical processors and donned Afros and dashikis in a cultural quest to embrace *things African*, the authorities frantically sought to sever the growing relationship between African people, culture, and political thought and action. In this light, the BPC was particularly significant for the physically small but largely conservative island and certified that Black Power was in Bermuda to stay.

This chapter is focused on the actual organization of the Conference, which critically impacted the Black Power Movement in Bermuda and the wider Caribbean. Its impact in Bermuda was most overtly witnessed by the emergence of the Black Beret Cadre in its aftermath, which attempted to implement a number of the BPC's resolutions. The meeting also influenced subsequent BPCs and the Sixth Pan-African Conference (Dar Es Salaam, 1974).

As the chair of the BPC, Kamarakafego played a major role in setting its tone. To begin with, a concerted effort was made to keep the media and Whites on the periphery of the BPC. Kamarakafego informed those "incensed

over their exclusion" to organize their own Black Power Conferences, which he would attend if invited.[1] Several global news organizations attempted to cover the event, but were told that the BPC was "Black people's business."[2] Participants were instructed not to give interviews, because at previous meetings many had been too eager to intellectually "master—to the press…and ended up not doing any collective work." Kamarakafego told the press that the Conference was being held in Bermuda because it was one of the last remaining "colonial strongholds" and had been "a dumping ground for White Colonials like the Attorney General, Commissioner of Police, and the so-called Chief Secretary." In addition, Bermuda's House of Assembly was "full of White businessmen whose major aim was to protect their own profits and interests." Violence was not necessary to change the power structure because Blacks were demographically the majority population and could better Bermuda through education and majority rule. However, Bermuda needed Black Power because the "economic structure had drained…and left them powerless."[3] Humorously, Kamarakafego used a post-Conference press meeting to discuss the "biased and hostile" reporting of the *Gazette* and to announce a conference resolution that Black people boycott the paper.[4]

The BPC was officially sponsored by the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) Youth Wing, and included youth who had been involved in the 1968 uprising. "Youth Wingers" secured lodging for foreign delegates, particularly in Black-owned guesthouses and homes. They also provided security, kept order during workshops, prevented the media from entering the Conference, and arranged the tape recording of workshops and the printing of materials.[5]

The Conference was separated into various workshops that focused on global Black issues, such as Technology, Education, Communications, Economics, Religion, History, and Politics.[6] These workshops were spread across the island, including Devonshire Recreation Club, Vernon Temple Church, PHC stadium, Francis Patton, and Bishop Spencer schools, Alaska Hall, and the Hamilton Workmen's Club.[7]

Registration was held at Hamilton's City Hall, which, amidst towering paintings of the queen of England, and former Hamilton mayors, symbolically represented British colonialism. Nevertheless, it was centrally located and physically large enough to handle registration for the Conference. Kamarakafego, knowing that he would not be able to personally book the Hall, had a female associate do so (as well as other facilities) in her name.[8]

Representatives from the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa were part of the 1,500 persons who registered for the Conference. Crowds of at least that number attended the opening ceremonies at the PHC stadium, and were addressed by Bishop Bright, Member of Colonial Parliament (MCP) Hugh Richardson (PLP), and keynote speaker C.L.R. James, who was a mentor of Kamarakafego.[9]

Over one thousand locals were present, and joined about two hundred delegates from abroad. In addition, at least one hundred persons surrounded the stadium gates. News agencies swarmed the guarded gates of PHC. According to the *Recorder*, they had flocked to Bermuda "on the heels" of the British marines.[10]

Over the next few days, participants collectively gave presentations. One session on the Black Youth featured Abebech Beckele (Ethiopia), Abdul Nanji (Tanzania), and a Mr. Rufus of New Paltz State University (New York), Venneta Ross (St. Kitt's), Ewart Brown, and A. Hodgson. It was attended by about six hundred persons. Queen Mother Moore, founder-president of the Universal Association of Ethiopian Women, Inc. and Thelma Morgan (Bermuda) of New Paltz University led a session focused on Black women. Held at City Hall, it attracted at least seven hundred people. The closing session occurred at the Devonshire Recreation Club, and included reports from the workshop leaders, a closing address by Benjamin Wright, and statements by James, Ben-Jochannan, W. Robinson, and Kamarakafego.[11]

A diverse group of locals were present (including doctors, MCPs, union members, taxi drivers, students, and others such as Dr. Marjorie Bean, and F.S. Furbert—principal of Berkeley Institute). Various global movements and organizations sent telegrams and letters of support to the BPC. These included the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Japanese Red Army, Guyana's People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Black Panther Party, the South African National Liberation Front, the Cuban Revolutionary Committee, revolutionary groups from North Korea and North Vietnam, student groups from Haiti, Ethiopia, the wider Caribbean, and the United States, and indigenous peoples of the French Polynesian islands, New Caledonia, and the Solomon Islands.[12]

Antigua's *Worker's Voice* denounced Britain's sending of troops to "shadow" the Conference as a "disgusting, disgraceful, shameful act of aggression committed against people of African descent." It felt that Bermuda maintained an institutionalized anti-Black mechanism and suffered from the "same anti-Black disease as the U.S., Britain and South Africa." However, it was hoped that the "spirit of solidarity" would be "rekindled in spite of all the continued efforts of non-Black people to divide and rule Black people."[13]

Guyana's PPP shared this view. Party Executive "Boysie" Ram Karran objected to the presence of the troops and foreign intelligence officers at the Conference. The PPP also criticized the non-White governments of the Caribbean for failing to protest this intimidation by the British and American governments.[14]

Via telegram Kwame Nkrumah extended "Revolutionary greetings" to the Black Power Movement and wished the Conference great success. He

saw this "historic Black Power meeting" as part of "the world rebellion of the oppressed against the oppressor," which operated "wherever Africans and people of African descent" lived. This was a fight against international and domestic colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism and Black people were urged to remember that the "complete unification of Mother Africa" was the "prerequisite to our survival as a people." Hence, Black people needed to strategically combine strength and energy in a unified armed struggle "against the common enemy."[15]

Nkrumah was then copresident of Guinea under the invitation of President Sekou Toure. Kwame Toure was also in Conakry at the time, serving as Nkrumah's secretary and political student. He had traveled to Africa in 1968 to learn from Nkrumah and to actively "fight for Africa."[16] This relationship was reflected in a telegram sent by Kwame Toure himself:

> Brothers and sisters remember as Kwame Nkrumah says "Black Power epitomizes a new stage of revolutionary consciousness of . . . the Black man. Since the Black man is the most oppressed of the races of mankind Black Power is the struggle for the possession of economic, cultural, social and political power which he in common with the oppressed of the earth must have in order to . . . overthrow the oppressor." The only way to achieve this is through . . . Pan-Africanism as enunciated by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.[17]

Mitsuksu Shiboh, a representative of the Japanese Red Army and Japanese USA Congress, called on "Asian brothers and sisters to cooperate in our common struggle against imperialism." On behalf of the BPC, he expressed concerns about Asian comrades "following the policy of United States imperialism and pursuing an egotistical economic prosperity of their own." He also demanded that Japan stop supporting racism imposed on "Black brothers and sisters" and severe its relationship with South Africa and Rhodesia. Shiboh felt that the togetherness shown among Afro-Asians at the BPC needed to be reaffirmed "until all the brothers and sisters in Asia and Africa" unified. Such unity was an "essential weapon against the racism and economic exploitation imposed upon the entire non-western world" and had to be joined by all the forces in Asia and Africa. He also called for a BPC to be held in Asia over the next year to support the Vietnamese liberation struggle.[18]

Each workshop produced a number of key resolutions. Chaired by Howard University Professor of Political Science, Acklyn Lynch, the Education Workshop found that Black education required higher ethical standards than mainstream institutions because the society's wider culture was "motivated by materialism, profit making, competition and self seeking individualism with a resulting de-humanization." In a colonial situation,

such a culture produced an education system that reinforced "the values of the controlling colonial power" while simultaneously creating an elite class of exploiters, stifling creative potential, and ensuring that the masses remained economically oppressed and ignorant.[19]

Such "systematic suppression" of Black culture and "calculated withholding of information and distortion of facts" about Black history destroyed Black self-worth. Black people needed to rediscover themselves through a pan-African perspective of "collective consciousness." Therefore, Black education needed to focus on creating positive self-imagery among Blacks; African culture; creative expression; self-reliance, group responsibility, and love for African people; technical skills; and nationhood.

The Workshop called for the elimination of streaming and the classification of students on the supposed "basis of intelligence"; stressed on syllabi relative to Black students; the increased recruitment of conscious Black teachers; and the replacement of words such as "Remedial" and "Special" and those commemorative of colonial oppressors such as "Churchill" from the names of local schools with the names of heroes positively significant to Black People. Furthermore, Black education needed to be directed "towards the liberation of Black People from colonial oppression" and the survival of Blacks throughout the Diaspora.[20]

The Communications Workshop suggested that a communication networks be created in Bermuda and the Black world to disseminate accurate knowledge about Blacks worldwide. This was to include the use of taped speeches, films, seminars, church discussions, parties, door-to-door campaigns, and newsletters intended to increase political awareness and to cover areas such as education, history, police conduct, and culture. It also called for the creation of a Bermuda-based Black Power publication, *Umoja* (Kiswahili for "unity"), which would share information with a Philadelphia-based paper of the same title.

The Workshop also discussed the local media's negative attitude toward Black people. It highlighted issues with the Police Force, and the government's recruitment of West Indians to police Black Bermudians. This divisive tactic drove a wedge through the Black community, and West Indian officers needed to be dealt with firmly but "with some understanding" and primary condemnation directed toward racist White officers. Many of the latter hailed from South Africa and Britain and had "the colonial mentality of an occupying army."

It also denounced the "flagrant discriminatory acts" against Conference delegates entering Bermuda who had "traveled hundreds of miles at their own… expense" and "were turned back without due process of the law." It called for a boycott of the *Gazette* and businesses that advertised in the paper until it improved "its sloppy, non-professional, inaccurate and

illogical style of reporting news." The *Gazette*'s hostile coverage of the BPC included its inaccurate reporting of the numbers of Conference attendees, its distortion of statements made by Conference speakers, and the taking of pictures highlighting "frivolities and irrelevancies." For example, it printed front-page photos showing delegates "relaxing on the beach," including John Shabazz, leader of the Black Citizens Patrol of Harlem.[21]

The Economic Workshop stressed that while Blacks were taught to believe that "the White man's economic system" would benefit themselves, rugged individualism and so-called Black Capitalism was "not relative to total Black Liberation." In essence, the "wealthy White world" functioned on a value system based on Black inferiority that legitimized the exploitation of Blacks by Whites. This phenomenon is clearly explained by Sizzla Kalonji: "*Babylon give dem a ride fi dem money make dem funny, and then brain wash them pon their western journey*."

Instead, Black people needed to develop an economic system of self-determination to economically liberate the Diaspora, to understand that there could be no individual freedom without collective freedom, and to respect one another regardless of differences such as age, sex, and class. Furthermore, it was important that Blacks united out of positivity and love and trust for one another as opposed to hate for Whites: "We must be so pro-Black that we have not time to be anti-White." The Workshop further called for a coalition of diverse Black organizations (economical, spiritual, political, and cultural) able to anticipate and respond to critical issues affecting Black people.[22]

The Politics Workshop, chaired by James, focused on political struggle and pan-Africanism. It called for an employment association to eliminate racial discrimination in the workforce, as Blacks in Bermuda were "confined to menial jobs." Blacks were also encouraged to develop sociopolitical programs to eliminate unjust distribution of land along racial lines in Bermuda. The Workshop also condemned the government's suppression of revolutionary literature in its attempts to sever "the lines of communication" among Blacks across the globe.

Participants also discussed the trial of the forty-two Black students and fifty-five White supporters involved in the Sir William's College (Montreal) Black Power demonstrations. The defendants identified themselves as the February 11 Defense Committee. Committee Chairman Norman Cooke was scheduled to represent the arrested students and Montreal's Black community at the BPC but was refused entry into Bermuda as an "undesirable visitor." The Workshop declared unconditional support for the arrested students.

Participants expressed support for global African liberation struggles against "Western capitalist domination." They called on Blacks to intensely study the strategies of liberation and self-determination used by nations

that had gained some measure of independence, such as Guinea, Tanzania, Algeria, and Cuba. Furthermore, they aimed to solve the internal dissensions affecting the Black liberation struggle in the United States.[23]

The Workshops on Religion and History were combined as two workshop leaders had been prevented from entering Bermuda. It was chaired by Ben-Jochannan, who affirmed that African people had a "proud history" that predated Europe. However, Africa's historic role in the world had been distorted, which led to ignorance about the significance of ancient African civilization and its impact on Greek philosophy and science. In addition, African culture had survived in Western societies despite the harshness of slavery.

Ross, a Sixth Form History Instructor from St. Kitt's, "destroyed any illusions" about the "docility" of Africans enslaved in the Caribbean by demonstrating the region's large number of slave revolts. She found that "the condition of the Caribbean masses [had] remained essentially unchanged since slavery's emancipation." The region's economies had not developed beyond a plantation structure and wages remained at the subsistence level. While the masses only did what was necessary for survival, West Indian elected leaders "beholden to foreign economic and political interests" did little to improve the people's conditions.

Adaylabu Adeigdola discussed differences between Western and African values. He defined Western society as materialistic, competitive, and individualistic without regard for African concepts of spirituality and culture. The practice of investing authority in spiritual, as opposed to secular, leaders in Africa demonstrated the significance of spirituality in such societies. While Western lifestyles had a destructive effect on African culture, it was essential that African people retained "the inherent spirituality of African civilization."

Bishop Bright called for the Black church to participate fully in the struggle and recognize the relationship between Black Power and Black Theology. It needed to develop a "Black theology free from the inhibitions of the dominant White church" and assume its essential task of Black liberation. This would be the real demonstration that it was "doing the work of God." Hence, the church needed to adopt a policy of Black self-determination and "examine all tactics, including violence, as a means for emancipating Black people."[24]

The Workshop called for the public library and education systems of the Caribbean to increase their literature relevant to the Black global experience; the Bermuda government to remove its bans on race-conscious materials, explain its refusal to admit delegates to the BPC, and publicly publish the names of those excluded; dashikis to be accepted in all places as formal wear; and comparative religion to be taught in the Caribbean public school systems. It also charged all non-African persons

and institutions that held material, documents, and artifacts belonging to African people to surrender them through commissions to be created for this purpose.[25]

A number of texts were recommended for reading. These included *African Glory* (J.C. de Graft-Johnson), *Facing Mount Kenya* (Jomo Kenyatta), *Gold Coast Revolution* (George Padmore), *Lost Cities of Africa* and *Black Mother* (Basil Davidson), *Before the Mayflower* (Lerone Bennett), *Black Boy* and *Native Son (*Richard Wright), *The Invisible Man* (Ralph Ellison), *Soul on Ice* (Eldridge Cleaver), *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* and *Malcolm X Speaks* (Malcolm X), *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* (Amy Jaques Garvey), *And Then I Heard the Thunder* (John Killens), *Black Bourgeoise* (E. Franklin Frazier), and books by J.A. Rogers. These kinds of books were on sale at the Conference.

A memorandum entitled "Black Power 1969" was produced, which definitely stated that work needed to be done to complete the theoretical ideas of the Conference. Surmised by the axiom, "We need *workers*, not leaders," this philosophy described the direction of the Movement in Bermuda. A portion of the document reads:

> It is necessary at this time to define our long range goals, our immediate objectives…and put into operation the work needed to fulfill these.…Many of the young Black sisters and brothers have been saying that there is a need to develop new values and put them into practice. If we would but listen to these Black sisters and brothers as well as note the work and sayings of such African brothers as Nkrumah, Nyerere, and read the words of Malcolm X, Monroe Trotter, Franz Fanon, Che Guevara, and W.E. DuBois, we could begin to direct our actions and work such that these new values could become truly living values.

The eventual goal was "world humanism," which involved "the working together of people on a worldwide basis to eliminate hunger, disease, poverty, ignorance, or dignity for all people." However, as Blacks were oppressed as Black people, the first objective was to gain *power* as a united community before joining with others to achieve this long-range goal.

Blacks needed to develop skills, knowledge, and resources for self-determination; for only Blacks could decide what tools of liberation were necessary and how to apply them. Furthermore, the Conference needed to make it

> clear to all Black people that we are only concerned with the WORK that we have to do to achieve the power we need. We are not concerned with the contradictions imposed upon us from outside nor need we waste our valuable strength debating these contradictions or justifying our goals.…We

> are concerned with developing knowledge [and] skills…to achieve well defined…objectives. … We cannot be tricked into meaningless rhetoric and arguments over external trappings [such as segregation and integration]….WE MUST BE ABOUT WORK!!!

In addition, Conference delegates were not interested in "negotiations…or compromising with the White perpetuators of racism, oppression, materialism, and genocide or their White and Negro mercenaries." They were not interesting in "producing Black copies of existing White institutions" that functioned on a basis of economic profit requiring the "exploitation and murder" of Blacks across the globe as well as the perversion of Whites. Black people had "no time to waste on protest popularity contests" disguised as "U.S. politics, demonstrations and legal appeals" in a "false and totally misleading hope of touching the White 'conscience.'" If Blacks did the necessary work then they would "have the POWER to freely join with others."[26] In essence, the BPC called for Blacks to struggle for *the power to prevent* racism from affecting them. Black Power advocates were focused on activating and harnessing the vast reservoir of *potential* power that Black communities actually possessed.

In contrast, the establishment was focused on destroying this process. For example, PLP Youth Wingers and sympathizers of Black Power were intimidated by their White employers if they showed support for the Conference; some were fired from their jobs.[27] On another level, colonial intelligence officers were quite interested in the details of the Conference. Extensive surveillance was conducted on the BPC and it seems apparent that informants and agents were placed throughout the workshops. For example, Manning had been informed by a "knowledgeable moderate participant" that any "extremists who [attended], including the Bermudians, [would] be unintimidated and [could] state fully their extreme views."[28] In addition, Kamarakafego remarked that "there were some Black local uncle Tom a**hole creeper policemen doing their duty for the White oligarchy. When our security officers reported to me that they were participating in our workshops, I instructed the Youth Wing security officers to allow those policemen to remain in the meeting, perhaps they would learn something."[29] To the delight of the FCO, Special Branch compiled an inch-thick, 133-page report on the BPC, including photographs and Conference resolutions. It also recorded key details about delegates, such as their nationalities, and the tone of and numbers attending each workshop.[30]

The *Gazette* was used to spread propaganda surrounding the BPC. For example, it published comments from the British Ministry of Defense claiming that the Bermuda government would not have to pay for the troops or helicopter support supplied to Bermuda as internal security was

the responsibility of Britain.[31] FCO records clearly show otherwise. Tucker had *hoped* that Britain would foot the bill based upon such responsibility, but the British Treasury felt that Bermuda should pay the entire costs.

Under stipulations of the 1927 Imperial Defense Act, Bermuda had contributed approximately £210,000 to the British defense fund for the "defense of the British empire," which included the island's local garrison. In addition, in 1964, British had relinquished and sold a naval site to Bermuda for £150,000. Based upon such payments, Martonmere had asked that funds be reimbursed for the use of British troops to quell the 1968 rebellions—for which Bermuda had been charged £46,414. Furthermore, Montserrat, Bermuda, Hong Kong, and Gibraltar were the only regions making such contributions. However, FCO officials asserted that British territories that requested military assistance were required to pay the extra costs in addition to defense fund contributions (such as in British Guyana and Mauritius before independence and Swaziland in 1960). Bermuda was expected to pay the entire costs, despite Tucker's claim that he had been offered the troops in return for withdrawing a proposal to ban the Conference.[32]

The United Bermuda Party (UBP) wanted to avoid the political controversy that would have arisen if it was publicly known that Bermuda had to pay for the suppression of the Conference. This issue also demonstrates the criminal economic nature of colonialism—not only did Bermuda pay for its *own* continued constitutional enslavement but for that of other countries and vice versa. Furthermore, is it not scandalous that public funds generated in a majority Black population were used to suppress militarily that same people?

The *Gazette* continued its attempts to discredit the BPC throughout its duration. As if to counter the PLP's opinion that British "killers" were roving throughout Hamilton, it printed a front-page article of a British marine giving blood to the Bermuda Red Cross. The *Gazette* later claimed that the marines had "simply blended with tourists, improving sun tans and taking in sights."

On the Conference's opening day, the paper made the following statement: "When the Bermuda Government decided to take no steps to ban the Black power conference…they advisely put themselves, and Bermuda, on the horns of a dilemma. As we think has already been shown, it can easily be a case of damned if you do and damned if you don't—with the odds strongly on the side of don't." Conferees were "seeking answers to perplexing problems that [were] certainly not peculiarly Bermudian" and it was not

> so much what happens at the conference, as its aftermath, that concerns us most. It would of course, be idle to deny that risks are involved on such occasions in a biracial community like ours, and a very great deal must depend upon those who have come amongst us. Maladroit handling of

> security arrangements has plainly got us off to a bad start.... Probably many of our people are going to find out for themselves what this 20th century phenomenon is all about. It presents a coat of many colors. It has its ugly and divisive aspects.

While the *Gazette* constantly maintained that Black Power was a threat to Bermuda, it implied that its advocates were incapable of providing serious leadership to solve the problems of Black people. It referred to the BPC as a simple "get-together" and consistently implied that participants were just "hanging out." It also reported that workshops had not taken place because its leaders had "failed to show up." In response, a Dawson Swan stated that the paper had purposefully not mentioned that it was due to the efforts of the government that the workshops were not held. It had turned back "principal figures whose presence would only have enhanced the spirit of the meeting." Nevertheless, the Conference participants carried on—testimony to the growing enlightenment and sense of self-responsibility among Blacks in Bermuda. E. Hodgson would add that any British soldier's need to "quell unrest" in Bermuda was not due to "any Black conferences but to the blatant wickedness and racism such as being illustrated currently" by the UBP "in the field of education."[33]

On July 9, on ZBM-TV, Ira Philip interviewed three Conference delegates, Professors Fernando Henriques and A. Lynch, and James Cuffee. Printed in the *Recorder*, this was one of the few interviews granted by the delegates. Henriques, West Indian director of the Center for Multi-Racial Studies at University of Sussex, England, stated that the BPC was significant because it gave Blacks a chance to begin the enormous amount of thinking necessary to build the new world for the children of the future. In his opinion, Black Power "existed in a state of suspension," for there were millions of Blacks in the world. However, this power had yet to be realized. Henriques aligned himself with the ideological thinking of Frantz Fanon and felt affinity toward anyone thinking about Black people. There was a unity in being Black in a White world because Blacks had specific experiences that Whites had never had.

When asked about the government's "fears" of disturbances, Lynch stated that this would come to "the fore in a colonial situation" which was not "used to Black people taking a position" and organizing themselves. Furthermore, as soon as Black people began to speak about their problems, colonial forces reacted with slogans of law and order. Lynch felt that the Black community needed to look at itself from a *pan-African* perspective: Black people "needed to start talking now of 600 million Black people who occupy the continent of Latin America, the Caribbean and parts of the U.S."[34]

The *Gazette* continually complained about its inability to gain access to the Conference. This was a credit to the security of the PLP Youth Wing. Ironically, the *Gazette* received some of its coverage from the United Press International (UPI) news reel. For instance, UPI reported that, at the opening night, C.L.R. James had stated that some Blacks in the United States were unacceptably playing with revolution, and America and other imperialist nations were "in full retreat before the tremendous forces unleashed by revolutions in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean."[35] As neither the press nor White people were allowed to enter the Session, one can only speculate how UPI gained its information.

The CIA noted that about one thousand and one hundred persons participated, but only about one hundred and ten represented Black Power associations outside of Bermuda (about forty were from the United States). It felt that these numbers would have been higher if the British, through comprehensive immigration controls, had not denied several "agitators" entry.[36] Nevertheless, the following factors demonstrate the success of the BPC: the positive reception of Kamarakafego as the representative of the Central Planning Committee in the Caribbean; local Black support of the BPC; efficient workshops; the solidarity displayed between global and local delegates; and the ability of the PLP Youth Wing to organize and conduct the Conference. Blacks also denounced the government's attacks on the Conference. For example, Dawson Swan recognized that the immigration regulations specifically targeted the BPC, and as public officials did not comment on visitors from racist countries such as South Africa, were they "more desirable" in Bermuda?

In the words of Martonmere, the BPC left "scars" in Bermuda (particularly among the Black youth), increased Black Power advocates in the island, and brought the PLP closer to Black Power.[37] For Kamarakafego, it had a significant impact on the political education and consciousness of a critical mass of Blacks on the island. It stimulated deeper study of Black Bermuda's history particularly among the youth. In addition, it encouraged Blacks to identify more positively with being Black.[38] It was a great achievement to have Black people from the Caribbean, America, and Africa "come together to talk about [their] current problems." Furthermore, an international Black Power organization had apparently been formed during the BPC.[39]

A host of organizations (such as the UN Library in Switzerland) from across the globe requested copies of the Conference resolutions.[40] These requests were denied, as Kamarakafego made a concerted effort to prevent the wider media and "authorities" from obtaining details about a discussion that primarily concerned Black people. He felt that some delegates upset at this decision—who were more concerned with media attention than actual *work*—took the documents and published them in the United

States. This is evidenced by a BPC report available in the U.S. Library of Congress.

The Conference had ramifications for Black Power globally, and knowledge of it reached as far as the Koori of Australia. Immediately following the Conference, an Australian radio station asked Kamarakafego to publically broadcast an interview with him. He remarked, "It doesn't matter to me, cause the way you killing those Black people we concerned about them too." During the interview he discussed Black Power, stating that Blacks in the Americas were concerned that Whites were abusing the land and human rights of their indigenous Black "brother and sisters" in the Pacific region. According to Kamarakafego, he soon received a telegrammed invitation from the Aborigines Advancement League (AAL) President Bob Maza and AAL employee, Bruce McGuinness, who had heard the interview while it was broadcast in Australia. They invited him to come to Australia and help them in their own Black Power struggle which, for them, referred to land rights, self-reliance, economic and political independence for indigenous Australia. Kamarakafego left for Melbourne shortly afterward, and addressed a meeting and press conference at the AAL's headquarters. While there he was referred to as the president of the Black Power Movement in the Caribbean and Latin America. The Australian media denounced this meeting and Black Power in general.[41]

The Conference also encouraged the emergence of the Sixth Pan-African Conference (PAC) held in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1974. C.L.R. James, a Pan-African stalwart, stayed in Bermuda for a little over a week after the BPC. Out of talks with Kamarakafego during this time it was decided that the latter would organize the next PAC.

It also helped spurn the Congress of African People (CAP), first held in Atlanta in September 1970. In the aftermath of the BPC, it had been determined that the next BPC would occur in Barbados in June 1970. Barbados Prime Minister Errol Barrow had been contacted and initially agreed with this decision. However, the American, British, French, and Dutch governments told Barrow that if he allowed Kamarakafego to organize it they would close their hotels in the island and stop tourism. As such, in April 1970, a mere two months before the Conference, Barrow informed Kamarakafego that it could not be held on the island. In a meeting in Barbados that also included the late Sonny Carson, Kamarakafego told Barrow that he was "just as big a f**king a**hole as" the authorities were to allow them to do so. He was thrown out of the island and could not return until two decades later. Kamarakafego informed the Black Power Steering Committee that if they did not have a Conference in that year then the "authorities" would have won. As such, it was held in Atlanta as the CAP to avoid using "Black Power" in the title.[42]

Table 4.1 Black Power organizations in Eastern Caribbean, latter half of 1969–70.

Country	*Black Power affiliated organization*
Antigua	Afro-Caribbean Movement
Barbados	People's Progressive Movement
Bermuda	Black Beret Cadre
Dominica	Black Socialist Party
Guyana	African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa
Grenada	The Forum
Montserrat	Black Power Party
St. Kitt's	Black Power Group
St. Lucia	The Forum
St. Vincent	Educational Forum of the People
Trinidad and Tobago	Black Panther Party, National Joint Action Committee

Source: Adapted from TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, Black Power in the Caribbean B 1970.

According to the FCO, Kamarakafego stated that the BPC in Bermuda would officially launch the Black Power Movement in the Caribbean. They further believed that the Conference had stimulated the Movement in the region due to a noted increase in *overt* Black Power activity and organizations across the region within months of its convening.[43]

In a document entitled "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean," which had been created at the urge of U.S. President Richard Nixon (who was concerned about the relationship between Black Power in the United States and Black militancy in the Caribbean), CIA officials opinionated that "serious efforts to develop a regional grouping of Black radical groups" in the West Indies had not occurred until the BPC. Black Power in the region was a "home-grown phenomenon" but ties were developing with "militant" groups in the United States. They also felt that some of the most serious contacts between Black Power in the United States and the Caribbean had manifested through the organizing of the BPC.[44]

The FCO had also compiled the following list of groups affiliated with Black Power in the Caribbean (see table 4.1). The officials also felt that Black Power adherents and regional cooperation in the Caribbean had dramatically increased within a year of the BPC, to consist of a small hard core of advocates numbering in the hundreds.[45]

To this list we could add groups such as Trinidad and Tobago's Joint National Action Committee (which would later become NJAC). Furthermore, it must be stated that the BPC was a critical moment in the growth of Black Power in the region and not the beginning of this phenomenon; there were other Black Power Conferences in the region as well. For

example, the gravitation of Bermuda's youth toward Black Power *prior to* the Conference reflected the embracing of the Movement by youth across the Caribbean. For example, NJAC was founded in 1969 as a response to the Black Power incidents in Montreal.[46] Such linkages beg for further investigation.

According to one Earl Outerbridge, the BPC was to have little impact on Bermuda because its leaders would not be able to accomplish much in the island's capitalistic society. He wondered why Bermudans spent £4 to listen to words of little relevance, as the Conference would be forgotten in a week as its "steam struck fresh air and quickly evaporated."[47]

As if on cue, the very next day after these comments were published in the *Gazette*, a protest march occurred at Bermuda's House of Assembly. Led by local Conference participants, the sight of Black protestors swarming the House's premises and grounds "frightened" the UBP and caused uproar in the House. PLP Youth Wing Leader Dennis Warner carried a petition into the House's inner chamber, but was told by the speaker of the House that he could not enter. Browne-Evans escorted Warner back into the public gallery and took the petition to the speaker. The protestors were expelled from the House, and a police officer has been permanently stationed at its entrance ever since.[48]

According to the *Gazette*, these "heckling youth" numbered at least sixty. Clad in dashikis, they continuously gave the Black Power sign and applauded throughout the session (e.g., when the PLP questioned the airport's stoplist and when Browne-Evans advocated that the incomes of the wealthy be taxed). While outside, the crowd swelled to between 150 and 200 persons. In protest of the UBP's behavior in Parliament, the rest of the PLP soon walked out and led the crowd to its headquarters in Alaska Hall, Court Street.

Tucker deplored the "disgraceful" protest. He accused the PLP of stage-managing the incident and feeding it through "inflammatory speeches." This claim was "supported" by the enthusiastic clapping and foot stomping that these "voters and people of Bermuda" were providing for the PLP.[49]

"Justus" supported these claims, stating that most of the protestors were overseas Conference delegates in a "well-planned, well-rehearsed attempt to intimidate…members of the house." The mob left behind a "trail of litter"; several free visitor booklets had been ripped apart and strewn on the floor. Justus had never seen "a group of people deliberately [foul] a public place in such a manner." He recalled that "obscenities and invectives" had been used at the opening session of the Conference (including familiar insults to the queen of England) and such behavior could not be ascribed to Bermudians. Hence, most Bermudians would be glad to see the foreign delegates leave, for the island could do without them "and their local stooges who befouled the meeting place of the freely-elected representatives of the people of Bermuda."

The next day, Justus again "blessed" the *Gazette* with a verbal tirade about the PLP. He wondered what madness had gripped its leadership, for it must have realized that it was hurt by its militancy and "far-left extremism" in the 1968 elections. Bermudians were collectively not "militant or extreme." However, the PLP had since then drifted further to the Left, evidenced by its visits to Cuba and the "use of mobs as instruments of public intimidation." The public was getting "sick and tired of this sort of conduct" and the Party would gain even less votes in the next election.[50]

Justus completely failed to discuss the core issues behind the protest. Rather than sincerely address the roots of *why* Black people protested, Whites chose to criticize the methods of *how* Blacks protested. As mentioned, the protestors were upset about the fraudulent immigration regulations implemented by the government. Was this not a legitimate concern?

As was often implied, Justus suggested that *local young* Blacks could not have led the protest. In essence, the patronizing superiority complex of Whites in Bermuda would not allow them to realize that Bermuda's Black youth were potential leaders themselves and that they could be analyzing Bermuda's colonial system through the same eyes of oppressed youth across the globe. These were the "angry children" of Sally Bassett and Malcolm X. They were becoming involved in the Black revolution that was sweeping the world. They were destined to be the leaders of Bermuda's Black Power Movement, and, in the words of the Black Beret Cadre, its "vanguard party."[51]

In fact, the emergence of the Cadre would perhaps reflect the true impact of the Conference. To no small extent the Berets, whether directly or indirectly, embraced the major tenets of the BPC resolutions and attempted to put them into action. These youth took the Conference seriously, which, for them, was much more than an exercise in rhetoric.

The Bermuda that the Cadre was about to enter posed definite challenges for Black Power, as its adversaries constantly argued that Black protest was illegitimate—as if racism was a figment of youthful imagination. On a popular level, Bermuda's surface wealth was often cited as a benchmark of Black privilege, without any substantial critique of the systematic constraints affecting Black life. Furthermore, while Black Power advocates were attacked for providing that critique, the fact remains that there would have been no need for Black Power if Blacks in Bermuda were self-determining.

But what *was* the state of Black Bermuda circa 1970? From an economic standpoint, despite its appearance as a relatively wealthy Caribbean country, Bermuda's economy was in a very precarious position.[52] The cost of living was spiraling, and rose 10 percent between 1970 and 1971. In the absence of income tax, the poor felt the brunt of Bermuda's economically punishing price system much more so than the rich. For example, as much

as 56.5 percent of Bermuda's revenue came from customs receipts, and the rich and poor alike paid the same duties.

In addition, land tax was increasing and the growing shortage of affordable housing was escalating rent prices. Under the authority of FCO inspectors, the Bank of Bermuda (of which Tucker was a director) had raised property rents by 67 percent between 1970 and 1971. In addition, the "critical . . . shortage of middle and lower income housing" was intensified by the American bases on the island, as "less than 1400 Americans assigned to two bases were merely camping out on 10 percent [1,423 acres] of Bermuda['s] total land area." This was a serious issue, and the UBP felt that "high visibility of U.S. occupancy of units needed by Bermudians" was sure to be an issue in the 1973 elections, unless the United States constructed on-base housing and showed visible signs of using the land.[53]

By 1972, international business commanded approximately $30 million or 13 percent of Bermuda's gross national profit. However, the majority of Bermudians did not enjoy the true economic benefits of the profits generated by these corporations. For example, out of a workforce numbering 24,700, exempt companies employed only 1,330 locals. In addition, foreign exempt companies paid a flat fee of $480 per year and a stamp duty to conduct business on the island. In staunch contrast to government revenue generated from customs duties (56.5 percent), company tax represented only 10 percent of these totals. Furthermore, before the Companies Incorporation Act of 1970, foreign companies could be incorporated through "private act," which made it simple for deals to be made between corporation representatives and local elites. In essence, the primary beneficiaries of the offshore companies were lawyers and the local White business elite who "expected to get a piece of the action for their cooperation."

Tourism represented 80 percent of the island's economy. In 1972, 425,000 tourists visited Bermuda and spent approximately $100 million. However, close to 70 percent of the tourist dollar was spent on foreign goods and services (Bermuda's imports totaled over $100 million with the United States its major supplier). Domestic exports (which mainly included flowers, concentrated essences, and pharmaceutical pretions) were valued at less than $1 million and its recorded re-exports (mainly pharmaceuticals) totaled about $96 million. While Bermuda produced vegetables, citrus, root crops, bananas, and dairy products at a value of approximately $2 million on about 740 acres, it did not grow enough food to feed its local population much less tourists. Hence, Bermuda imported 80 percent of its food needs, costs of which had risen 40 percent from 1967 to 1971.[54]

Underneath the umbrella of colonialism, Bermuda was politically controlled through "informal centers of power." Major decisions were made in consultation with local and foreign "wielders" of financial power.

According to Ryan, Blacks who held "positions of authority in the Cabinet [were] powerless to do anything on behalf of the Black community that was contrary to the material interests of the White oligarchy. They [did] not in fact share White power; they merely [provided] the illusion that Blacks [had] a share of that power."[55]

The island's constituency boundaries continued to strengthen the White vote. Richard Posnett, head of the FCO's West Indies Department, felt that there was "a wide disparity between the value of a vote in the mainly White rural areas (roughly one Member of the Legislative Council for 350 voters) and the mainly Black urban area of Pembroke (roughly one Member to over 700 voters)." Indeed, the 1970 Census displayed that there were 12 constituencies containing over 1,000 voters. Twelve MPs represented 17,355 voters, whereas in the 8 predominantly White constituencies with less than 1,000 voters, 5,607 voters were represented by 16 MPs.[56]

The UBP was well aware that maintaining these boundaries was critical to its political success; in fact, in 1973, H. Viera (UBP MCP) expressed concern to Manning that if the voting districts were proportionally representative, the UBP would lose some of its seats. Furthermore, the Party's fragile voting base was greatly augmented by the votes of expatriates, which amounted to between 300 and 400 votes in certain parishes. This often "spelled the difference between defeat and victory for UBP candidates," who often won with less than 300 votes. According to Manning, the situation was exacerbated with the 1971 election of Bermuda's first Black government leader, E.T. Richards, who was "weak and complacent."[57]

This situation could only be rectified by constitutional amendment, which was demanded by the PLP and would be accepted by most Blacks. However, Martonmere felt that any equitable change to the boundaries was "a recipe for disruption of Bermuda's economic and social fabric." He felt that the British government had "a responsibility to see the continuation of good government" and that there should be no hurry "to amend the electoral representation in a way which would…lead…to power falling into the hands of more extreme Black elements." Meanwhile, Posnett felt that such an attempt to "maintain an inequitable system in order to achieve a desired political orientation" was democratically wrong.[58]

Ironically, the Cadre would possess similar assertions about Bermudian "democracy" as did Posnett. Hence, one would have not needed to go any further than the FCO itself to affirm whether Black Power advocates in Bermuda had legitimate concerns. Nevertheless, the FCO was there to preserve colonialism, regardless of the individual positions of its officials. It would be up to the oppressed themselves to seek to better their conditions. This, in essence, would be the Cadre's mission.

5

Wake the Town and Tell the People: The Black Beret Cadre Emerges

The Black Beret Cadre was formed in the late summer of 1969. Its relatively short period of overt activity (1969–72) represented the apex of Black Power in Bermuda. It sought to bring about a political revolution in Bermuda through Black Power; in Bermuda's colonial context this implied economic, political, and cultural independence from British imperialism. Self-defined as the vanguard of Black Power in the island, the Cadre established a number of social programs geared toward Black self-determination. The Berets worked closely with other Black progressive organizations and received support from the local Black community, particularly the island's youth. They also maintained relationships with organizations such as the Black Panther Party (United States) and revolutionary groups across the African Diaspora.

Emerging out of Bermuda's Black *radical tradition*, the Cadre's experience reflected a continuum of centuries of Black struggle. These freedom fighters shared the blood of Sally Bassett and the spirit of Black Tom. They represented latent Black Nationalism that surged through twentieth-century Bermuda since the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Understanding their connection to historical Black struggle in Bermuda, they sought to build on the struggles of their ancestors. Indeed, the Cadre was a true "child" of the "Long Sixties"; Berets had grown up in segregated Bermuda, experienced the Theatre Boycott (1959), the BELCO uprisings (1965), the youth rebellions and granting of universal adult suffrage in 1968, the birth of Party politics, the government's token drives for integration, and the Black Power Conference (BPC). This highly tumultuous political era was also replete with African, Asian, and Caribbean independence and liberation struggles, and U.S. Civil Rights and Black Power Movements.

The Cadre was formed because of the establishment's refusal to significantly address the fundamental racial and class issues that divided Bermuda. In the words of one Beret, "Brothers were just tired of oppression." However, they "shared a vision . . . that one day Bermuda would be self-governing and that there would be opportunities for Blacks in power."[1] Unapologetically calling for political revolution in Bermuda, they were well prepared to use armed struggle if necessary to achieve this goal. Through publications, rallies, and low-scale urban warfare, Berets clashed head-on with the island's security forces.

As it trampled over the United Bermuda Party's (UBP) laws that defined their "insolence" as criminal, Bermuda's colonial government attacked the Cadre via hostile tactics reminiscent of the latter's response to the UNIA, the Nation of Islam (NOI), labor union leaders, and Kamarakafego. In fact, the establishment's assault on the Berets was an extension of its assailment on Black Power in general, and British concerns with the growth of the Movement in the West Indies. The Berets were persecuted via the logistic control of Governor Martonmere and other Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials, collectively known as the Intelligence Committee. Placed under close surveillance, U.S. and Canadian officials also supported their suppression. The establishment projected the Berets as a caustic group of hateful, unintelligent, and alienated hoodlums bent on violently destroying Bermuda. This fallacious perception remains in contemporary Bermuda, demonstrating the relative success of the government's use of sustained propaganda to discredit the Movement. On a popular level this is marked by a host of political commentary on the local Bermudian blogosphere that, at best, suffer from historical amnesia. At least one author is preparing a manuscript defining the Cadre as terrorists,[2] while over the past few years a series of articles have appeared in the *Mid-Ocean* which, using records from the FCO archives, have attempted to discredit the Cadre and indirectly the PLP's recent political campaigns by highlighting the Party's historic connection with the Cadre.

As such, this chapter openly examines the origins, objectives, principles, and general activities of the Cadre. It is critical that some space be given to such a discussion because of the dubious, almost dehumanizing perception of the Cadre that persists in the written record and popular mindset. The Cadre has yet to undergo the relatively recent scholarly attention that has been given to Black Power organizations such as the U.S. Black Panther Party, which have provided more accurate and balanced accounts of the Panthers and Black Power as opposed to questionable views that equated the Party and the Movement to "violent terrorism."[3] In fact, this will perhaps be the first monologue that attempts to do so.

The primary organizer of the Cadre was John Hilton Basset Jr., also known as "Dionne" (DIE-OWN). Its long-standing Chief of Staff, Bassett formed the Cadre with Eliyahtsoor Ben Aaharon (Melville Saltus) and a number of others. High school seniors or recent graduates, these youth realized that their school education had left them inadequately knowledgeable about Blacks in Bermuda. They talked to older Blacks to fill this void, informing the latter that a youth group would bring to fruition the struggles that they had started. Bassett and Ben Aaharon were instrumental in selecting key elders. For example, as the latter frequented the Bermuda Industrial Union (BIU) headquarters this nucleus spoke with union activists such as Austin Wilson and Walter Tweed, who heightened their awareness about historical Black activism (such as labor movement and Theatre Boycott) in Bermuda.[4]

Predominantly aged between the ages of sixteen and thirty, the Cadre was a close-knitted group; Berets were often biologically related, raised in the same neighborhoods (such as "Back-a-Town" and Parsons Road), and attended the same schools and/or sociopolitical organizations. Many were overlapping members in the PLP Youth Wing, the Black Student Union (BSU), the Young Life Group, and high schools such as the Technical and Berkeley Institutes, the Prospect School for Girls, and the then Winston Churchill School (later renamed Robert Crawford). Some Berets studied at universities abroad, such as Bassett and former Attorney General Phil Perinchief (Dalhousie University).

Ben Aaharon is a primary example of this phenomenon. Raised in Back-a-Town, he attended Samaritan's Hall (along with Erskine "Buck" Burrows) on Court Street and Central Primary School (Victor Scott) where he met a number of future Berets, such as Sinclair Swan. When later attending a school on Ord Road and later the Technical Institute (as did Robin Swan), this process was repeated. In addition, both the families of Bassett and Aaharon were of the Baha'i faith and they attended the same services. Aaharon was also a member of the PLP Youth Wing and Young Life.[5]

Berets from the Back-a-Town/Parson's Road area were "unified" by the Pembroke Marsh. Also known as the "Pond," trash was dumped and burned here. According to Sinclair Swan:

> Central [school] was smack dab in almost the heart of the Pond where they burned trash. I don't think there was one child who I went to school with, who came . . . *not* smelling of smoke from the pond . . . because parents hung all clothes on line. We didn't have dryers, we had a washer. Some had tubs, or scrub boards, others were fortunate enough to have a washer that rolled the clothes with ringers on them and they dried faster. Otherwise

> you had to wring them in your hand. I mean the pond burned all day every day. You woke up with the smell of smoke, you went down with the smell of smoke.

The pond was a major part in the childhood of these youths who constantly played there. Despite such youthful oblivion, the pond was a major health hazard. Children often went there to eat outdated foodstuffs and candy that the Bermuda Drug Agency and import houses dumped in the Marsh. The pond often caught on fire, and in one instance a youth was burned from head to toe when a discarded car with gasoline in its tank suddenly exploded.[6] It is hard to imagine that such a pond would have been allowed to exist if Parson's Road was a White neighborhood, and not located in the island's "Black Belt."

Though primarily from working-class families, the Berets had diverse social and economic experiences. Not every Beret was from "Back-a-Town," an area often associated with economically strained single-parent families and "socially alienated" Black youths. In fact, segregation ensured that many Black children grew up in supportive, family-oriented Black neighborhoods.

Born on August 18, 1946, Bassett himself came from a politically minded middle-class family—for example, they had been involved in Universal Adult Suffrage Movement. The eldest of four children, Bassett was an avid reader and student. His father, a self-made man and a very successful architect, held numerous contracts in the affluent Tucker's Town area. However the majority of these contracts were lost as a result of the political stance taken by his son, and significantly impacted his business. In addition, his politically conscious grandfather, John G. Bassett, SR., owned Bassett's Dry Goods on Court Street and Bassett's Mineral Water factory. Dionne appreciated their wisdom and often reasoned with these men about current events and Black history.[7]

As a child, Bassett wanted to study space aeronautics and eventually studied aeronautical science at a school in Michigan (1966–67) and the Aerospace Institute of Chicago (1968–69).[8] While abroad several experiences helped shape his understanding of global Black struggle. For example, he was assaulted (along with a girlfriend) by police officers during the clashes between White student anti-Vietnam protestors and the Chicago Police and National Guard during the National Democratic Convention of August 1968. While walking they were approached by police, who kicked him in his groin, threw him to the ground, and put a foot on his neck. They were arrested and released after a White witness testified to his non-involvement in the demonstrations.

Bassett also raised money by writing and producing plays. Similar to activities organized by the Black Panthers, he used the funds to feed the

needy in the Black community. In fact, he was a close friend with Panthers from Illinois, in particular Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. While it is not certain whether he was actually a Panther during this period, he intensively practiced martial arts with Party members, attended Panther rallies and possibly meetings. Nevertheless, the brutal assassinations of Hampton and Clark by the Chicago Police Department and the FBI greatly strengthened his resolve as a freedom fighter.[9]

While back in Bermuda he noticed that numbers of his friends were incarcerated for minor things (such as the possession of small amounts of reefer) that prevented them from attending school. He recognized that Black struggle in Bermuda and the United States was part of the same global struggle against oppression and ingeniously applied the ideas of Black Power to Bermuda's situation when relevant. Deducing that political struggle was more important than his personal studies, he opted to remain in Bermuda to help better the conditions of Bermuda's Black community. During this time he was performing electric work along North Shore, Devonshire and, after meeting Ben Aaharon, the two began to organize the Cadre.[10]

Black females played critical roles in the Cadre, including its Liberation schools and Intelligence and Security Unit (ISU). Born in 1954, Michelle Khaldun (one of the first female Berets) came from an extremely race-conscious family. Her grandmother (who was highly active in her lodge) studied Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, and informed her of Garvey and relatives who left Bermuda to join the UNIA abroad. Her mother often stressed the "need for Black people to have their own" and read literature such as *Ebony* and the *Autobiography of Malcolm X*. After reading Malcolm's autobiography in one night, Khaldun realized the "power of knowledge of self." She grew up on family land that her grandfather (who worked in a horse livery and repaired shoes) had purchased and distributed between her five aunts.

At ten years old, she decided to discontinue going to the segregated Anglican Church. Note that this occurred about five years after official governmental desegregation. However, Whites refused to relinquish the power relationships established during segregation, evidenced by their resistance to the integration of Bermuda's public schools. In fact, the Warwick Academy, the school closest to Khaldun, had planned to admit children of both races during the first year that she was to enter high school. However, she felt that if she could not attend the Academy the year before, then she did not want to go at all. Instead, she attended the Berkeley Institute, Bermuda's elite school for Blacks, where she would meet other Berets.[11]

Calvin Shabazz was raised in the areas of Pembroke's Friswell's Hill and Hamilton's Ewing Street. As a youngster, he spent a lot of time on Court

Street, and was well respected in Back-a-Town. He also attended Samaritan's Hall, Central, and Berkeley Schools. He eventually studied Business Administration in Canada, and worked for American International in Bermuda. He also had a close relationship with Dionne's grandfather, and used to work with him. He was introduced to politics in 1967, while working at the Empire Life Insurance Company with Walter Roberts. Through Roberts's encouragement, he joined the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), and often addressed youth during Party rallies. He played an instrumental role in helping Kamarakafego organize the PLP Youth Wing, and represented the Wingers on the PLP Central Committee. He eventually left the PLP due to concerns that the Party system was entrenched in a colonial structure.

While abroad Shabazz had gained a reputation for his political writing; he wrote for the leftist magazine *Ramparts* and also submitted articles to the Black Panther Party's *Intercommunal News Service*. He had also been involved with the NOI and played a leading role in its Bermuda Chapter upon his return to the island. As the NOI headquarters was located in the Bassett building, right across the hall from the Cadre, he often reasoned with Berets. He eventually joined in 1971.

He believed that, as did Mao in China's case, that if Bermuda's proletariat was not involved in the struggle then the Cadre could not make any substantial changes in the island. Hence, he sought to increase the Cadre's street credibility and emphasized developing and expanding connections with Bermuda's grassroots Black community. For example, he changed the *Black Beret*'s subtitle from *Voice of the Revolutionaries* to *Voice of the People*. A prolific martial artist, Shabazz brought such skills into the Cadre. He possessed a Black Belt in Judo and studied Karate. Along with Kitchener Galloway (recall he was arrested during the 1968 Floral Pageant), he boxed as a youth.[12]

Other Berets did not come from backgrounds that enabled them to further their academic education abroad. For example, after the untimely death of his father, S. Swan and his brother worked nightly as musicians simply to put themselves through high school. He joined the workforce, as did most Berets, immediately after high school and maintained two jobs.[13] Regardless of their backgrounds Berets were well aware of the political and economic persecution that faced them and their families in challenging Bermuda's oligarchy, and were prepared to commit "class suicide" if necessary to do so.

Bermuda's current Premier Ewart Brown, while not an official Beret, was an associate of the Cadre. Like some Berets however, he was involved in Black Power activities while abroad in school. He participated in the BPC, but returned to Howard University to continue his studies in Medicine.

He was no stranger to political activism; as Howard's Student Body president, he was a key player in its student protests of 1968. Howard students shut down the institution's administration building in an effort to bring Black Studies to the University, make Howard's curriculum more relative to its Black student body, and address other student issues. Brown had also been involved in the 1968 "Towards a Black University Conference," which occurred at Howard under the guidance of political stalwarts such as Acklyn Lynch. He eventually became active in the Movement in California.[14]

On December 31, 1969, Brown and Phil Perinchief (Uhuru) organized a "sit-down rally" in front of City Hall to "ring out the Sixties in [Bermuda] and with it ring out the racism and decadence" of the Bermuda government. Demonstrators expressed issues about racism, colonialism, narcotics trafficking, and the continued ban of *Muhammad Speaks*. According to the *Recorder*, this "brand new breed of young Bermudians" was "full of conviction, daring and articulate." Most were students from abroad at home on winter break (Perinchief, aged twenty-five, was studying in the United Kingdom). A number of Berets, including Bassett, were in the audience, and the three officially met in terms of "the struggle."[15]

In a subsequent television interview with Ira Philip, the three men discussed the demonstration and the need for Bermuda's Black youth to organize and fight against the government's racism. Yuhudi stated that Bermuda faced racism and (neo)colonialism, which should have meant to Blacks "what Nazism meant to Jews." When asked whether they were trying to "stir up" Bermuda's peace and harmony, Bassett quoted Frederick Douglass—stating that one could not expect crops to grow without plowing the ground. Further, it was not a matter of "disturbing harmony," but recognizing and solving the problems of the Black community. In essence, he felt it important to organize the youth to prevent unnecessary bloodshed that would result from Bermuda's current policies.

Indeed, Brown had just quelled a near "riot" on New Year's Eve, when a group of over 200 persons "rampaged through Church Street." Store and car windows were broken, bottles were thrown, and a motorcycle was set on fire. Eight persons were assaulted, including three police officers. When an altercation broke out in front of City Hall, newly appointed Police Commissioner George Duckett called out the riot squad. Arriving minutes before the Squad, Brown persuaded Duckett to wait while he led the crowd into City Hall's grounds and calmed them from its steps.[16]

As several Berets were initially members of the PLP Youth Wing, they possessed a close relationship and respect with Kamarakafego. Bermuda's youth were drawn to him because of his outspoken personality and local and international activism.[17] Berets participated and helped organize the 1969 BPC, either as Youth Wingers or otherwise. In fact, a number of

the Cadre's aims were direct manifestations of resolutions passed at the Conference. They were exposed to a host of literature and information about the struggle. Ben Aaharon recalls meeting C.L.R. James and other key delegates in hour-long sessions. This was a very moving experience, in particular the Conference's opening night at the PHC stadium.[18]

Khaldun was forbidden by her parents to attend the BPC because they felt that it was "not a place for fifteen-year-old girl" and that her presence there would negatively affect her educational future. However, she did attend secretly with a cousin, who would also join the Cadre. Overwhelmed by the entire experience, which included seeing Queen Mother Moore, Khaldun began for the first time to understand that "Bermuda had a role to play in the movement."[19]

The syncretism of the Beret/Youth Wing collective is further highlighted through *Umoja: The Bermuda Voice of the Black Power Conference*, which was published at the call of the Conference's Communications workshop. Its first edition contained BPC material and was published immediately following the Conference.[20] Featuring poetry and articles that discussed racism in Bermuda and related matters, *Umoja* became the official newsletter of the PLP Youth Wing; and at least one edition included the PLP's political platform.

To surmise, *Umoja* stated that the Youth Wing wanted "Peace, freedom, justice and human rights for all people." Blacks were expected to "acquire self defense, knowledge of the law and Black Nationalism." Derogatory names for Black people, such as Negro, spook, nigger, colored, and spade, needed to be eliminated from commonplace vocabulary. Black women were encouraged to "seek their role" in the Revolution. *Umoja* also called for Blacks to perform the "Black Power Salute" before and after performing in any form of public sport or activity.[21]

It later argued that Black Revolutionary Power in Bermuda would eradicate Bermuda's "racist capitalist character," which supported Black oppression and led to the "indisputable failure" of the education system. The island's Western education system glorified Whites and Western culture, and not only robbed Blacks of self-knowledge but "dehumanized Whites to the point" where several stood to exterminate Black revolutionaries because they threatened the system. Bermudian Whites were produced as "a technical and administrative elite" to perpetuate capitalism. Black Power would reverse such trends by demonstrating that the fundamental purpose of education was to produce socially responsible human beings and would "turn over control of schools to local communities" and allow parents, students, and teachers to transform them "into real centers for the community."

Black Power also sought to change Bermuda's relations with the world. As in Bermuda, "four-fifths of mankind" were "struggling to rid themselves

of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation." In response, colonialists across the world used violence to suppress such movements. Black Power would align Bermuda with these four-fifths, for it recognized the right of nations to self-determination.

Umoja denounced racism and racial injustice in historical and contemporary Bermuda. For example, it announced that one of Bermuda's judges, Richmond Smith, was from apartheid South Africa. It also pointed out that there were no local Black schools named after Black people. *Umoja* also published a popular grassroots belief about the construction of Bermuda's oldest church, St. Peter's. According to this tradition, a shortage of turtle wax prompted White enslavers to order that enslaved Blacks be murdered and their blood used in the clay that made the Church.

One essay by "Che Hannibal" denounced the legal practice of hanging in various Black countries, equating it to the lynching of Blacks. The gallows had never meant anything good to anyone except the "White colonial oppressor" and had been used to murder heroes such as Jamaica's Paul Bogle. Such men had fought for self-determination and independence, yet independent Black countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago retained "that symbol of colonial suppression, the noose." These countries were really White social systems led by brainwashed "Black Skins in White Masks," which explained why their leaders claimed that their countries had no use for Black Power. Many Black prime ministers were not worried about justice, but only about "losing the next election" and the time had come to "remove the faint-hearted and weary like Eric Williams of the Caribbean."

According to Che, it was an "indication of shortsightedness when Governments traditionally treat symptoms and not causes. They attack crime in the streets and not inequality in education. They attack juvenile delinquency and they won't provide low income houses. They eliminate Black men while they should be instituting social reforms so that Blacks can get education, medical care and employment."

Umoja also reprinted an article by Albert Cleage titled the "Black Messiah." Cleage, the Detroit-based leader of the U.S. Black Theology Movement, described Jesus as an historical "revolutionary Black leader" of "a non-White people struggling for national liberation against the rule of a White nation, Rome." Whites insisted that Christ was White despite contrary historical evidence and hundreds of shrines dedicated to Black Madonnas across the world. This demonstrated their "White supremacist conviction that all things good and valuable" had to be White. By the same token, until Black Christians challenged this notion, they had "not freed themselves from their spiritual bondage to the White man" or mentally established "their right to first-class citizenship in Christ's kingdom on earth." Black people could not "build dignity on their knees worshipping

a White Christ" and needed to "put down this White Jesus [whom] the White man gave us in slavery."[22] This was very instructive, because the Youth Winger/Beret collective felt divinely justified in resisting oppression. Many had been raised in Christian households, and either rejected Christianity as an impediment to liberation ideology, or found in the Bible the inspiration that supported the struggle.

As shown, the Youth Wingers were politically conscious even before the formation of the Cadre. Many had joined the Youth Wing because the PLP wanted to achieve independence for Bermuda. However, they eventually recognized that there were "fundamental differences between themselves and the PLP." There were concerns that a *bourgeois*, elitist element existed within the Party and that certain members were "White-washed."[23] Others doubted that the Party was the most effective political vehicle to bring about concrete change, because its members did not "talk to young people." Furthermore, Kamarakafego was so involved in his international activities that he was often off the island.[24]

Hence, the Cadre's creation also reflected the Black youth's growing disenchantment with Party politics and the reformist means of protest used by other Black generations. The Berets sought to find their own place in the struggle, and, as Fanon suggested, to identify their generational mission, and to accept or betray it. In essence, many were drawn to the Cadre's philosophical focus of "revolution by any means necessary," a stance considered more radical than that of the Youth Wing, and began to attend Cadre meetings. According to Khaldun, Kamarakafego was disappointed by this focus, because he felt that Blacks needed to build political power through "a stronger political base."[25]

Kamarakafego's perspective on the Cadre is significant. He always respected youth's right to have a voice and encouraged them to speak openly during Youth Wing meetings. He recognized the potential political power of the youth and had argued that, in disagreement with other PLP members, schoolchildren needed to be involved in the debate about universal suffrage. However, Youth Wing activism seemed to waiver whenever he traveled and picked up upon his return. Hence, he encouraged Youth Wingers to remain active, which they did by joining the Cadre.

He supported the Berets and attended at least one Cadre meeting. He warned the Berets to express their own creativity and not to imitate blindly other organizations, such as the Black Panther Party (BPP). He also did not agree with the position of some Berets on the use of armed struggle to achieve change in Bermuda: "Some said 'we gotta shoot up' and I said you do that at 1:00, you'd be dead by 1:30 because the man got all the . . . guns all over the place. . . . Talking about armed struggle, there ain't no mountains here, where you going to have armed struggle like Cuba . . . ?"

Kamrakafego himself had been to the Sierra Maestra (the mountainous and densely foliated region where Castro had launched the Cuban Revolution). He did not disagree in principle with armed struggle, for he had staunchly supported it globally. However, he did not think that it was practical in Bermuda due to the island's specific geopolitical situation.

He also did not think it was wise for the Berets to publicize their activities, which was akin to "telling your enemy you're going to attack them" and only giving them time to prepare for action.[26] This is a perceptive and instructive analysis. Nevertheless, FCO records demonstrate that Special Branch was able to achieve advanced notice of Cadre activities—whether publicized or not—through its own covert measures.

The Cadre aimed to politically take over Bermuda, dismantle its colonial system, and establish an independent, socialist, egalitarian society that distributed its national wealth as people needed. The Berets simply wanted the right to define their own freedom and to remove the "invisible line" that prevented Blacks from ownership or control of Bermuda's destiny. For the Cadre, the struggle was more complex than simply a racial one targeted against an "enemy" White race. They argued that the entire colonial system, which was racist and oppressive *in and of itself*, had to be dismantled. Once Blacks had closed ranks and unified, coalitions with Whites could then be possible. They felt it necessary to stimulate a sense of empowerment amongst Blacks in the island through Black Nationalism, which would "move people from . . . civil rights to human rights" and call into question core issues of colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism.[27]

They also possessed a "10–10 program," which was similar to the Black Panther Party's ten points; Berets wanted freedom, land, decent housing, education, political independence in Bermuda, and full employment for Blacks. They also demanded that Blacks be tried by jury of their peers; police harassment be immediately ceased; Bermuda's government stop supporting racist regimes throughout the world, and all public facilities be put in the hands of the people. They also sought to maintain a community news service, political education classes, liberation schools for Black children, public meetings, a community information center, legal center and defense fund, day care centers, exchange programs to Africa, Asia, Cuba, and the United States, community work and assistance for Blacks on trial and prison outreach.[28] They further called for the elimination of male chauvinism; a greater involvement of the Black elite in the Black community; the heightening of revolutionary consciousness and culture in Bermuda; the elimination of "religious escapism" (including the use of drugs); and the return to Blacks the lands that were taken from them unfairly by Whites (such as Tucker's Town).

The Cadre expressed its aims through its paper, the *Black Beret: Voice of the Black Community*, and other documents such as the *Invisible Government* and the *Black Beret Manifesto*. The *Invisible Government*, written primarily by Yuhudi, asserted that Bermuda was not controlled by the "puppet" UBP government, but by an "Invisible Government," Britain. The local government, comprising "Uncle Toms, Aunt Jemimas and White local lackeys," reported to it through the British governor. This "Invisible Government" was manipulated by British expatriates to benefit themselves at the detriment of local Blacks. Furthermore, it was

> tragic as well as dishonest that up until now Bermudians at large have been misled into believing that the UBP is the real government in Bermuda. Alternatively they have been further misled into believing that the PLP will assume this responsibility if they miraculously gained a majority of seats in the House of Assembly. We at this moment excuse neither party for…keeping the people ignorant of the real facts of our dilemma. The truth is that neither of these two parties is in total control of Bermuda's affairs under the present system of colonialism.

Hence, the roots of Bermuda's problems did not exclusively lie within Bermuda's local parliament but existed "throughout the entire involvement of the British forces" on the island.[29]

The Cadre's forty-one-paged *Black Beret Manifesto* (primarily the work of Basset) was published in 1971. Containing a host of Panther material, it stated that integration would co-opt Black leadership, call for Blacks to adopt White culture to the demise of their own, destroy Black institutions, and increase "the dependency of Black institutions on Whites for their very survival." Hence, Berets felt that it would lead to the deepening psychological and physical enslavement of Black Bermudians.

Like the *Invisible Government*, the *Manifesto* highlighted the connection between colonialism and racism, arguing that Bermuda's decisions were made in "Whitehall rather than Front Street" and that Bermuda's civil service and Police Force were primarily made up of British expatriates;[30] in addition, Bermuda's judiciary and the senior officers of the Regiment were exclusively expatriates. Furthermore, Britain's "typically mercantilist policy kept the economy bond to the British sterling" and, along with tourism, prevented Bermuda from "establishing a viable and healthy economy." The *Manifesto* also stressed that the Cadre had to "take whatever steps…necessary to protect the interests" of Black people. This required a Black Revolution and, as Blacks had little other recourse, defensive or preemptive violence was a viable means in this pursuit.[31]

The *Black Beret*, printed with a mimeograph machine, had a circulation of about five hundred copies biweekly. As it was illegal to sell the paper,

distributors asked for monetary donations. The paper was visually striking, provocative, and informative; the June 11, 1970 edition depicted a Black youth wearing Black beret, an ammunition bandolier, and repeating rifle held at alert. It was captioned with Huey P. Newton's quote, "An unarmed people are either slaves or are subject to slavery at any given moment." Another displayed Black people with "arms upflung in defiant gesture" and holding automatic weapons, and referenced Mao Tse-Tung, "The evil system of colonialism and imperialism arose and throve with the enslavement of negroes and the trade in negroes, and it will surely come to its end with the complete emancipation of the Black people."

For Whites, these images symbolized the Cadre's direct threat to their power. Hence, the White media transformed this image of a young Black freedom fighter into that of a young delinquent criminal. However, for many Black youth, a Beret holding a rifle was an admirable display of defiance to a system that seemed only to respect Black people when they took such a stance. The Berets were serious, historically conscious, well disciplined, intelligent, well read, active, grassroots, and possessed integrity. It should thus come as no surprise that the establishment defined the Cadre as "public enemy number one."[32]

The *Black Beret al*so contained editorials about racial injustices in Bermuda's court system, history, poetry, artwork, letters from students in its Liberation school, and local and international news about Black political struggle. It also discussed in detail the eventual arrests and court proceedings of a number of Berets. In another example, it also printed a letter written by Ewart Brown (a "right-on brother") about the racial discrimination that he faced while on an externship with the King Edward Hospital,[33] and, on another date, posted a story about the frame-up of the "Soledad Three"—George Jackson, John Cluchette, and Fleeta Drumgo (members of California's Soledad Prison Black Panther Chapter)—the death of Jonathan Jackson, and the FBI's hunt for Angela Davis.[34]

The Cadre was birthed from specific conditions affecting Bermuda, such as British colonialism and the local Black radical tradition. The 1965 BELCO uprising gave these young Berets a visible example of local Black men fighting police officers for equal rights. Key Berets were involved in the April 1968 uprisings (Glen Fubler was arrested on charges of "wandering abroad" on the property of the Court Street Chinese Store).[35]

However, the Cadre intelligently placed the Black Bermudian experience within a context of global struggle against (neo)colonialism, White supremacy, and racism. This unapologetically pan-Africanist perspective viewed Bermuda's unique circumstance as a branch of an essentially larger experience—the violent enslavement of African people from the continent of Africa, their dispersal in the Americas, and the continued legacy

Table 5.1 Political movements/leaders studied by the Cadre.

Africa/Asia/Europe	*Caribbean/ L. America*	*United States*
African National Congress	Fidel Castro (Cuban Revolution)	Black Panther Party
Kwame Nkrumah	Frantz Fanon	Black Student Union
Samora Machele	Marcus Garvey	H. Rap Brown
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	Che Guevara	Stokely Carmichael
Julius Nyerere	Toussaint L'Ouverture	Malcolm X
Mao-Tse Tung	George Padmore	Martin Luther King, Jr.

of oppression by their former enslavers (*Maafa*). As such, it logically possessed an affinity toward liberation struggles across the African Diaspora. Indeed, it also aligned itself with other racial and ethnic groups who were and had been historically oppressed by colonialism.

The Cadre was perhaps most ideologically aligned with the BPP, with whom they communicated with regularly. The Cadre's standard Beret uniform was similar to that of the Panthers: a black beret cap turned to the side with an Africa insignia, and a Black leather jacket with a red, black, and green button pinned to it. Upon his return from school, Bassett had brought a substantial amount of Panther-related literature to the island; the Cadre also received Panther newsletters biweekly. Panthers visited the island covertly to meet with the Berets. The Cadre also communicated with the International Section of the BPP (Algeria) and the National Committee for the Defense of Joanne Chasimard (Assata Shakur) and Clark Squire (Sundiata Accoli).[36]

The Cadre was far from a violent group of "youths on the rampage."[37] An ideologically diverse and studious group, the Berets included Black Nationalists, Socialists, Pan-Africanists, and Marxist Leninists. As table 5.1 demonstrates, they drew on the experiences and philosophies of a number of global revolutionary Movements.

Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* was central to the Cadre's study of political theory, as were Castro's works on socialism and Mao-Tse Tung's *Red Book*. They also read books such as Nkrumah's *Towards Colonial Freedom,* J.A. Roger's *World's Great Men of Color*, Sam Greenlee's *The Spook Who Sat by the Door*, and Carlos Marighella's *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Much of this literature was prohibited in Bermuda, but the Berets managed to covertly bring them into the island.[38]

The works of Garvey and the UNIA also influenced the Cadre, Black Power, and the growth of Islam in Bermuda. In fact, a number of Bermuda's elders had "cut their political teeth" via the UNIA movement. For example, Khaldun's cousin often read her grandfather's papers on Garvey.[39]

The typical response of a Beret to the question "How many Berets were there," is "Those who know don't say and those that say don't know." That being said, the Cadre appears to have comprised between forty to fifty "hard-core members" and between five hundred to one thousand associates.[40] Initially, Bassett individually recruited Berets by handing out flyers and inviting people to meetings. Khaldun met Bassett through her cousin. At his invite she went to a meeting that happened to be attended by several of her friends from Young Life and the Berkeley.[41]

Cadre meetings were often held on Burnaby Street, Hamilton. The first public meeting was held by November 1969. From 1969 until 1972, the Cadre met at least three times a week.[42] In March 1970, the Cadre moved its headquarters to the second floor of the Bassett Building on Court Street. It remained here until the Cadre was forced to go underground. By June 1970, the Cadre employed at least one Beret to maintain, manage, and organize its headquarters on a 9:00 a.m–5.00 p.m. daily basis.[43]

As group membership increased meetings were held across the entire island. Smaller "cells" were eventually formed and met setely. In April 1970 a major skirmish occurred between the police and Devil's Hole youth when officers raided the area on a supposed drug bust. This incident significantly increased Cadre membership.[44]

Berets were strongly encouraged to be drug and alcohol free. They established an antidrug program (based on a BPP model) that declared that "Drugs plus capitalism equaled genocide for a people and the community." The Cadre interfered with drug sales and exposed suppliers in their writings.[45]

The Cadre engaged in political, military, martial arts, and first aid training; it was critical to study both military and political theory, because "politics was war without bloodshed and war was politics with bloodshed." Hence, they studied the principles of guerrilla warfare through the works of Guevara and Castro.[46] Political classes were held at least once a week. Their serious study protocol included local and international history, politics, economics, and law. They also studied Bermuda's 1968 Constitution and, while they used it to defend their right to demonstrate and freedom of assembly, they also argued that it was not a constitution but a "constitutional order" given to Bermuda by London's Privy Council to "keep the natives in check."[47]

It was extremely difficult to obtain weapons for military training. However, the Cadre found ways to secure them. For example, certain items could be sent directly from the United States and then be picked up by Berets employed at the Post Office.[48] Initially, Bassett taught the Berets martial arts, other forms of self-defense, and physical fitness. In Bermuda, he also trained with a number of Asians from the New Queen Chinese

restaurant. During Bassett's imprisonment, Ottiwell Simmons, Jr. (Chaka) and Shabazz taught martial arts. Berets were also trained in first aid.[49]

The Cadre's ISU was responsible for projects such as gathering photographs, license plates, personal information, and logistic details about police officers. It eventually compiled a list of officers from the Special Branch and Criminal Investigations Departments, and displayed their photographs regularly at Beret meetings. According to Special Branch, if trouble erupted, Berets would have been able to use this information to attack such officers at their residences.[50]

Defense Units were also formed, which comprised six persons split into three cells of two. Each cell had a specific responsibility for one of the following: communications, information, or "mobility." Cell members performed tasks such as guarding public or private meetings, functions and equipment, gathering intelligence, and the maintenance of weapons (such as machetes, billy clubs, and knives).[51]

The Cadre explicitly argued that "the only way to total freedom in Bermuda is through armed struggle." To be sure, the Berets did not possess any philosophical beliefs against meeting violence with violence. They physically retaliated against police attacks, and were quite adept at using incendiary weapons. Berets expressed differing views on the use of violence in the service of revolution. Basset reportedly owned a pistol and once publicly stated that Black people needed to learn how to use guns for self-defense purposes. However, Ben Aaharon and others privately responded that they would only carry firearms out of necessity.

However, this notion of armed struggle was enveloped by a primary concern with nation building. In fact, political reeducation was the most consistent method that Berets employed to achieve their aims. The Cadre used as many avenues as possible to educate the Black community, and in particular the island's youth, about colonialism, independence, and the history of Blacks in the island. Berets hosted and participated in a number of speeches, public lectures, classes, and forums in settings such as schools, street corners, churches, and homes. The Cadre operated "24/7" and "could be in anyone's living room at two or three o'clock in the morning," as some individuals preferred to meet secretly with the Cadre at night. Sometimes the Berets drove around in a truck and addressed crowds from its back by using a bullhorn.

Relationships with various local organizations such as Black churches, unions, and Parent Teacher Associations were maintained. The Cadre pledged to support any progressive group that took a "similar stand to combat racism, colonialism and all oppressive practices." By the same token, it received support from wide sectors of the community, such as from AME minister John Brandon, who had been involved in the U.S. Civil Rights

Movement and was a staunch advocate of Black Power and Black Theology. They were often invited to public schools by student groups to encourage faculty to implement Black studies into their curriculums.[52]

The Cadre possessed an interesting connection with the BIU, whose president Ottiwell Simmons, Sr., was the father of Beret Simmons, Jr. (Chaka). Hence, when, in 1970, a fire destroyed the Simmons' home, the Cadre assisted the BIU in generating funds for the family. A cocktail party was held and a BIU pamphlet urging financial support for the family was attached to copies of the Cadre's *Manifesto* and distributed and sold.[53]

The Berets also worked with the NOI, and distributed its literature even though it was illegal to do so. In 1971 it denounced Brother Byron Philip's appearance in court for "being in 'unlawful' possession of the legitimate, informative 'Muhammad Speaks,' " feeling that this demonstrated "that the oppressor makes no distinction between Black people when he is intent on violating their constitutional rights." The Cadre saw "separatism amongst Black people on ideological, religious, social or other grounds" as "detrimental to the furtherance of our common struggle to rid ourselves of the beast." Furthermore, it was "willing to strive hard, working hand in hand with programmes that the Muslims and ourselves have sincerely established for the benefit of our people."[54]

Berets were often invited to various public schools by student groups to encourage faculty to implement Black studies into their curriculums.[55] The latter was difficult, as Black Power activity was firmly suppressed by school officials.[56] In response, the Cadre created its own "Liberation Schools," eventually named Mark Albouy Liberation School. Perhaps the most long-lasting overt Cadre program, the schools peaked in 1971 with about forty-five consistent students. The school was implemented by Khaldun and another Jeanne Knights; it was maintained by a number of female Berets, several of whom had been drawn to the Cadre because of this educational aspect. Held on Saturdays in the basement of the Bassett building, the schools focused on teaching children Black history and culture. They utilized books about Black history, created an "ABCs of the liberation school," and a liberation song that included the lyrics, "Freedom justice and equality, red is for the blood we shed, green is for the land we had, Black is for the color of our skin." Attendees included the siblings of Berets.[57]

Black females played other key roles in the Cadre, whose leaders stressed that women be respected. As stated, they held positions of responsibility in a wide range of Cadre activities. As to be expected in Bermuda, the Cadre was a family-orientated group; while many Berets saw themselves as brothers and sisters, some also met their spouses through the Movement. In addition, while male chauvinism did exist, this kind of thinking was actively discouraged.[58]

In approximately three years of open activity, the Berets organized and participated in a number of demonstrations, marches, and rallies, which were often protests against racial discrimination and imperialism in Bermuda and the Black world. Rallies often included fashion shows, karate demonstrations, Congo drumming performances, speeches, and poetry readings.[59] They also helped to raise funds and facilitated the exchange of ideas between the Cadre and the Black community.[60] For example, on November 12, 1970, the Cadre held a rally at Devonshire Recreation Field. Attended by over 100 people of mixed generations, it was marked by dialogue between the Berets and the elder community. Often successful, these events were targets for police surveillance and harassment, as colonial officials were quite concerned about their "possible effects" on the community.[61] Indeed, the Cadre was visibly active in the Black community, and were willing to do whatever was necessary to liberate Bermuda from colonialism. It should thus come as no surprise that the UBP and British governments defined the Cadre as "public enemy number one."[62]

6

The Empire Strikes Back: The Government's War against the Berets

On March 26, 1970 the *Recorder* reported that a bulletin of the "newly formed Black Beret Cadre" was being studied by the attorney general. The bulletin called for the renaming of Hamilton's Victoria Park to Malcolm X Memorial Park. Its caption "Peace if possible; Compromise Never; Freedom by any means possible" was highlighted by images of a "submachine gun and a spear."[1] This bulletin drew an immediate response by letters submitted to the local papers.

One "Concerned" felt that the Cadre had declared "war on the establishment" with imaginary and baloney concerns. He/she also believed that the Cadre was probably Communist because "such groups" always tried to stir up trouble. Hence, he/she behooved the island to "declare war" on "groups such as the Cadre."

One "Observer" felt that giving sympathy to Black Power was "pandering to a menace" that could "well be the beginning of the end of life as we know it in Bermuda." The Cadre type was well known: "they wore berets, were young, impressionable and uneducated" as was "evidenced by simple spelling mistakes" in their declaration. However, behind them was a core of "highly-trained and completely unscrupulous persons" committed to "the overthrow and destruction" of all "decent and law-abiding things." This group would "inflame their young and largely uninformed members into some senseless act of destruction" and then "slip away like a shadow to start the same elsewhere."

Terry Lister questioned whether "Observer" had ever met one of the Berets. Furthermore, was it a crime for Berets to better things for Blacks in Bermuda? How could "Observer" project such destruction? Was he afraid of losing a top position if the Cadre unsettled the system? Lister felt it

disastrous to say that the Berets were uneducated, for the majority of them had or were getting a good education.[2]

This dialogue highlights the typical debate about the Cadre as it became visible through activities such as public forums and publications in the months following its creation. They were immediately labeled by Whites as Communist, delinquent, violent, and uneducated criminals who imagined oppression. As opposed to the experience of the U.S. Black Panthers, there was no liberal White Left in Bermuda that expressed support for the Cadre. In contrast, as the Cadre developed into the cornerstone of Black Power in Bermuda, it was often supported by the Black community across generational- and class lines. The Berets helped stimulate the growth of Black political activism among the island's youth, particularly in the public school system.

In response to this early success—witnessed by the spreading of Black Power—the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and United Bermuda Party (UBP) vehemently attacked the Cadre in an effort to not only eradicate the Berets, but to suppress the Movement in and of itself. These systematic tactics included passing legislation to attack Cadre publications, intense surveillance of the Cadre, legal, economic, and police harassment, and an extensive anti-Beret propaganda campaign aimed to convince Blacks (in particular the middle class) that the Cadre and Black Power would destroy their privileged quality of life. This was in spite of the fact that certain FCO officials ironically often understood that the Cadre possessed legitimate issues that the ultraconservative UBP refused to address even in an effort to hinder the impact of Black Power.

Berets were often prevented from leaving the island; they were forced to miss flights and/or their associates were prevented from entering the country. Many were harassed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada by their respective authorities. Berets were often cited constantly for trivial civic violations, such as trespassing, which aimed to cripple the Cadre's mobility and finances. In addition, their student loans were often canceled and many were fired from their jobs. It was impossible for them to establish lines of credit at Bermuda's banks and the threat of calling in the mortgages of their parents remained overhead.[3] In examining the establishment's suppression of the Cadre, an image of a complex intelligence and security network emerges that is reminisce of the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which it used to eliminate U.S. dissidents and, in particular, groups such as the Black Panthers and the American Indian Movement (AIM).

At the beginning of 1970, the FCO expressed concern that Black Power in the Caribbean was achieving a momentum similar to that of 1960s African nationalism. In response, it suggested that local governments,

potential investors, and U.S., British, and Canadian firms reshape their hiring policies to avoid being "conspicuous targets of attack" for Black Power. The tourist industry was a prime example. It was felt that the region's hotel chains needed to redistribute their equity more equally to give the appearance of greater local participation.

Most disconcerting to the FCO was the strength of Black Power in the region: its appeal and deep concentration within the Caribbean's "unemployed, discontented and unfulfilled youth" as it gave actual direction, support, and contacts for their own struggles as opposed to political "lip service." Black Power was a "modern ideology" that addressed to their particular needs. The FCO stressed that even the Caribbean's "apostles of violence" received support because they were able "to point to apparent success gained by violence in the U.S."[4]

Black Power in the Caribbean was principally directed against "overseas White control of…local economies" and local politicians who were content with and profited from the situation and took "insufficiently effective steps to correct it or to reduce the glaring disparities between the rich and the poor."[5] Its advocates gained support in projecting a Caribbean-wide image that appealed to a

> Black Caribbean nationalism which would transcend the existing national barriers and give a hope of the creation of a Black Caribbean nation when the existing leaders (who had signally failed to achieve a Caribbean political federation and had relapsed into parochialism) had been swept away and Black Power sympathizers had come to power on a wave of popular support throughout the Caribbean.[6]

The following statement perhaps surmises best the colonial establishment's perception of Black Power in the region:

> If Black Power were a coherent and moderate movement, it might in theory bring about a measure of unity in the states and could contribute to a reduction of privilege. But its racist base is sinister and in its more extreme manifestations its aims are inimical to our interests. In the Caribbean it has grown in a year from practically nothing to be a force to be reckoned with.…Its spread, either as a destructive force threatening constitutional governments or in terms of political movement in favor of the nationalization of foreign enterprises…would be bound at least to affect our commercial relations with the region. It would also cause difficulty for us in dependent territories (notably Bermuda) where we are directly responsible for maintaining internal security. And it could prove disastrous to the interests of the region itself, where the increasingly tourist-based development of the islands could be badly set back by a loss of outside confidence.[7]

Of all of the British-dependent territories, the FCO believed Black Power to be most evident in Bermuda where its racial divisions and White-dominated minority government made itself into an "easy target." Hence, since the 1969 Black Power Conference (BPC), it placed the island's Black youth organizations under specific attention.[8] In January 1970 it noted that the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) Youth Wing was becoming more "militant" and that its activities needed to be "watched carefully." The Youth Wing continued to publish *Umoja* and had been meeting (in locations such as Hamilton Parish Workman's Club and the Allen AME Temple's Youth Centre) to organize an island-wide membership drive.

At one such meeting Youth Wingers discussed the development of a "numerically strong Youth Wing capable of splitting into cadres each of which would be trained to carry out tactical maneuvers." At a subsequent gathering attended by about forty people, the FCO claimed that "there was considerable talk of violence. Two speakers advocated the use of dynamite to blow up public buildings" and suggested the "killing of prominent White or 'Uncle Tom' members of the community." One young female reportedly stated that she was "prepared to sacrifice her own life to eliminate a prominent member of Government." Though this "extreme minority" had not gained popular support, it "gained fervor" in each meeting through more insistent demands for action. Hence, FCO officials felt that if a "leader of the caliber of Ewart Brown" emerged, the situation would "become increasingly threatening to security." Police Commissioner Duckett and Government Leader Tucker took these threats seriously and implemented security precautions.

Martonmere believed it impossible for the police to personally protect all members of government who might have been targets for a "demented assassin" and chose to keep the Youth Wing under close surveillance. The Wing was apparently aware of this and its security precautions during the meetings prevented Special Branch from gaining intelligence. Martonmere was particularly disturbed that PLP leaders A. Hodgson, a regular "malicious instigator," and Wade attended the meetings and supported "the advocators of violence."[9]

The FCO's Bermuda Intelligence Committee had become aware of the Cadre by at least November 1969. This Committee included Attorney General Summerfield, Chief Secretary to the Cabinet J. Sykes, Commissioner of Police Duckett, head of the Police Force's Special Branch, a labor relations officer, an adjutant, a member of the Bermuda Regiment, an army intelligence officer, Governor Martonmere, other FCO officials (such as A.J. Fairclough, head of the FCO's West Indian Department),[10] and the local UBP government (represented by Tucker and later E.T. Richards). It produced monthly "Intelligence Reports" that the governor submitted

to the FCO, often compiled with information covertly gathered by Special Branch. Hence, in 1969 the Cadre joined the likes of Kamarakafego, the PLP, Black Power, the Bermuda Industrial Report (BIU) and labor movement, and the Nation of Islam (NOI) as regular headlines in these reports.

Intelligence gathering implied infiltration of the Cadre; in fact, in September 1970 Special Branch would boast that it had successfully infiltrated a number of local Black Power organizations. Cadre meetings held in the Bassett Building were extensively documented. For example, Special Branch reported that at the *very first* meeting in the building, twelve persons had attended, that it had been tape-recorded, that Cadre rules and regulations were announced, that weekly programs were accepted, and that the front door was guarded. Even the dimensions of the room (26 x 13 feet) were detailed. In addition, the police eventually obtained fingerprints and photos of Berets who were never arrested. The Cadre believed that the police used a Chinese restaurant located across from its headquarters to observe its activities. This is perhaps one reason why the restaurant was burned down in later uprisings in October 1970.[11]

The Cadre confirmed its own suspicions that they were being monitored and headquarters possibly wiretapped by leaking disinformation to the police. Other methods to challenge this surveillance included utilized encrypted forms of communication and placing fake license plates on their motorcycles to avoid police attention.[12] Recruits were also put through security checks in an effort to weed out informants.

The Cadre also operated on a cell system model utilized by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Simply speaking, a cell began with three trusted individuals. In turn each formed another cell with two more people, creating a larger cell. However, new cell members were not informed of those in the inner cell. Hence, the Cadre consisted of an inner leadership circle surrounded by larger circles.[13]

This system was particularly effective in performing specific covert tasks, some of which have officially remained unsolved. Cells held their own meetings and exchanged information on a *need-to-know basis*. Hence, informants would only be able to report on discussions within their own cell, hindering their ability to gather information and allowing leaks to be traced to particular cells. For example, the Cadre "had no problems in liberating stuff from White people." As one Beret recalls:

> The experiences I remember I can't talk about. We used to have an undercover group. The Berets did its own thing but at the same time we had a back up crew.…We used to do a lot of crazy things.…Everyone had their own sect. Like if I was working with someone, none of us knew what every one else knew. Everyone had their own thing that they were responsible for.[14]

These were not idle measures. Special Branch complained that when the Beret used the cell system its capacity to gather intelligence was stifled as opposed to when the Cadre did not. In the latter case, the police were often at advanced knowledge of Cadre activities. For example, in January 1970, they were aware that the Berets planned to hold a public forum on February 12, 1970 at Trinity Hall, Hamilton.[15] According to Swan:

> …the Hall was packed. There was so much unity there. It was really encouraging, at the same time frightening, cause you looked around at the people there, and you knew there were people there who couldn't wait to get out and share what they saw.…I felt…the infiltration…but when we showed up in our leather jackets, jeans and berets and African insignia, red, black and green, there was an air of respect, we said wow…that's the way it was in that hall, you could hear a pin drop when Dionne [Bassett] spoke.[16]

Swan was absolutely correct. The FCO February Intelligence Report keenly detailed the forum, stating that about one hundred persons, the majority of whom were between fourteen and twenty-five years of age, attended the meeting. The main speaker was AME Reverend John Brandon, who stated that, if necessary, violence had to be used to achieve change in Bermuda. Five Cadre executives (including Bassett) also outlined its aims, which included organizing and educating "Black youth with a view to implementing social and economic changes in the community." The Berets criticized racism in the judicial and immigration systems, interpreted Black Power as "Black people organized independently from the White man," and described themselves "as a tightly-knit group formed in a similar manner to Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Group." On display were large photographs of Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, and other prominent Panthers and a poster-sized caricature of a screaming pig running along a road with a Black hand holding a gun behind it. Presumably referring to Tucker, the caption read, "Run Sir Henry, Run, Oink, Oink."

This forum confirmed for the FCO that the Cadre was becoming Bermuda's most influential Black Power organization:

> The "Black Berets"…have…become more militant than the [Youth] Wing from which they originated.…Bassett has emerged as leader and may prove to be the cohesive driving force lacking among young militants.…Members of the executive are also the leaders of the Youth Wing.…It would seem that the extreme element of the latter, whilst not anxious to sever ties with the latter, have formed a sete group modeled on the lines of the Black Panther Party. The Cadre is tightly controlled, very security conscious and completely free from political or 'adult' interference. It is this group which, in all probability, will provide the greatest threat to internal security.[17]

Brandon, staunch advocate of Black Power and Black Theology, was also considered to be such a "danger" and an "undesirable." The minister had been involved in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, and arrived in Bermuda in 1969. In early March 1970, he organized a weeklong seminar at the Allen Temple AME Church, entitled, "Consultation on the Black Church and Social Issues." Scheduled speakers and panelists included Ira Philip, PLP Party leaders, and Berets such as Bassett.[18]

The Cadre and Youth Wing continued to host collaborative events. On February 21, both groups coorganized a memorial service in Victoria Park to commemorate the assassination of Malcolm X and stress Black unity. Attended by approximately one hundred and fifty persons, three Berets and a Youth Winger gave speeches and encouraged the audience to "support the Black man's cause."

Throughout February, the Youth Wing hosted a series of Black history lectures. Speeches urged Black youth to avoid the use of drugs and educate themselves to better their lives. An NOI representative also participated and explained the Nation's history, criticized the ban on *Muhammad Speaks*, and invited the audience to attend the Nation's meetings.[19]

Such developments led colonial officials to state that in the past six months the Youth Wing/Black Beret Cadre had "become better organized and much more violent." Furthermore, the "increasing momentum and evidence of Black Power doctrinal infiltration on racial and violent lines" was a matter of considerable concern and represented "an insidious process of conditioning for the uncommitted" and particularly teenagers, which could pave the way for "more outrageous" incidents.[20]

In the following month, the Berets led a march through Tucker's Town. Totaling about thirty youths, they walked into its private Mid-Ocean Club and reportedly demanded to be served. Upon leaving, they were approached by Duckett and a squad of police, who informed them via bullhorn that they needed to leave the premises or be arrested for trespassing. The Berets simply continued to march to the Castle Point beach in the heart of the area, and then walked back.[21]

Surveillance at a subsequent Cadre meeting alerted colonial officials to further possible incidents during Easter weekend. The Berets planned to "take action" in the event that H. Rap Brown lost a case in court that he faced in the United States. Kamarakafego was present at the meeting, and on his recommendation it was agreed that a protest be held at City Hall. Though no such demonstrations took place, a British frigate was stationed in Bermuda's waters in addition to other security measures.

However, on the evening of Easter Sunday, an explosion wrecked "a White Man's shrine," the eighteenth-century Devonshire Church. A twenty-five-year-old male, later reported to be a Beret, was found injured

in the explosion and later convicted (and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment) for the incident. An aborted arson attempt also occurred at the House of Assembly. In June, a similar attempt was made at the Smith's Parish Vestry. Despite the lack of concrete evidence, officials linked all three incidents to the Cadre.[22]

In addition, at the invitation of Kamarakafego, students involved in the Sir George Williams University protests attempted to visit Bermuda. They were put on Bermuda's stop-list, but one of its key leaders, Dominican Rosie Douglas (who would later become prime minister of Dominica), managed to successfully enter the island. FCO officials felt that Douglas was "leading agitations behind the scenes"; he claimed to have "met with certain groups" and would stay in Bermuda "as long as necessary." Douglas gave a press conference but, upon review, the governor and his advisors found it to be of "gutter language" and "unfit to present to the public." Douglas was placed on the stop-list but left the island before Martonmere could prosecute and deport him.[23]

The UBP was warned about the "potential danger" of the presence of "hard core" Berets in "sensitive areas" such as the Regiment, the Police Force, and government departments such as the Post Office. The Regiment contained "twenty known potential trouble-makers," six of whom were members of the Cadre and Youth Wing. One "extremely intelligent young corporal" was seen distributing Cadre literature, and had only joined the Regiment so that he could learn to fight when the revolution came.[24]

FCO officials were alarmed that the Cadre had "infiltrated" the island's schools and youth centers through various organizations. This included the Warwick Youth Centre, which it had redecorated with its colors (red, black, and green) and slogans. Cadre-like groups were emerging across the island, as in Warwick, St. George's, and Devil's Hole. This was understandable, because its grievances "appeared legitimate" and were similar to the PLP's. However, they felt that the Cadre possessed an added "dangerous element:" a growing belief that they had "talked long enough without suitable response" and they were now "prepared to resort to violent means to achieve" their goals. Even more disconcerting for the FCO was the wider Black community's growing support for the Cadre.[25]

In fact, it was felt that it was this militancy that had won the Cadre public support. FCO officials were vexed that even after the Cadre's implications in the burning of Devonshire Church, organizations such as the AME Church still supported it. Furthermore, the Cadre actively sought to fulfill its aim to "organize and educate Black youth as an instrument for social change," and concentrated on "disrupting" school classes, encouraging "indiscipline," and advocating a sete stream for Black children.[26]

Indeed, Black Power activity was quite pronounced in the island's public school system. This was poignantly demonstrated when, on March 17, 1970, the Berkeley Black Student Association (BSA) organized a boycott of its annual sports day on in a demand that Black Studies be taught in the high school.[27] Indeed, the "Berkeley experience" reflected the need for Black Power in the island.

The Berkeley was Bermuda's elite academic school for Blacks. Many of its students could have hoped to find a comfortable place amongst Bermuda's Black middle class. In fact, a number of "Berkeleyites" became and have continued to become collaborators with the White oligarchy.

Historically speaking, racism in segregated Bermuda resulted in a cultural paradigm of aesthetics that denigrated Blackness and preferred "lightness" (perhaps read Whiteness). Within a social context where Blacks were defined as "coloured," "Black" was synonymous with a host of other negative racial epitaphs such as "golliwog" or "hunched." Such issues with "Blackness" carried over into the school system and even the Berkeley, where students were often selected (or not selected) for certain positions of responsibility based upon their complexion.

The school's curriculum consisted of a heavy "colonial dose" of British history, to the exclusion of Black or Bermuda history. However, other factors helped to nurture a Black consciousness among the students. Prominent Black visitors were also invited to speak at the school's assembly. A few teachers would covertly talk about the system in an effort to promote thought amongst the students. They exposed students to Black literature, such as writings of Langston Hughes and Eva Hodgson's *Second-Class Citizens*. In fact, Hodgson, who taught geography at the school, encouraged students to think of themselves as being "Black," which was a first for many of them.[28] To little avail, she had publically advocated for almost a decade about the inclusion of Black Studies in the public school curriculum.[29]

A significant number of Berets and associates were "Berkeleyites," such as Khaldun, Swan, Simmons, and Perinchief. The African Liberation Dancers also emerged from the school. This group performed at a number of Cadre rallies and also included Berets associates such as Dame Jennifer Smith, former premier of Bermuda.[30]

Khaldun found that only a few of her classmates were as racially or historically conscious as she was. They began to discuss issues affecting the Black Diaspora and questioned the lack of Bermuda history being taught at the school. This group included Simmons, whose own awareness about activism was encouraged by his father's experiences as leader of the BIU.

Along with several other Berkeleyites Khaldun attended Young Life meetings, where she met other conscious Black youth (such as Ben Aaharon and Sinclair Swan). In addition to socializing, the group discussed the need

for Black self-determination in Bermuda. They talked about persons such as Malcolm X and read books such as Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* and *Black Skin, White Masks*.

Khaldun and her cousin also joined the PLP Youth Wing. Khaldun's uncle was involved with the Party and "exposed them to politics" at family gatherings. In fact, many like-minded youth from the Berkeley and Young Life groups gravitated toward the Youth Wing to discuss and act on key issues facing Blacks.[31]

FCO officials considered Berkeley to be the "pressure point" of Black Power, but the Movement was a visible force in several schools. In 1970, the Cadre/Youth Wing group encouraged the creation of an island-wide Black Union of Students (BUS), which formed branches at the Academic Sixth Form Centre, Bermuda Technical Institute, and the Sandy's Secondary and Churchill Schools. An estimated 400–500 students began to attend island-wide BUS meetings. Each student body had its own leaders and met regularly to discuss Black Power and the need for Black Studies in the school system. In response, the Intelligence Committee informed the UBP that it was inadvisable to allow the BUS, a "racially-inclined" organization associated with the Cadre, to be formed in schools especially in biracial ones such as the Whitney. Meanwhile, Cadre activity also spread to the Warwick, Whitney, and St. George's Secondary and Central and Prospect Primary Schools.

Related incidents spread across the island. In early 1970, students at the Churchill School planned to have a march protesting Black oppression. FCO authorities claimed that the school was vulnerable to Cadre activity because its students came from "poor homes" and had "low intelligence quotients." Discipline at the majority-Black Whitney Institute was problematic because the school possessed only one Black teacher. White female teachers at Warwick and Sandy's Secondary schools claimed to have been abused and assaulted. Lack of supervision at the Sixth Form Center had resulted in "unauthorized meetings" between students and Berets for months.

Pressure on the Education Department to introduce Black Studies into the schools was meeting with some success. The Berets threatened to boycott the schools at the start of the next year if student concerns were not addressed. Students were "more truculent and unresponsive, particularly towards White teachers" than before, an attitude "no doubt" fostered by the Berets and the Youth Wing" and local news coverage focused on global student unrest. This was causing expatriate teachers to resign at an unprecedented rate.[32]

The FCO refused to recognize that the Berets were not simply an "outside influence." A number of these students, as demonstrated, were raised in racially aware backgrounds and were politically conscious before the emergence of the Berets. In addition, many were Berets themselves.

This overlapping Young Life, Youth Wing, BUS, and Berkeley collective felt that Berkeley, as a public school comprising an all-Black board of governors, would be the most practical institution to initially implement Black Studies. When a group of Berkeleyites approached Principal Furbert about the matter, he retorted that Black history was not in the curriculum. They then proposed that Berkeley host an after-school Black Studies program and invite students from other schools to attend. Furbert refused on the grounds that the school system did not mix student bodies. The students keenly remarked that this mixing was allowed during the annual interschool sports. In response it was claimed there was no one to teach the classes. To no avail, the students responded that they would get the books and teachers simply had to lead the discussions.

The students concluded that if Black Studies were not allowed in class and as knowledge was more important than sports, then they would boycott Berkeley's sports day. Students would "sit on the field and talk about [Black] heroes and history rather than run" races. Directed by Khaldun and Simmons, the Berkeley BSA practically brought the Berkeley sports day to a halt.[33] In the aftermath, parents were called to the school and students were asked to explain their actions during a special assembly.

Simmons asserted that the boycott was necessary to demonstrate the serious need for Black Studies in the school system. Furthermore, the BSA was not anti-White but pro-Black, and had issues with the education system rather than individuals and the tendency of adults to "talk" without enough action. Due to this pressure, it was decided that more Black literature would be introduced into the school's curriculum; a female African-American teacher (an alumnus of Howard University) was brought in to teach Black Studies.[34]

The leaders of the Boycott were respected non-senior students who openly discussed Black history. In fact, one was the daughter of a school principal. Criminalized via the media, the *Gazette* saw the Boycott as "a very radical stand"; one commenter to the paper complained that the students were "wasting and disrupting time in school" and that the government needed to "stamp out this evil."[35]

For FCO officials, the Boycott demonstrated that the "cult of Black separation among young people [was] being actively promoted." The Black Power Movement was becoming more organized and effective, and incidents such as the burning of the Devonshire Church "indicated a new phase of bolder and more determined attacks against authorities."[36] Fairclough surmised that

> Whether under the guise of the Black Beret Cadre, Black Union of Students, PLP Youth Wing or the "Black Church," there is ample evidence in the form

> of sabotage, demonstrations and seditious talk to indicate that a youthful, radical and dangerous movement is expanding in size and influence with alarming rapidity and must be curbed if a reasonably peaceful future for Bermuda is to be preserved. *Black Power cannot be eradicated but its evil influences can, and must be, retarded*. (Emphasis added)

For Fairclough, Black Power's impact "depended on the effectiveness of Government counter-measures" against the Cadre, which would otherwise "perpetuate further acts of violence and disruption." The public needed "demonstrable assurance" that the government was "not prepared to tolerate violence and racial hatred." He concluded, without any doubt, that "disastrous" results would occur from allowing "the trend in violence" to "continue unabated" and not immediately "taking effective counter-measures."[37] However, the Intelligence Committee felt that direct action against the Cadre was unwise, because it was unsure of how the Black community would respond to the open suppression of the Cadre. Hence, it launched a specific covert campaign to suppress the Berets and Black Power.

They agreed that the UBP needed to take firm action to prevent the Cadre from increasing its influence "possibly beyond control." They recommended that the Party seek assistance from the FCO's Information Research Department (IRD) to mount "a propaganda campaign against [the Cadre]." Clashes between the police and the Berets were anticipated and riot units were placed on stand-by. In addition, minor offenses were to be handled through summonses rather than immediate arrest "to avoid provoking disturbances which would almost certainly result from police attempts to arrest" Berets.

According to Martonmere, the Cadre was "rapidly becoming a serious threat to security." It challenged "authority" with the "intention of provoking government reaction and using this as an excuse for violence." It had undoubtedly "vastly improved" and now had "effective leadership and rapidly increasing support among young Black people."[38]

Unsurprisingly, the governor was unwilling to address the concerns of the Black population. For example, on April 7, the PLP Youth Wing (along with Kamarakafego) met with him to discuss a PLP petition submitted to the queen of England about the 1968 Bermuda Constitution (the petition dealt with discrimination in housing, employment, real estate and the judicial system; the education system's focus on White history and culture; and the immediate grant of self-government and scheduling of independence) and issues such as Bermuda's excess of foreign teachers and civil servants, the harassment of Black people for marijuana use, police brutality, a call to lower the voting age to eighteen, and harsh sentences in the judicial system

(such as the use of the cat-o-nine tails and hanging). The governor claimed that the Constitution duty-bound him to assent to the Party in power and could not implement any concerns from the petition nor "give opinions on political matters." He recommended that the Youth Wingers cooperate with the UBP, adding that there had not been a hanging in Bermuda for "a long time."

This was certainly untrue, because he had no problem in giving his opinions to the UBP. The governor would later negatively describe the Youth Wingers as unimpressive, sullen, inarticulate, and "woefully ignorant" of Bermuda's situation, claiming that it was "easy to believe how such youths could be the dupes of unscrupulous and irresponsible adults" using them for their own unlawful purposes. Nevertheless, their comments were accordingly documented. Note was surely taken when one female Winger/Beret remarked, "We don't want trouble and bombings, but if we want to get something done, what else can we do?" Martonmere had long concluded that the Youth Wing platform contained "some really dangerous stuff." Yet, he felt that the meeting could be used as propaganda to show that some "good" could come out of discussions with the establishment rather than through demonstrations.[39]

In a lengthy report, Attorney General Summerfield felt that the Movement compromised the security of Bermuda as "several (Black) racist organizations" were "committed to promoting disorder." Such disorders included "secret meetings where treason, murder and violence was discussed and incited," and included the "organized distribution of anti-White and subversive literature." Their "legitimate" motives aimed to "stimulate racial pride and a sense of identity among those of Negro descent" but were mixed with "outright racial hatred and contempt for Whites" and "fostered by bitter attacks on the White community." They attacked the judiciary and law enforcement authorities and contemptuously ridiculed traditional values as supportive of White power. "Tension and suspicion between the races" had reached an unprecedented level and "open flouting of the law" was rising.

According to Summerfield, these "militants" saw Black Studies as a partial cure for Bermuda's ills and reached responsive ears through "persistent propaganda." They exploited both *real* grievances (such as the spiraling cost of living, and token integration) and "imagined" or past ones to garner support. In addition, they attributed the "natural frustrations of those who [had] not succeeded" to the "system." There were only about fifty "dedicated militants," most of them Berets. However, with two hundred active sympathizers, the Cadre (with members as young as fourteen) was expected to expand. He also felt that "several older embittered hard-liners, for their own ends" were "encouraging these groups, systematically poisoning

their minds and inciting them to violence." "Treason and violence" were being advocated in "secret meetings" that made "one's blood run cold"; such meetings led to the arson attempt of the House of Assembly and the demolition of the Devonshire Church. Furthermore, with "the doctrine of violent revolution having taken firm root" and "their minds poisoned with hate," Summerfield suggested that the Berets had begun confidently to "translate their philosophy into action as their activities went unchecked."

He also felt there were more Blacks, than many FCO officials cared to admit, who wavered between sympathy for these "militants" and "fear of the unleashing of forces" that could "get out of control and endanger their standard of living." This group was subject to intimidation and explained the virtual absence of prosecutions for the recent incidents. It was impossible to obtain evidence and even if so, there was a high likelihood of "perverse verdicts" in jury trials—which would be affected by fear of reprisals, intimidation, and racialism.

Hence, Summerfield proposed a number of countermeasures to thwart the Berets. He felt that the UBP needed to do visibly all it possibly could to "remove or alleviate real causes of grievances, the most critical being the fast rising cost of living and slow pace of integration." Also, quick "firm, fair and positive action" was needed in the courts; the jury system was to be inconspicuously revised to prevent perverse verdicts in racial cases. However, if the Supreme Court's trial procedure was to be dramatically changed, the public had first to be convinced that the current system had broken down.

He also suggested that "sustained counter propaganda and 'spoiling' tactics by professionals" be used against the Cadre. One local television program had "given a lead and made a first class job of discrediting" the Berets. In addition, the UBP needed to condemn lawlessness, and parents and religious and social organizations needed to be called upon to help reassert "traditional values" and denounce "anti-social and subversive activities." The government also needed to make more use of the stop-list to "keep out agitators and other trouble makers." In addition, "known trouble spots," such as specific schools, "were to be kept under observation" and "any organized hooliganism, assaults, and intimidation" was to be responded to quickly. It was hoped that such operations would result in the consistent capture of "these gangs of intruders on the spot" and with their "speedy prosecution," their "subversive organizations" would become demoralized. He continued, "At the schools where there is regular lunchtime indoctrination of Black power philosophy and anti-White propaganda, at openly assembled meetings, the presence of a Police Officer would deter the use of language which contravenes any provision of law, e.g. the Race Relations Act, 1969, or . . . produce evidence for a prosecution."

Hard-core Berets were to be removed from "sensitive" organizations, such as the Police Force and the Regiment and a "permanent watch" kept on "targets of a particularly dangerous disposition." However, it was important not to "drive a permanent wedge" between "those temporarily under the spell of revolutionary fervor" and the rest of society. Social work was needed "to wean them away from lawlessness, to give them an opportunity to better themselves and to find a useful and rewarding niche in ordered society."[40]

Summerfield's racist implications suggested that there was something psychologically or socially wrong with Black people who resisted White oppression, quite reminiscent of White enslavers who claimed that Africans who resisted slavery possessed mental diseases (such as *dysaethesia aethiopica*).[41] Indeed, Whites saw Black Power as a cancer, evil curse, or pathological condition that needed to be eradicated, destroyed, or "healed." During the enslavement era perhaps a White minister would have performed the exorcism of this demonic spirit of African resistance; in the twentieth century White "specialists," such as psychologists or social workers, were required to perform such "mental surgery." It is perhaps more accurate to assert that a White supremacist mentality endeared to such notions was mentally dysfunctional.

The attorney general further believed that the Cadre and Youth Wing's aims of "violent revolution" warranted an increase of the Police Force, which stood at 272 officers. He called for all officers ranked at inspector or above to be armed with .38 revolvers. In addition, Duckett was instructed to recruit officers trained in riot control from only Britain or ex-colonial sources. Efforts to recruit from the Caribbean had failed because most of its "coloured" officers were inappropriately trained, "not used to Bermuda's standard of living," and inefficient at riot control. In contrast, British officers were "more experienced" and efficient.[42] Between 1968, 1969, and 1970, officers were recruited from Bermuda (7, 4, 2), Britain (17, 12, 8), and the wider Caribbean (6, 21, 0).[43]

This racial pattern of external recruitment of police officers was historically prevalent in the British colonial experience. Recruitment from Britain served to ensure the loyalty of the Police Force. It also reflected the color-class structure of wider society by policies that ranked and promoted White officers over Black ones.

It was also felt that Bermuda's Regiment did not possess riot control potential and could not support these forces. However, the Royal Navy was prepared to do so. In fact, ships were stationed in Florida and the Bahamas that could reach Bermuda in approximately forty-eight hours.[44]

Hence, several key members of Bermuda's Intelligence (Security) Committee had similar views on how to suppress Black Power. On April 14, 1970, it met at Government House to formally decide the appropriate

process in which they would attack the "well-led, organized, disciplined and extremely militant" Cadre. This timing was critical, for disturbances were expected to occur when students such as Brown returned to Bermuda on break.

It opted for a "balanced" approach to be taken to damage the Cadre's public image. This included the dissemination of political speeches, constructed with the advice of IRD expert, through the media. These would be "positive" (e.g., profiles of successfully educated young White and Black Bermudians) and "negative" (such as denouncements of violent behavior). It was decided to broadcast legislation through television to discourage violence; increase the UBP's powers of deportation; arrange visits to Bermuda by "moderate and suitable outstanding Blacks"; and implement an anti–Black Power campaign. Still, Fairclough remained dissatisfied and called for more action to thwart the Cadre.[45]

As planned, on April 17, 1970, Tucker conducted a television speech (compiled with the assistance of the Council) based on these themes. He denounced "incidents of lawlessness," which included intimidation, threats of violence, invasions of private property, meetings "where racist propaganda of the most vicious type" was "preached," "frequent profanity in the streets," the harassment of tourists and residents, and the distribution of "racist literature." He claimed that racist groups among young people orchestrated these "evil" activities to create a "climate of fear," stir up racial hatred, and unlawfully "disrupt society…to create chaos." In forcing changes that needed to be "properly achieved by democratic parliamentary process," they aimed to disrupt the education system and damage the economy regardless of innocent suffering. At least one hard-core group was "militant, disciplined and wore uniforms" and encouraged by adults interested in "personal power at any price." The latter impressed the minds of school youth, as "a gang of outsiders" had wrecked Berkeley's sports day and teachers were "threatened with weapons and abused in the most foul language." Hence, the UBP had canceled the annual interschool sports day.

The UBP leader claimed that Black and White Bermudians had mutual problems and Bermuda's youth possessed less grievances than those in other countries, as the island's educational standards were high, job opportunities unlimited, and sports facilities improving. In addition, the government had a "duty to condemn publicly and forcibly such racist organizations and…incidents" and expected "that all responsible…leaders in the community" did likewise. In essence, it would "*take all necessary steps to ensure that this cancer…was eradicated*" (emphasis added).

Tucker wanted to "make it absolutely clear that the Government [would] not…be deflected, by the action of a tiny minority of irresponsible evildoers, from its programme" of integration. It was determined to "stamp

out this evil," which would destroy Bermuda if not stopped and was in the process of significantly increasing the Police Force to help prosecute law offenders. Nevertheless, he claimed the government remained open to addressing individual grievances.[46]

Browne-Evans denounced this speech as reactionary:

> The Government Leader pushed the panic button because Black people have reached the point of no return in their quest for freedom and dignity.... He has been slumbering while the youth have been arming themselves and now he is afraid of them. After years of trying to keep Black people from coming together he is acting like a frightened chicken because we are at last getting together.

She found Tucker's account of the Boycott to be a "blatant" lie, as a "gang of outsiders" had not orchestrated it and the students had been responsible in boycotting a sports rather than a usual school day. She was sure that the Cadre was the "uniformed group" that he referred to. Furthermore, she felt that Bermuda's civil and political situation could only be bettered by independence and a host of issues would be avoided if British police officers remained out of Bermuda. She encouraged the youth to "learn the laws of civil disobedience," and informed them that if they planned to have a disturbance "keep 1973 [election year] free from violence and save it for the politicians."

Viera claimed that the PLP's "emotionally charged remarks and ugly rhetoric" had activated the recent "lawlessness." He believed that there was "no such thing as civil disobedience, only criminal disobedience" and those engaged in the latter used "overworked terms like oppression, poverty, police brutality and discrimination."[47] Yet again, another claimed that oppression in Bermuda existed only in the minds of its victims.

Weeks later, FCO officials appeared satisfied that countermeasures had brought things "under control" and cut some of the ground "away from the feet of the Cadre." Tucker's speech had "put some backbone" into Bermudians who saw the "real danger" of the Berets. Witnesses had offered information in an unprecedented manner. They further believed that a police raid at Devil's Hole, the increase in the Police Force, the cancelation of interschool sports, the dismissal of a Regiment corporal (who was a Cadre Field Marshall), and the closure of the Warwick Youth Centre had "retarded the evils of Black Power." The activities of the Berets had subsisted and there had been a change in the island's atmosphere; "sullen looks" were replaced by "happy smiles and friendly greetings."[48]

However, the FCO had other concerns. Special Branch had yet to compile the names of "militants" to be put on the stop list. Also, Summerfield

felt that the Police raid in Devil's Hole had been a total disaster and "opened them up to provocation by the PLP." In fact, the raid appears to have *boosted* Cadre membership and Black Power activity in the area.[49]

Hence, the Berets and Youth Wingers continued to be closely watched. Martonmere noted that Bassett had flown to New York on April 29 for an unknown purpose. It was also detailed that Youth Wingers were planning to participate in an African Heritage Conference at Howard University, Washington DC.[50]

FCO officials also kept a close watch on the PLP. It was gleefully noted that Wade and A. Hodgson were to be placed on the stop-lists of St. Lucia and Antigua, and, in addition to Kamarakafego, were already prohibited from entering St. Vincent. Kamarakafego had also been prevented from entering Anguilla and the Cayman Islands, and officials were seeking further information about his activities in Tortola. They concluded that the latter's local concerns had become secondary to his global Black Power activities, claiming that he and other U.S.-based colleagues were trying to obtain land in the Caribbean. There was also concern that Kwame Toure was to pass through Bermuda en route to Europe.[51]

Meanwhile, the FCO began to implement its propaganda campaign against the Cadre. Tucker had agreed about the need for a "professional propagandist" to orchestrate an effective anti-Beret publicity campaign. In fact, in April 1970 an FCO Information Expert J. Rayner (and an overseas police advisor) arrived in the island to "investigate the possibilities of IRD-type work being undertaken in Bermuda to assist the…government in dealing with…the newly emerged hard core of Black Power troublemakers, the 'Black Beret Cadres.'"

Rayner would conclude that the Berets were motivated by hatred and violence, "impervious to reason," and were "out to gain power for the Black people of Bermuda by violent means and to kick out or destroy the Whites." He found that there was an "urgent need" to support government and police action against the Berets through education, publicity, and propaganda. The situation also called for "imaginative exploitation of opportunities for positive 'building-up' publicity, e.g. by stimulating newsworthy speeches by members of the government." The absence of propaganda would cause the government to "lose ground in the propaganda field" and efforts were to be made "if only to maintain the propaganda status quo." An experienced IRD officer could then back this up with "covert propaganda." Nevertheless, these activities needed to have a "long-term effect" in countering Black Power as the Movement would remain "however effectively the…Cadres" were dealt with.

FCO officials claimed that while many Blacks did not approve of the Cadre's activities or positions, only few would say so openly. However,

Rayner retorted that a large proportion of the Black population was in "natural sympathy with the non-violent and more general aspects of the Black Power movement," constituting "a long-term problem which [needed] long-term propaganda treatment." He broke Bermuda's population into four groups: "extremists" and their supporters (mostly young); younger Bermudians, such as older high school children and students attending universities abroad; older, middle-age, "middle-of-the-road Blacks"; and Whites. He then suggested that the supposed "extremists" be isolated as they would obviously not be affected by any propaganda. Similarly, a large number of the second group (high school and university students) was either "impervious to counter propaganda" or "at least difficult targets to reach," particularly those who had "come into contact with Black Power organizations in the U.S. and Canada." In contrast, older and moderate Blacks could be reached with the aim was to "bolster their natural dislike of violence . . . to a point where some [would] speak out against it." Lastly, the White population would "welcome any sign of strong action on the part of the Government."

Bermuda's two television channels and newspaper editors were considered to be "amenable to persuasion" (clearly an understatement) and they would be provided with "good stories." The press was key, as local newspapers remained influential "among the older and more established population." As these papers published news material from Europe and the United States, it was possible to also place suitable stories through those channels.[52]

Within a month, Hugh Mooney, an IRD officer, was brought to Bermuda to help in these propaganda activities. His work included exploiting political speeches made by UBP supporters. As part of this process, a "coloured man" was appointed deputy director of education in an attempt to help quell the Black community's gripes about the education system. The former White deputy director was removed under the guise that he had applied for a headmaster's position.[53]

Mooney's first "notable" acts were placing letters in the *Gazette* signed with a pseudo name. On June 4, 1970, as "To Tell the Truth," he wrote to the paper discrediting Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad, the NOI, and Black Power. Calling himself an "Educated Bermudian," he stated that he did not want his children to associate with "ignorant layabout" Black Power advocates and urged "educated" parents to do the same. On June 8, he wrote another letter, this time as a "Veritas," that expressed great support for his first letter. He denounced Black Power in Bermuda and the United States, supported integration, and called on other educated Bermudians to do the same. This suggests that the *Gazette* was a willing participant in this propaganda campaign against the Cadre.

Nevertheless, Fairclough felt that letters to the *Gazette* had "restricted impact" and something "more substantial" was needed. Days later, Mooney was presented with another opportunity. A group of Black youths had applied to lease government land and it was felt that granting them this opportunity would have provided material for "good propaganda." However, Mooney could not fulfill such duties because he was having trouble obtaining the minutes of Executive Council meetings that discussed the matter.[54] This reflected a consistent bickering that took place among the officials as to how Black Power should have been suppressed.

Top FCO authorities felt that there was "too much complacency and not enough action in Bermuda." They were unhappy with Martonmere's apparently complacent style, which had caused them to know less about Bermuda's security issues than they needed to. Officials further expressed that the situation in Bermuda was made even "worse by the fact that [the Cadre] had actual grievances" and that "the UBP…had done absolutely nothing to put matters right or even make improvements." Tucker only "paid lip service to acknowledge the measures which were politically desirable" and was not expected to take effective action. A different governor and chief secretary would "long since have tried to provoke more realism and action" in the UBP, for there was to be "real trouble in the future if the UBP did not have a complete change of heart." Secretary Sykes was eventually removed on the grounds of inefficiency, but it was publicly claimed that he had simply retired to Fuji.[55]

This, once again, demonstrates that Bermuda's colonial officials believed that the Cadre grievances could have been reasonably addressed by UBP, but the latter refused to do so. In some regard, it appears that, in spite of the racism of FCO officials, the UBP was even more conservative than their mentors in Britain. In actuality, this is really not a credit to these colonial agents. They only expressed what was logical and obvious, and what Blacks in Bermuda had been stating for years. Furthermore, the fact that they still continued to devise ways to suppress the Cadre is rather telling. The Cadre was absolutely correct—the entire system of colonialism needed to be uprooted, for the ability of the UBP to suppress Blacks in Bermuda would have been greatly hindered without the logistical support of the FCO.

A report created by E. Wynne, another IRD officer, was testimony to this phenomenon. Wynne's perspective is fundamentally racist, and while the report somewhat accurately depicted White power in Bermuda it simultaneously condoned and recommended suggestions to maintain this power. He began by stating that Bermuda's White oligarchy still controlled Bermuda's tourist, banking, and commercial industries. Though Blacks had made "inroads into this restricted area," it was unlikely that they would progress any further "in the foreseeable future" because "banking laws were designed to prevent" this.

Wynne also stated that racial tensions had increased since integration and the Wooding Commission's recommendations had not eased these. Older Blacks, "living in a fairly paternalistic society," had tolerated Bermuda's racism and there were few middle-aged Blacks not "disinterested with protest." Some of them "worked hard" and, in finding "financial independence," could "stop considering racist problems." Similarly, there were "those who had supported the Establishment" (such as Lancelot Swan) and were labeled as Uncle Toms by the Cadre. Better-paid workers of mature age did not want any trouble, "but if examined would probably come to the conclusion that there [was] a lot to be desired…but better to put up with things" as they were. However, many young Blacks felt differently, and with the advent of Black Power and the Cadre, there were "distinct attitudes of permanent protest" about seemingly basic issues that were "now part of the everyday philosophy of a large number of young people" (in essence, resistance to colonialism had become an aspect of *youth culture*).

He further remarked that Black Power philosophy "expected satisfaction" and "preferred anarchy." Its advocates asserted that Black society could not advance because it was against the long-term interests of the White oligarchy to allow it to. They were not concerned with racial equality, but insisted that Bermuda be governed by a politically independent Black majority. The government did nothing to address obvious genuine issues, such as police harassment and biased court treatment toward Blacks, job discrimination, cost of living, and a grossly imbalanced distribution of Bermuda's wealth. In addition, "Black people lived in concentration in poorer areas where housing is bad but cheaper, yet they see luxury all around them and feel entitled to share in it." Such concentrations fostered "the formation of discontented groups," as the Cadre reigned "rather comfortably in the present ruins of Court Street." These concentrations "invited Police activity" as Blacks "behaved better" in areas more spread out. It was well known that Whites smoked marijuana and other drugs, but only Black youth were brought before court, because "a White in his palace was not a target for the Police." However, this was a staunch contrast to "a group of boys smoking pot and playing bongo drums on a street corner in Hamilton."

He nevertheless felt that Blacks were encouraged to "take their subordinate attitudes to Court" by PLP Members of Colonial Parliament (MCPS) such as Browne-Evans. He further claimed that White employers wanted to employ Blacks fairly, but how could they employ generally hostile boys who insisted on wearing "African hair and clothes styles." Wynne also suggested that there might have been "something in the ethos of Black people" that accounted for the "laziness, lack of efficiency and disgruntled attitudes" of Bermuda's Black youth.

Bermuda's government was run by "business men with other commitments" who often went abroad on private business trips, and traveled to the U.S. east coast on a "commute basis." This was stimulated by the headquartering of approximately one thousand and seven hundred exempt companies in Bermuda. Wynne found no strata of liberals among Bermuda's Whites, who generally focused on "how to keep things the way they were" and talked little of the root causes of the violent disturbances. Furthermore, Tucker was a man of "substance, great personal integrity and charm." Yet, for Blacks in Bermuda "the name Tucker" was an "anathema in itself," which "conjured up visions of a White oligarchy determined to maintain the superior status of White Bermudians." Wynne felt that this was not fair, but even he found it "unlikely that [Tucker] would assume any type of liberal philosophy toward Black problems." While Tucker was not an extremist, it was "hard to believe that at the back of his mind" he "could envisage a Black society sharing fully all the wealth of Bermuda."

Wynne nevertheless felt that the UBP should make concerted efforts to separate real grievances from the "principles of revolution for the sake of revolution," gain the support of the Black population, and isolate the "extremists from the responsible stratum of society." It needed to state that the "radicals" were committed to international revolution not relevant to Bermuda and repeatedly tell the public "what would happen" to them if they did not take a stand against them. Officers needed to be sent abroad to study methods of handling race relations in the United States and he suggested that the UBP employ a public relations firm experienced in handling racial conflicts that had been recommended by Good Year and Colombia Pictures.

Also, a public forum needed to be implemented to mediate racial disputes. *It did not matter if it did not work, it just needed to be seen to be in existence and action.* The UBP could also run a well-publicized seminar with government leaders and allow people to "openly and frankly" discuss racial matters. This would give the appearance that the government was interested in racial problems and it would appeal to moderate Blacks. Extremists would probably not come forth and the government could greatly publicize this, claiming that it made a serious attempt to hear their concerns in vain. It could then challenge the *very existence* of such grievances.[56]

FCO were also concerned about the presence of Black Power materials in the island. For example, during Cup Match 1970, a number of posters appeared across the island that contained slogans and pictorials protesting racism and colonialism in Bermuda. Signed the "Black Ghosts," and coupled with a red, black, and green insignia, the content included slogans such as: "We want to be free…We intend to be free by any means necessary";

"Kill to survive, survive we must to death…we will fight to death … the people are tired of Jack Tucker…get out of Bermuda"; "We do not want war, but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary pick up the gun (included a picture of a rifle)"; and "We want to see St. George's Secondary rebuilt…We want Duckett out of the island because he is a pig…We want an end to the economic exploitation of the masses of Bermuda…We want the Black children of Bermuda to be taught subjects which are relevant to their history and culture…We want freedom." Another, placed at the Central Police Station, showed a White and Black person saying "All Power to the People," while a cop depicted as pig ran toward them saying "Law and Order." Underneath was written, "Death to Duckett, Death to Sir Henry and to his racist Government." Yet another, placed at Admiralty House and the Bermuda Regiment headquarters, stated, "Prove to us that you are not racist. Send all White members of the Bermuda Regiment to South Africa to kill Ian Smith."[57]

Specific measures were implemented to disrupt the Cadre's *Black Beret*. Interestingly, these tactics reflected the suppression of the Universal Negro Improvement Associations' (UNIA) *Negro World* in the 1920s. The Intelligence Committee felt that "there existed an insidious, Black Power inspired, seditious influence being spread by word of mouth and publications" such as the *Beret* and *Umoja*. Presented as "Black awareness," it attracted "impressionable youngsters misguidedly…ready to translate 'pro-Black' into 'anti-White.'" Furthermore, if this trend was not curbed it could "grow to proportions" possibly "disastrous to integrated government in Bermuda."

Both papers were said to have an "evil" and "segregationist" influence on "the minds of already restive Black youngsters." They were also considered seditious and "bound to have a long-term deleterious effect on security." Due to these "dangerous implications," the Committee recommended that they be banned. However, this initial decision was overturned due to the belief that this would only give credence to the Cadre's claims that the government was repressive. On the contrary, if the UBP was to "put its house in better order," then the papers would have "little or no attraction, except to the dedicated Black Power supporters, and their consequent danger considerably reduced."[58]

The colonial experiences of other countries showed that banning the *Black Beret* would only give it new life as "the more furtive clandestine publication" would "attain a new status." It was thus recommended that a law be created requiring the publishers and editors of written material for public distribution to be registered and sworn. This would make them legally responsible for the publication's content, "personally actionable for any libel committed," and subject to any breaches (or vaguely, *incitements* to breach) of the law.

The publishers could then be visited in the act of preparing the paper and charged with breaking the registration law. In defense, the Berets would state that their views were being suppressed, to which prosecutors could reply that they merely wanted to see the publication lawfully published. Thus, it would be illegal to further publish the material unregistered, and any breaches would allow the government to ban the paper without having to find any other reasons to do so. On the other hand, if the publishers did register, they would be fully responsible for any material or statements made and could be further persecuted.[59] These guidelines would be eventually codified as the Printed Publications Bill.

As planned, the *Black Beret* was soon listed as a "seditious publication" that aimed to "bring into hatred" Bermuda's authorities and raise "disaffection among inhabitants." On November 16, 1970, Bassett was charged with "possession without lawful excuse of a seditious publication," the apparently twelfth edition of the "*The Black Beret—Voice of the Black Community*." This was under the Prohibited Publications Act.[60] The implications of the suppression of the Cadre are detailed in chapter 7.

7

We Don't Need No Water: The Cadre Burns the Union Jack

> Bloody red slashes across my great grandfather's
> blakk slave back,
> The tainted justice of a psychotic imperialist
> obsessed with his union jack…[1]

One of the most critical examples of modern pan-African consciousness was the Black Diaspora's support of continental African liberation struggles and protest against South Africa's apartheid regime. Several organizations challenged their local governments' policies toward South Africa, such as TransAfrica in the United States. Bermuda and the Caribbean were no exception.

In 1964, the UN Security Council imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa in denouncement of apartheid. Although Britain had initially followed suit, a year later British ministers approved the sale of military helicopters to this rouge state. In July 1970, the Security Council reaffirmed this embargo. However, the British government claimed that it could not afford to enter an economic war with South Africa, as it had heavy investments in the country totaling approximately £280 million.[2]

On August 6, 1970 the governments of Trinidad and Tobago and Cameroon decried Britain for these activities; 600 students demonstrated outside the British High Commission in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, for the same purpose. Ahmadou Ahidjo, president of Cameroon and the Organization for African Unity (OAU), stated that the "African peoples are deeply offended by the attitude of the United Kingdom Government which morally and materially constitutes a direct endorsement of the odious and inhumane policies of the South African authorities."[3]

The Cadre shared this sentiment and held rallies in protest of White minority rule in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). They also deplored Bermuda's economic relationships with South African businesses. This included the Anglo-American Mining Corporation (controlled by the Oppenheimers), which channeled funds from its mining operations in southern Africa through MINORCO, a subsidiary company registered and operated in Bermuda.[4]

In contrast, a number of "influential" White Bermudians staunchly supported Ian Smith and White oppression in Southern Rhodesia. In 1966 Bermuda's legislature unwillingly extended support of Britain's Southern Rhodesia Act, which called for restrictions on the supply of petroleum to the country (the United Nations had also imposed sanctions). Bermuda's White legislators strongly opposed these actions; the Bill barely passed through the Legislative Council on a 6–4 vote, with those voting for the Bill doing so "reluctantly." One White Member of Colonial Parliament (MCP) "warned" the Hamilton's Lions Club what Britain's actions might mean for them. In addition, a group of White Bermudians attempted to form a Bermuda chapter of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society.[5]

As a V.P. Scott questioned whether Bermuda would "take a stand on the South African issue," the Cadre organized a major rally to protest Britain's continued sale of arms to South Africa and to commemorate the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre.[6] It also sought to highlight the connection between political oppression in South Africa and Bermuda. The Cadre also felt that Duckett's appointment as Bermuda's commissioner of police was unacceptable due to his former colonial experience. Hence, it was decided that burning the Union Jack would symbolically demonstrate these positions.

At a lecture at the Vernon Temple AME, Ben Aaharon stated that the Berets were "prepared to make the supreme sacrifice" to bring about change in Bermuda. Flanked by Perinchief and Brandon, he asserted that the Cadre had to take a stand against the government's insensitivity about the South African issues and that the United Bermuda Party's (UBP) acceptance of Britain's sale of arms to South Africa legitimized the use of arms against Blacks in Bermuda. Blacks needed to fight against the unjust system of colonialism, even if laws had to be broken to do so, or if the tourist industry was harmed in the process of getting the "right people in the right places" to run the island.[7]

As such, on August 8, 1970, Berets burned the British National flag, the Union Jack, on a Saturday afternoon on the steps of Hamilton's City Hall, demonstrating their "indignation at the British Crown's benign" response

to the Sharpeville incident. The rally drew a lot of attention, as City Hall was located in a heavily populated area. The Berets demanded that the UBP denounce Britain's sale of arms to South Africa. While Bassett addressed the crowd about the aforementioned injustices, other Berets burned the flag.[8]

The Cadre anticipated police action. In preparation, Berets had obtained a number of weapons, such as wooden handles from shovels and axes. These were driven to the Hall's parking lot, and placed underneath the car. At any sign of police attacks, the car was to be driven off while Berets picked up the weapons. However, there was no direct response by the police, who had been given other instructions.[9]

In April, the Black People's Movement (BPM) conducted rallies coinciding with those held by the Provisional African Front of Unification (United States). Held with the encouragement of Kamarakafego, they were attended by approximately thirty children from the Cadre's Liberation School and twenty others. According to Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials, the Movement announced plans to "take over the whole youth movement for the Berets." It was believed to have developed from the Black Union of Students (BUS) and was led by a former Beret.[10]

The Intelligence Committee expected such demonstrations to continue into the summer; Special Branch claimed to have achieved "good penetration of coloured militant and Black Power groups" and had advanced knowledge of the rally. It claimed that one Beret stated that there would be "burning" during the summer. A member of the Regiment also overheard two boys "talking loudly about the town being burned down in August when all the brothers… returned from the US"; it was assumed that they referred to students such as Brown. Another Beret, Glen Fubler, had suggested that the Berets split up into groups to burn several Union Jacks and interrupt the flow of traffic. However, Bassett decided on the City Hall flag burning.[11]

In anticipation of such incidents, in July 1970, the UBP had passed the Offensive Behavior Bill. Browne-Evans rejected it as one bill among many others that were criminalizing people for petty offenses in what was "almost becoming a Police State." Pearman accused her of "fostering unrest, violence and lawlessness" because the Bill addressed the behavior of "young hooligans" who considered it fun to "stand on a street corner, spit at passers by and molest residents and visitors."[12] However, it is "crystal clear" that the Bill targeted the political activities of the Black youth.

The Committee decided to directly attack the Cadre leadership. They considered, Bassett, its Chief of Staff, to be the "cohesive driving force" behind the "militant youth." Possessing an "aggressive ingenuity and zeal

for rigid discipline," he was quite "capable of controlling the Berets" and had "proved himself as a disciplinarian." For example, he had severely "upbraided" another Beret for "using profane language and pulling on the arm of a White female motorist during the march on Tucker's Town." Bassett stated that such behavior "would not be tolerated since the 'Pigs' were looking for an opportunity to attack the BBC." Nevertheless, FCO officials maintained that, "in true Malcolm X style," Bassett and other Central Committee Berets were "prepared to encourage the more fanatic to acts of violence" while appearing uninvolved.[13]

Hence, while Bassett did not actually burn the Union Jack, within a week he was subsequently arrested at night under charges relating to the "Offensive Behavior" Bill (according to Shabazz, his "ace-boys" from off the street had ensured that no one was going to get arrested during the flag burning). Bassett reportedly admitted that he had played a role in the burning to "dramatize the stand" that the Cadre took about the arms sales. There were actually other Berets who could have been charged for the burning, as two held the flag and another the matches. It is possible that Bassett accepted the charge because of his close friendship with the Beret who actually did so. The latter's mother was studying in England at the time, and Bassett was concerned about the impact that her son's imprisonment would have had on her. Later that evening, the Cadre held a rally at the corner of Court Street, minutes from its headquarters. About four hundred people attended.[14]

The months following Bassett's arrest were ripe with "disturbances." FCO officials were aware that the Cadre planned to demonstrate during a visit of Prince Charles through the further burning of Union Jacks, and had considered canceling the trip due to security concerns. However, Bassett suspended this action as several key Berets were to be away at the CAP Conference in Atlanta. Nevertheless, bomb threats at the City Hall were reported, and the outer walls of City Hall and Hamilton Cathedral defaced. As further security, Royal Marines and handpicked members of the Regiment assisted the police during Charles's stay.

However, the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) boycotted the functions for the prince as he was "the supreme embodiment of British Colonialism and Imperialism." It also protested the sale of arms to South Africa and Britain's failure to intervene in Rhodesia. Yet, it noted that Britain was quick to suppress national liberation in Ghana, Kenya, India, Malawi, Jamaica, and Anguilla.[15]

In late September, a scuffle broke out when police arrested two men, Gary Dillas and Winston "Jomo" Hayward, who were sitting along "Nellie's Walk" in front of City Hall. Hayward had apparently refused to move when officers ordered him. A large crowd gathered as they were

arrested, and headed to the Hamilton Police Station to inquire about the reason for arrest. Hayward was charged for loitering, resisting arrest, and using offensive words and refused bail. Dillas was charged with assaulting and obstructing an officer "in execution of his duty." This continual of police provocation (including Bassett's arrest) sparked a major uprising. By the time the sun had risen the next day, four establishments, including the Transportation Control Department (a popular target for protestors), had been firebombed with Molotov cocktails.[16]

The following week, a two-hour demonstration was held at the City Hall. According to the *Gazette*, a fight broke out, and as police intervened, a large crowd attacked them. Three officers were hospitalized. While police vehicles were attacked around the Hall, a group of about one hundred youths crowded the police station. The authorities claimed that a brother of Hakim Gordon (son of E.F. Gordon) instructed the group to split into two; one would investigate the police station while the other prepared Molotov cocktails. Swelling to between two and three hundred persons, the former group stayed in the area of the station throughout the night. The presence of Berets at the demonstration was confirmed, as Perinchief and his brother Jerome (also a Beret) were among the crowd and supposedly had threatened the police with violence.[17]

The *Gazette* complained that the demonstration "went too far" and felt that such "destruction of discipline" could not be allowed to persist.[18] Surely to the chagrin of the *Gazette*, the "destruction" continued throughout the weekend. Extensive arson damage was reported and three men were shot and wounded. Note, this was a week prior to Bassett's court date. As Tucker was currently vacationing in the Mediterranean, E.T. Richards, acting government leader, made an official statement decrying the "purposeless and meaningless" incidents, vandalism, and "organized hooliganism." He claimed that these violent attacks on the whole community threatened the island's security and would not be tolerated. All the forces of law and order had been "mobilized to stamp out this evil" and the consequences would be severe for those responsible.[19]

As if on cue, Bassett was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment on the same day of Richards's statement. The prosecution's principal witness was a British police officer, who told the court that, though he had not seen Bassett actually burn the flag, he was very offended by the act "because he was brought up to respect the flag of his country." Judge Richmond Smith felt that flags were the "symbols of nations" and to burn one was a great insult to those respecting it. He saw the flag burning as "an ugly incident challenging to authority," a combative "calculated attack by public mutilation on a symbol . . . of a

country and sovereignty," and a modern version of "throwing down the gauntlet."[20]

Later that evening, "violence hit Bermuda for the fifth night in a row," and spread across the island through Warwick, Bailey's Bay, Devil's Hole, and St. George's. Five arson attempts took place in Hamilton. A petrol bomb was thrown at City Hall and one building was completely destroyed by fire, totaling damages at $125,000.[21]

The FCO was certain that the Cadre was directing the uprising. However, the Berets did not carry incendiary items while driving, and it was felt that they appeared uninvolved so as not to jeopardize Bassett's appeal of his sentence. Yet, the FCO asserted that it was "known that [Berets] had been told to do their own thing," which meant meeting in cells of three every night to "arrange and perhaps participate in arson and damage." This prevented them from obtaining intelligence about the Cadre's plans or gathering evidence for prosecution.

Since October 2, in a span of eight nights, twenty-five cases of arson had been reported, thirteen counts of malicious damage, and two shooting attempts. A brush fire had been started in Paget, bottles thrown at police cars, and the Berkeley Principal's Office and the Education Department attacked. The police had arrested ten youths, including a fifteen-year-old boy for throwing a Molotov cocktail at the Cable & Wireless building. The boy was sentenced to "corrective training" and "six strokes of the cane" for "riotous behavior."[22]

On the evening of October 10, police attempted to arrest a group of youths for "obstructing the pavement" with motorcycles. According to the FCO, the youths refused arrest, "used foul language," and attracted a large and angry crowd. The riot squad was employed and used tear gas to disperse the group, which reorganized, set up wooden roadblocks along Court Street, and destroyed the area's lighting; this seriously impeded the police and the fire brigade. Over seven hours of skirmishing ensued as the crowd swelled to between 500 and 600 persons. At least two snipers fired on officers with automatic weapons.[23]

Cars were burned, including one owned by Ira Philip, who had been trying to report the incident. He recalled seeing the crowd "pelting" the police and a motorcyclist "accidentally" knocked down by a police vehicle. Three hundred and seventy Regiment soldiers were also deployed on the scene. Sixteen persons were eventually arrested. Royer's Grocery, which had been completely burned down in the 1968 April rebellions and since rebuilt, was again severely damaged. Also targeted were the Chinese-owned Canton restaurant, and the Bermuda Press, Decouto, DeFontes', and TCD buildings. Further incidents were also reported in Somerset and at the Masters Ltd. building in Orange Valley. These were all non-Black-owned establishments.

This action spread across the island during the following week. In St. George's, Bermuda's oldest building, the 348-year-old State House was set afire. In his upcoming visit the Prince of Wales was to sign an ancient bible at the building, which had been a Freemason's lodge since 1815.

Numbers of Black youth were arrested and tried, most on charges of "offensive language." Such was the case for one who told officers that if he "had a machine gun he would shoot them." Another was given two months in jail for obstructing police.[24]

The White community expressed collective "disgust" at the uprisings, and generally felt that the government was not doing enough to stop the "disturbances." In the *Gazette*, "Concerned" felt that the UBP was out of touch with reality for "pursuing a lenient course with the radical element." In comparison to the rest of the world, Bermuda had been a "virtual dise" for all regardless of color. The minority of people "fomenting insurrection" were "malcontents with nothing to lose" and "selfishly dedicated to destroying" at any cost. They were strategically located through the island, but most active in the schools where they could do the most harm. Nothing less than harsh measures would solve the problem.

Another wondered whether the government was "afraid of these hoodlums" and told that the UBP needed to "get cracking" and "severely punish these "irresponsible, violent youths." The Party was told to "fight violence with violence" and bring back the Cat o' Nine Tails. In turn, the *Gazette* stressed that a curfew be imposed to curb the crime wave of the "hoodlums." Otherwise Bermuda faced "joining the other islands in a poverty-stricken state in which the well off [had] bicycles and the poor [could] not afford the bus."

However, in the same edition of the *Gazette*, a Carmen Gaglio expressed the difficulty of lower-income individuals to meet the growing rise in rents. The UBP's proposed housing scheme to alleviate the problem was "both late and inadequate" as it should have addressed the problem years ago at the first signs of Bermuda's dramatic population increase. Bermudians were beginning to feel as if their backs were against the wall, which when they did reach, "all hell" would break loose."

A "Child of the Future Generation" stated that the Cadre had "chosen the path of rebellion and Communism" by burning the Union Jack. He was confused by the Cadre's "fight for freedom," because Black people had "been free for over one hundred and sixty years." Those who said that Whites were responsible for slavery forgot that "the Black race aided in [the] trade, starting in the African jungles where tribal chiefs handed over their tribes for their own benefit." Subsequently, "White brothers fought White brothers for the abolition of slavery, over which much blood was soiled."[25]

"Pax" felt that the "louts standing on the street corners, goading the police with insults and obscenities," were sitting in their classrooms doing the same thing to their teachers. Those who were destroying public buildings were also destroying school facilities. Hence, the "disgraceful attitude" shown to the police was an "extension of the same problem which made a travesty out of Bermuda's education system." Nothing further could be expected of these youth, who had "deliberately learned next to nothing in school except how to sit on their backsides and demand . . . rights" that they did not have. Such "louts" needed to ask themselves what they could do, or had done, for Bermuda. "Pax" also felt that there was not a generation gap in Bermuda, but a *de*-generation gap.

Numerous commentators erroneously blamed Communism as the cause of the "riots." One stated that the "rabble rousers" were followers of Karl Marx, and that the police should have been able to "frog-march" these communists out of the island without having to go through the normal legal procedures of the court . A. Pritcher felt that "there was a hard core group of anarchists . . . trained in subversive tactics" in Bermuda and it was "horrible" to think that they were better trained than the police. Another writer did not understand "what these despoilers of prosperity, miscreants, vandals, ruiners of a good substantial economy, ignoramuses, fools, idiots, asses, and masqueraders in human clothing" expected to accomplish.

According to the *Gazette*, the problem was a "psychological one" and the "sick children" carrying out such "heinous operations" needed to know that the "teacher" had "finally picked up the cane." The "stupidity" of the attacks was the "product of sick minds," which could only be cured through the injection of discipline and sense by adults. It was "an illness, because, even it were politically motivated, there are no apparent aims save perhaps the belief among a few mad minds that they are endowed with the wisdom to run Bermuda without any interest at all in what other people want."[26]

The *Gazette* refused to believe that the sole reason for the flag burning and subsequent uprisings was to call on the government to condemn Britain's arms sales to South Africa. While it claimed not to condone the latter practice, the paper felt it would be a "fearful mistake" if the government yielded to such "senseless blackmail." If it were to do so, a series of other demands would follow until Bermuda was "ruled by a minority of its people," like South Africa.

This fails to account for the fact that, as has been shown, a minority of people and non-Bermudians *did* control the island. Indeed, Britain's financial and military relationship with South Africa was not the *sole* issue. The llel between sociopolitical oppression in Bermuda and South Africa was also a critical catalyst for the demonstrations.

The *Gazette* further claimed that the disturbances were led by a "frenzied mob, mainly of uncontrollable youth." Court Street remained "hostile to Whites" and "hardly ideal for a Sunday drive." The street was littered with glass, hatred, hostile and untrusting faces, Afros, and curbside scowling youths wearing the almost "uniform for unrest–blue tattered jeans and leather jackets." It saw the disturbances as not about White against Black, but "descent citizens" against "criminals." The latter was a "group of idiots" who used the "propaganda of racial hatred" as did the Ku Klux Klan and National Party of South Africa. Encouraging "stupid" behavior, these "idiots" were creating a history of which their descendents would not be proud.[27]

As did the *Gazette*, the wider White community commended the police, despite their questionable tactics. Freddy Wade was arrested for "obstructing an Officer in the line of duty." In addition, the police raided a house containing a mother and daughter at 5:45 a.m. There were about fifty officers, armed with tear gas and carrying cameras. They claimed to be looking for food looted from Royer's Grocery, while Duckett stated they were looking for offensive weapons. Meanwhile, Hakim Gordon was refused entry into Bermuda as an "undesirable alien."[28]

Only few letters printed in the *Gazette* expressed less than outright condemnation of the youth. One stated that the disturbances were due to frustrations caused by the UBP. He disagreed with Richards's statement that the incidents were problems for the whole community, for it was the UBP that had created the frustrations. Furthermore, as there had never been any problems on Nellie's Walk, the writer assumed that the sight of people sitting there must have been seen as an "eye sore" for Prince Charles during his upcoming visit.[29]

Meanwhile, in the "absence of any positive statement by the UBP," Government backbencher Viera addressed the people of Bermuda about "the politics of terror used by revolutionaries." He felt that Bermuda's "ridiculous constitution of 1968" placed responsibility for Bermuda's security in the hands of the governor, who had "historically reacted unwisely, adopting a wait and see attitude and repeatedly operating from a position of weakness." Yet, the revolutionaries were "trying to demoralize and destroy established society…while the Governor and his security council [were] still being polite" and were asleep. The "dog had been kicked, but continued to wag its tail." The "political crazies" were being appeased and accommodated by "liberals and timid people in high places." The Cadre needed to be "isolated and contained because their philosophy [was] totally incompatible with the multi-racial society" that the UBP was building. He proposed stronger sentences (such as a minimum of three years imprisonment for those caught with incendiary devices) and that more power be granted to the Police Force, particularly in regard to searches.

Tucker was not far behind Viera's "tough talk." He stated that the government believed that the uprising was organized—yet of "uncivilized conduct and willful destruction"—and designed to "terrorize . . . the public and create a state of anarchy." It also aimed to "destroy the economy, impoverish the community and disrupt the functioning of Government." The UBP leader claimed that the average Bermudian had "had his bellyful of such . . . nonsense," and found it difficult to concede that such "gross vandalism" was justified by "some vague feeling of oppression." Furthermore, there had never been brighter opportunities for young people (read, *Black* people) in the areas of education, recreation, and employment.[30]

During the uprising, the governor refused to impose a curfew, as this would have activated emergency procedures (as in 1968). However, the FCO was prepared to have warships sent to Bermuda in preference over Anguilla, and the arrival of two ships already en route to the island were to be expedited. The Reserve Constabulary had been implemented, and the Bermuda Regiment was called to duty. Hence, the UBP was feeling "more optimistic" about the situation. Duckett, aborted a trip to Interpol Conference in Holland, cut his trip short, and flew back to Bermuda after discussions with the governor. In addition, a member of Scotland Yard's Special Branch was brought to the island.[31]

The PLP expressed alarm at the violence, but criticized the government for failing to "remove the social conditions" that led to it. The UBP had not acted on the recommendations of the Wooding Commission, which, for example, stressed that the Police Force be Bermudianized. Instead, the UBP had gone in the completely opposite direction.[32]

Fairclough also wondered whether the disturbances were due to the unfulfilled promises of the Commission's Report. Furthermore, the UBP's attempts to quell Black Power had been largely unsuccessful. Its newly formed Police Cadet scheme had only attracted few youth and could not reach those of Court Street. In addition, the "rougher" element was no longer confined to this area. Fairclough also felt that the "threat of violence" would exist as long as there were militant Black Power groups in the island. Black Power would just not go away in a racially divided society as Bermuda regardless of the government's good public relations.[33]

Fairclough's colleagues felt that "the situation in Bermuda had been unstable" for a few years. Black Power in Bermuda was connected with its rise in the West Indies and stemmed from the fact that Bermuda's government was predominantly White. Hence, they felt it logical that the Cadre would connect their struggle to the South African situation.[34]

These officials were particularly concerned that during the recent uprising, a Regiment corporal (Derrick Binns—who was a Cadre field marshall) had instructed a company of soldiers to not oppose "the struggle for our

future going on in Court Street." He apparently caused "insubordination" among twelve other soldiers. He was later arrested on the advice of the attorney general and was incarcerated for about six months.[35]

Fifty-nine other soldiers were also discharged from the Regiment amid concerns that they possessed Beret aims and high anti-White feeling. However, it was publicly claimed that they were discharged for reasons such as not showing up to camp and being unwilling to serve. Special Branch believed the situation was more serious than perceived. About fifty others called themselves "liberators" and were sympathetic toward the expelled corporal. It was also believed that a Cadre minister was still amidst the ranks of the Regiment, shedding doubt on the Regiment's capability.[36]

The FCO also questioned the function of Regiment, whose role in Bermuda had never been clearly defined. The assumption of external defense "quite obviously … did not make sense." It was the last remaining territorial Regiment in any of Britain's "dependencies" and possessed "formidable firepower" but lacked arms security. It consisted of "low-minded persons" of White heritage over Black officers. Conscription under the Defense Act was "obviously unpopular and… unfair," and was "all too similar to the draft system of the United States in sending men to Vietnam."[37]

It was felt that the Regiment should perhaps be voluntary and create closer ties to the community through propaganda and youth programs such as Outward Bound. Furthermore, the traditional anathematic concept of the Regiment, its racial structure, colonial symbolism, and use for internal security "marked it down for propaganda and subversive attack" by Black militants.[38] J. Macoun, an overseas police advisor, reported that the Regiment possessed a tremendous arsenal of two hundred and thirty three 7.62 m.m. self-loading rifles, one hundred and eight 9 m.m. submachine guns, and twelve 7.62 m.m. machine guns, but for what purpose? He recommended that it be completely disbanded, for on an island of Bermuda's size, the "*only conceivable threat was from within*" (emphasis added) and a riot-duty enabled Police Force and voluntary reserves was all that was needed.[39]

Shortly afterward, Bermuda's Regiment began to be actively transformed to increase its internal security capability. Instead of internal security being of the lowest priority and external defense the highest, the positions were reversed. Training was reorganized to include riot drill with batons, shields, respirators, and CS tear gas.[40]

Indeed, in 1970 the Cadre was this internal threat. During the recent uprising, it issued a communiqué condemning Bassett's "unjust imprisonment" via the *Gazette*, ZBM, and ZFB (radio and television stations, respectively):

> We defend the human rights of all oppressed people and… victims of… the racist oppressive system of colonial rule. Such racism was demonstrated in

> the fascist kangaroo circus inaccurately described as a court of justice. We warn the department responsible for this injustice…that this will not be tolerated by the Black Beret Cadre who are sworn enemies of injustice. The Black Beret believe in peace if possible, compromise never, freedom by any means necessary.[41]

The government used this statement to attack the Cadre. The attorney general decided that it brought the Bermuda court "into contempt" because it described the latter as being fascist. While actually written by Ben Aaharon, he, Perinchief, and Bassett were all charged with contempt of court as they were documented as the *Black Beret's* editors and writers.[42]

The *Gazette*, ZBM, and ZFB were also charged with contempt for broadcasting the editorial. In ZBM's case, a number of Berets had entered the station and forced a radio announcer to read the statement over the air. Eventually the *Gazette* was fined $5,000, ZBM $100, and ZFB $5,000 for publishing the "disgracefully scurrilous attack on a court of summary jurisdiction."[43]

Perinchief delivered the message and was the first to be arrested and convicted. In response to such injustices, in late October the Cadre held a protest rally at the Front Street, Hamilton flagpole. At least one hundred people and sixty non-Berets attended and completely circled the area. Berets had been instructed to alternatively lie down or disperse through the Front Street stores if the police intervened. There reportedly had had been talk of "burning effigies, and a procession through Front Street." The *Gazette* would later claim that demonstrators shouted, "Left, Right, Pick up Guns" and carried placards stating slogans such as "F— White Imperialists."[44]

The Cadre stated that Blacks had never received justice in Bermuda's courts. The entire judicial system had been "deliberately designed [for] the eternal enslavement and detriment of the colonial subjects." Until Bermuda freed itself of "the British occupying forces i.e., the police force, the judiciary, civil servants, teachers, nurses" it would be "forced to accept the…attendant evils of colonialism and British double standards." These evils included the six-week incarceration of Hayward "in the man's concentration camp, Casemates." Hayward's wife was pregnant with five children, yet inadequate provisions had been made for them despite several visits to the Health and Welfare Department.

Furthermore, Blacks were defenseless in courts where the juries were not made up of their peers and "political rejects from Britain, and colonial stooges from…Africa [were] unjustly at work" as judges and magistrates. Bermuda's "high prices, rents and mortgages" were "part and parcel of the capitalistic system," which kept Black people "daily slaves for mere

survival." Young "brothers and sisters" were unjustly sent to corrective training for school delinquency, and coupled with other petty violations, often remained jailed "for indefinite periods of time." Bassett, Hayward, Binns (Che), Perinchief, and others were "being dragged before the courts on vague, trumped up charges." If one charge failed to work, then others were manufactured, such as offensive behavior, disorderly conduct, and contempt of court. The Cadre called for protection of Black people from "police rioters" and their gestapo tactics, such as "raiding defenseless elderly Black women" and subjecting Blacks to humiliating searches. Furthermore, the freedoms of the press, assembly, political affiliation, and peaceful demonstrations needed to be recognized, as they were in the Britain.[45]

Over one hundred officers, including the riot squad, stood "on guard." Superintendent Knobby Clark told the Cadre that any attempts to march would be illegal, as they did not have a permit to do so. This did not thwart the procession; apparently, Perinchief broadcast over a megaphone, "The man says we cannot march. Who are they to say we cannot march in our own country?" The police, who outnumbered the demonstrators, did not want to rush the group on Front Street. However, as the police attempted to prevent the crowd from moving toward City Hall, a clash broke out, with the police "receiving much more than they gave out." The marchers were eventually pushed back to Court Street. Numbers were arrested immediately and by summons and charged with "illegal procession." Browne-Evans defended all except one.[46]

Ben Aaharon, Perinchief, and Bassett were not concerned that the "authorities" knew that they had the communiqué. They believed that the court did not have an objective right to try them, because it was the Chief and Puigne judges themselves who claimed offense by the document. They thought that the case would have to be adjourned and taken to the London-based Privy Council for Colonial Affairs. However, they did not understand the role of the attorney general, whom, as director of the prosecutor's office, protector and drafter of the law, had the right to determine if a criminal offense had been committed and could recommend that the police press charges. In essence, the judiciary simply heard cases legitimized by the general. Furthermore, a case could not be sent to the Privy Council unless it went through the local court system. Hence, the judges had to hear the case. Suffice to say, the three Berets were found guilty.[47]

Perinchief's arrest is worth noting. The *Gazette*'s editor had identified him as the deliverer of the communiqué from a group of photographs provided by the police. The editor then accompanied the officers to Harrington Sound School, where Perinchief taught at and was arrested.[48] He also refused to take the oath during his trial and was found to have

"caused certain scandalous libels to be published against the courts of Bermuda" and was "in contempt of court as a result of this scandalisation." Despite the protest of his colleagues who testified that Perinchief was an excellent teacher who did not discuss politics on the job, he was fired. He was sentenced to nine months and imprisoned on November 20, 1970. Arnold Francis had initially defended Bassett and Perinchief, but Shabazz fired him and defended his comrades in court.[49]

The arrest of these Cadre leaders only legitimized the significance of the "struggle." Martonmere would later state that their imprisonment had "strengthened their determination, improved their discipline," and gave them a "minor sense of martyrdom."[50] Furthermore, the Berets continued to meet, and prepared for the impending incarceration of these three by a timely shift in leadership.

At the end of November 1970, Bassett relinquished his post of Chief of Staff in favor of Jerome Perinchief, and became minister of security and defense. He remained active, leading discussions on "the role of the revolutionary" through extracts from Mao's *The Political Thought of Mao-Tse-Tung* and Seale's *Seize the Time*. In one discussion, he used the *Thought of Mao* to describe how "intelligence units on the Communist cell principle had successfully penetrated Western organizations sometimes to the point of overthrowing Government." Berets were urged to adopt similar strategies in Bermuda, as the police, Regiment, communications media, and government departments were "targets worthy of penetration." Albeit somewhat late, Bassett warned that the Cadre itself might be susceptible to infiltration, and that discovered informants would be eliminated.

The Cadre continued to host rallies. In December, it held one at the Bishop Spencer School to "explain Cadre activities, objects and intentions to the people of Bermuda." An audience of about one hundred was told that the Cadre aimed to eliminate the "injustices of the Establishment." Simmons was reported to have urged the audience to "save money to buy arms for the 'Revolution.'" He also reportedly stated that if the Cadre had owned weapons during the October uprisings, the deputy commissioner of police (who had recently had an accident) would have "fell from bullets and not from a veranda."

During this month, the Cadre sought to rent out a room in a Court Street building to use as a library and reading room. Also, Bassett's pending prosecution for "possession of seditious literature" did not dissuade the Cadre from producing its *Manifesto*. The Intelligence Committee claimed it to be "less militant" than the *Beret* and its "usual expressions of hatred," and contained "forty-one pages of well prepared material." Perhaps in response to police harassment, nonexecutive Berets distributed the *Manifesto*. On December 22, two Berets who were distributing the

Manifesto were challenged by a police officer on claims that it was seditious. The officer then followed them back to the Cadre's headquarters. This prompted Bassett to instruct the Berets to defend the headquarters "on a twenty-four hours basis with the aid of weapons if necessary."

The Intelligence Committee expressed concern that the Cadre continued to function actively and that its publications such as the *Manifesto* were successful, particularly amongst middle-class Blacks. Hence, it urgently repeated earlier recommendations, that Cadre publications be banned or suppressed; counter-propaganda be urgently implemented; and that the government visibly deal with the justifiable grievances.[51]

On January 11, 1971, Bassett and Ben Aaharon were sentenced to nine months jail in Casemates prison and told that they would remain there until they apologized for the burning of the flag and handling of "seditious material." They refused to do so (Perinchief had stated that he was "utterly unrepentant"). Nevertheless, Ben Aaharon and Perinchief did only six months, while Bassett served three months concurrently with his sentence for "offensive behavior."[52]

This was a significant moment for the Berets, who had already had a presence in the prison system (in fact, it is during this incarceration that these Berets formed a relationship with "Buck" Burrows). In fact, FCO officials believed that disturbances at Casemates prison in April 1970 might have been connected with outside agitation, the spread of Black Power among the prisoners and an "untrustworthy" prison staff.[53]

These three political prisoners were given "special privileges." Placed in the same cell, the literature available to them was not restricted. Perinchief, who had already served about a month and a half, was graded a "star" prisoner and made prison librarian. Well respected by other prisoners, who called him "Teacher," he introduced classes to inmates in Mathematics and English. In December 1970, he had settled a dispute over prison conditions. Though there was "no evidence of his indulging in political or racial instruction," officials felt that he aimed to "indoctrinate his fellow prisoners with BBC aims and principles." Of serious concern was the fact that the Prison Library contained revolutionary books (such as the *Anarchist's Cook Book*, an "encyclopedia for sabotage") and that Perinchief, as librarian, was able to choose more. It was felt that this kind of literature should not have been allowed in the country, much less Casemates.

The officials were displeased with this "potentially dangerous" situation. Out of a total of 112 prison officers in the entire system, only 12 percent were White and most of these were stationed at the Police Headquarters. At Casemates, only two officers out of forty were White. In addition, some 40 percent of the wardens and 75 percent of the prisoners were "either like-minded or under the influence of Perinchief and the Cadre." They felt that

it would be "physically impossible and psychologically inadvisable" to segregate the Berets, which would not eradicate militancy among the prison staff but encourage the Berets to legally complain and "inflate their egotism and sense of martyrdom." The Cadre was "in a position to organize civil disturbances in Hamilton timed to coincide with rioting at Casemates," and this would be difficult to contain. However, Perinchief asserts that for "contaminating" inmates with "political ideology," the three of them were removed from general population and placed in "the Political Block."[54]

In April 1970, Martonmere had boasted that Black Power had been "retarded" and Cadre's activities "subsided." In October, he was eating those words. By 1971, he was exclaiming that the "evil of Black Power was gaining ground." Furthermore, the Cadre was becoming "more firmly entrenched with an increased hard core and peripheral support" and "developing a Jekyll and Hyde image of reason on the one hand and a hate-filled obsession with racialism, violence and firearms on the other." "Liberal-minded Black people" could not help to be influenced by the "reasonable approach," particularly if they themselves were having financial or housing problems. In contrast, "criminals, hooligans and layabouts" would welcome any Cadre activity that led to revenge against the establishment. Furthermore, due to the PLP's "quiescence," the Cadre had become the only "organization effectively fighting for so-called justifiable grievances."[55] Hence, by March 1971, it was claimed that the Cadre's methods had become "more sophisticated" and appealed to the Black middle class.

In fact, the Cadre's membership was increasing. They had implemented Liberation Schools and created a community center in the basement of the Bassett (Dionne's grandfather) building. Berets also intensively studied and circulated the *Manifesto* and *Black Beret*, which had increased to a circulation of about two thousand.

Furthermore, it appears that the Black "middle class and even some of the intelligentsia" were "undoubtedly" increasing their support for the Cadre. This was suggested, for example, through its noncooperation with the police in reporting incidents, giving evidence, or impartiality as jurors. This development deemed any overt government attacks against the Cadre less publicly acceptable. FCO officials believed that this support would diminish if the Cadre resorted to violence and threatened the "standard of living" of those who gave the group tacit support.

Prior to his imprisonment, Bassett encouraged "Berets with leadership potential" to ensure that the Cadre survived its political persecution. Indeed, other key Berets, such as Shabazz, J. Perinchief, and Simmons, became more instrumental in the Cadre's leadership, direction, and activities. For example, in February, J. Perinchief focused on creating the Internal Security Units (ISUs). This was part of a thrust to "counter attack" the

"authorities," who had clearly demonstrated that they were the "enemies" of Black people. Duckett was described as "a mercenary and a killer who had virtually a free hand in suppressing Black people" and Tucker "was no friend of the Black man since he refused to condemn the sale of arms to South Africa."

J. Perinchief and Simmons placed an emphasis on physical training, fitness, karate, and first aid. For example, in late March, the Cadre held an outdoor exercise on a beach along South Shore, Warwick. Approximately thirty Berets participated, and practiced drill exercises and movements.

In February, the Cadre hosted public functions as the "Concerned Four." One seminar, attended by Kamarakafego, discussed education, lack of communication in the Black community, and economic and community projects. The other was a successful "Revolutionary Seminar" and "Black Arts Festival," held at the Bishop Spencer. Attendance averaged between 150 and 200 persons and included African dance, a fashion show, playlets, karate demonstrations, and revolutionary poetry. Browne-Evans, who was showing increased support of the Cadre, also attended.

These "sophisticated and purposeful activities" concerned the Intelligence Committee, who felt that the Cadre's "rabble rousing activities" had been "replaced by cool systematic well planned operations." Beret efforts to discredit the police were "well thought out" and there was danger that these would be influential in an extreme internal security situation. Furthermore, the Cadre membership continued to increase with about one hundred members, twenty "hard-core" Berets, and about forty regulars at each meeting.

In one meeting, Berets debated the possibility of traveling to Cuba. Though this could have been done via Canada, it was recognized that such trips would attract police attention. When several Berets expressed dissatisfaction with the achievements of the PLP it was suggested the Bassett and Ben Aaharon run as independent candidates at the 1973 General Election and use the Cadre ideologies as their platform.

In May 1971, J. Perinchief (who was particularly concerned with Cadre security) announced the formation of Defense Unit cells. At one meeting, copies of Marighella's *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla* were distributed to Defense Unit members for study. Perinchief made references to sections of the work, such as "Characteristics of the Urban Guerrilla Technique," "Desertions, Diversions, Seizures, Expropriation of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives," and "Sabotage." Though the *Mini-Manual* was subsequently banned from Bermuda, the "authorities" believed the capability of the unit to be "extremely suspect."[56]

Shabazz worked to maintain and strengthen the Cadre's relationship with the wider Black community. In March 1971 he accepted an invitation

stating that the Cadre had been invited to speak at an April rally (organized by Kamarakafego) to draw attention to the Sharpeville Massacre, U.S. involvement in the suppression of the 1970 Black Power uprisings in Trinidad and Tobago, Portugal's invasion of Guinea, the mistreatment of Blacks sent to Vietnam, and similar issues. This was to coincide with a similar rally being held in Washington, DC.

Shabazz also suggested the creation of a community aid program, in which Berets would visit incarcerated prisoners and the island's brain-injured children and help impoverished persons in tasks such as "repairing doors and windows." It was further recommended that the Cadre run a store that sold lower-priced goods to also help those in need. Hence, in late March several Berets assisted in the renovation of a building at Cox's Hill, Pembroke.

The FCO claimed that after one Beret suggested that guerrilla tactics be used to scare the government into agreeing with Cadre demands, Shabazz stated that this would mistakenly "instill fear in the people." Furthermore, the government would "bring in more forces and intensify the existing Police State." During a discussion on community affairs, he remarked that Black Bermudians "were too interested in acquiring sports cars, boats and clothes and having a good time." In response, Simmons remarked that such "lame-thinking" existed among the PLP, as certain members were openly living in luxury.[57] The drive for material wealth was seen as a hindrance to more progressive thought.

In April, the Cadre released a bulletin discussing the ill-treatment of Black prisoners by White prison officers. A fracas had occurred when prisoners at the Prison Farm, St. George's, sought improved conditions. In support, the Berets called for a number of reforms in the prison system, such as the imprisonment of sixteen–eighteen year olds in Casemates should cease and Black cultural exhibitions be regularly utilized as part of a rehabilitation program. Bassett went on a hunger strike to protest the unjust conditions of the prison and to support Cadre demands.[58]

The Cadre remained connected with Black Power in Bermuda's public schools. In late March, several Berets visited the Churchill School and spoke to a group of about forty–fifty students, who had been "disciplined" the preceding day. Reportedly, the Cadre told the students to disregard anything said by expatriate teachers and to inform the Berets of any further acts of "discipline." About fifteen–twenty students from the Churchill and Berkeley Schools attended a Cadre meeting later that evening.

Two Berkeleyites reportedly lectured groups of Churchill students about the BUS. On March 30, a representative of the Black People's Movement (BPM) addressed the students, and referenced a ten-point program similar

to that of the BUS, stating that racist teachers be restricted, that students expelled or suspended be reinstated, and that the practice of caning students be eliminated. Furthermore, the BUS had apparently been advising Black students not to take "A" Level examinations, which were required to enter Canadian and British Universities, and encouraging them to enter Howard University. Indeed, several students at the Sixth Form Centre desired to attend the school.

In addition, the headmaster of the Churchill School had seized the Black Panther newspaper, *The Black Panther Intercommunal News Service*, which an African-American teacher, Booker T. Quattlebaum, had apparently given to a student for circulation. The Education Department immediately sought to have Quattlebaum, "an able and enthusiastic Black Power advocate," removed. The Intelligence Committee felt that this "American Negro" had had an "appalling influence" on the school, such that one "seasoned" teacher felt that it would take two to three years to return the school to "normal." In one incident, Quattlebaum had "derided a guest lecturer who was talking to children about drugs, interrupted him, and put up a defense for marijuana." He had reportedly been arrested twice in the United States (once for drug use). The Committee considered it unacceptable that such a "Trojan Horse" had been allowed to enter the school system (particularly since the Berets had considerable significance in the schools) and recommended that this "menace to society" be deported. It was also suggested that a clause be placed in future teacher applications that any actions of a racial character would result in immediate termination.

The *Intercommunal News Service* was subsequently banned from the school. In protest, Churchill students, apparently led by a well-known Beret, held a sit-in on the school field. At the Secondary School Athletic Championships at the National Stadium, Churchill students placed placards on the inside of the Stadium fences. These called for Black Studies at the school, an end to caning, an end to the wearing of school uniforms, and the reinstatement of Quattlebaum. Thirty-two students were then suspended from the school. Martonmere claimed that Cadre visits to the schools stimulated these activities.[59]

According to the Cadre, the Churchill School had been one of the island's "lowest educational institutions" and reflected a school system that had "worked against the interest of the Black community and in the interest of the power structure" and the "Forty Thieves." The majority of Black youth were dumped into "so-called modern secondary schools emphasizing so-called vocational training," which only served to produce a "cheap labour class." However, Churchill students recognized this and their "righteous resistance" forced the ruling clique to attack them. The Cadre stated

that Quattlebaum gave students his historical and political knowledge and was attacked because of his close relationship with the student body.[60]

The hostility of the Bermuda government to Black studies encouraged the Cadre to continue its Liberation Schools. These expanded during 1971, demonstrating their support by Black parents. Instruction included karate lessons and was "enthusiastically received." In February 1971, about twenty-five youth between the ages of eight and twelve attended the schools. By June, this number had risen to about forty-five students.

Jeanna Knights was the school's most effective teacher. Her lessons were of great "concern" to colonial officials; Martonmere felt that through the "chanting of anti-White slogans, the indoctrination of racial hatred" in the schools had also increased, and it was "disturbing to contemplate" its effect on race relations. Furthermore, these children were "not waifs and strays collected from the streets but [were] attending the classes with the full knowledge and consent of their parents."

It was claimed that they were being taught "racial and violent songs" and nursery rhymes. Hence "Mary no longer had a little lamb but instead Mary had an M1 gun." The term "pig" had been "introduced into the children's vocabulary" and was "used as a prefix to surnames whenever a person representing authority [was] mentioned." Students were also given posters of Bassett, Ben Aaharon, and Perinchief, and told to hang them over their beds. They were also apparently told "not to talk to policemen but to walk away if they are approached." Children took their song sheets home, but there had not been any complaints from parents.[61]

According to FCO officials, Knights strongly advocated guerrilla warfare, and believed that violence was the only effective means of making change in Bermuda. They noted that she was once challenged on this position by other Berets in a meeting in which Malcolm X's "Ballet or the Bullet" was being studied. Knight's movements were closely detailed. For example, they noted that in October 1971 she visited the Black Panther Party office while on a trip to New York.[62]

Students also wrote a number of letters of support to the incarcerated Berets, similar to the following:

> Dear Brother Dionne,
>
> When will you come out of that pig's pen? When the time comes I hope that it is soon. We went swimming with [the] Liberation school…and we had a lot of fun, sometimes I wish that you and brother Mel were here. We have lots of new children that have joined liberation school. We had other visitors…that came here to tell us about other black people all over the world, and what they told us was very good to learn. We are in a struggle for freedom and when you come out I hope you will help us get it. (Sis. Kim, 9 yrs.)[63]

However, a number of parents did express issues with the public school system. In a March meeting, members of the Ord Road School PTA, in a "militant, anti-Government manner," demanded that a Black headmaster, Black teachers, and an all Black school be implemented. Also, several parents of the Berets attended a Cadre meeting in March. They were told that the Cadre was a "revolutionary organization dedicated to changing the system." One parent questioned the maturity of the Cadre leadership, but acknowledged that it was quite organized. Another complained that the Liberation School was teaching children to refer to people as "pigs," but admired that the Berets "stood up for their rights." Parents were reportedly encouraged to form their own group and take a stand against Bermuda's high prices and boycott White-owned stores.

To the chagrin of the security forces, after studying a police report about the schools, the attorney general and permanent secretary of education could find nothing illegal about the schools. However, it was decided to report their activities to the Race Relations Council, which unsuccessfully tried to infiltrate the schools. The Intelligence Committee found such racial indoctrination of children to be "disquieting," and the exact kind of practice that professional propagandist Wynne had been brought to the island to counteract.[64]

In March 1971, Perinchief was released from prison, and it was believed that he was responsible for an increase in printed material released by the Cadre, which included a reprint called "Bobby Seale's Letter," a "Statement from the Minister of Defense," and "Revolutionary Principles." The latter was apparently compiled with excerpts from *The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung* with certain amendments (such as *Black Beret* for *Marxist-Leninist*) to Mao's "eight points for attention" that dealt with discipline.[65]

Amidst concerns that such publications were well received by the Black middle class, in May 1971, the UBP passed a new Printed Publications Bill under FCO's guidelines. The Bill was specifically "intended to restrict the propaganda activities of the BBC." It required all publications to be registered, and carry the name, occupation, place of abode, or business address of the printers or publishers. It also made it an offense to print, sell, distribute, publish, *or possess* publications that did not carry this information. The Bill allowed the police to apply for a warrant to seize machinery if the publication infringed its terms and those of any other law (e.g., if it was deemed to be seditious). In addition, the head librarian was to be given a copy within a week after printing.[66]

The PLP vehemently protested the Bill. Browne-Evans labeled it as "one of Government's atrocious infringements of the minds of Black people." Thomas correctly saw it as an attempt to crush the Cadre's publications. Roberts felt the Bill would suppress the thoughts of young people. Wade accused the

government of "introducing suppressive legislation every time the masses were fighting for justice." Stanley Morton, who had attended at least one Beret meeting, stated that it was an effort to "ban all progressive literature which could assist the masses towards progressive thinking."

In response, Shabazz stated while the Bill "intended to stifle the voices of revolutionaries," the group would continue to publish any banned literature "with the result that the courts would be jammed with people found in possession of prohibited literature."[67] According to the *Beret*, the Bill would allow the police to find out faster whom to arrest for publishing "seditious" material. Furthermore, an updated Prohibited Publications Act should have been called the "Let's keep the Berets from Educating the People Act." Freedom of speech was "fairy tale" in Bermuda and it was no accident that Berets were being pressed into court by Bermuda's "fascist Government" through unconstitutional and outdated laws, nor was it coincidental that the Nation of Islam's (NOI) Brother Byron faced charges for possession of *Muhammad Speaks* at the same time that Bassett did for possessing the *Black Beret*.[68]

As the government tightened its legal noose around the Cadre, the imprisonment of Bassett, Perinchief, and Ben Aaharon also had an adverse effect on the Berets. According to Ben Aaharon, there was a lapse in discipline and the increase of certain activities that the initial leadership had deemed intolerable, such as "inappropriate" relationships with women. Furthermore, dissension began to appear in the group. For example, it was reported that Shabazz had "caused an uproar" at one meeting when he "demanded $30.00" from each Beret to contribute toward the Cadre Defense Fund, stating that it "was an order and that no arguments would be entertained." These issues were compounded by further government attacks on the Cadre. In April 1971, Simmons was summoned to "nine months corrective training" at the Senior Training School on a charge of "threatening behavior to an Officer." The news of his sentence apparently led to "dismay and confusion" and hurt the morale of certain Berets.[69]

However, the Cadre felt that these attacks were a sign that they were "doing their job." Furthermore, it was quite hopeful that Bassett's appeal of his charges would be successful and prove that "the people's power is a potent force." In addition, the Cadre showed support with the Ord Road School's PTA, and extended them "revolutionary greetings" for their stand against the government's policy toward their school. However, there were other areas of concern.[70]

The Berets had made themselves readily available to address varying concerns of the Black community, but with sometimes mixed results. For example, two visiting African-American college students informed them that the Department of Trade and Tourism had refused to allow them to

enter the annual College Queen contest of April 1971. In response, the Cadre released a circular urging Black Bermudians to protest at the contest's site, the Bermudiana Hotel. Approximately thirty Berets and supporters showed up. As a consequence, one student was accepted as a contestant and placed second.[71]

In another instance, three girls from a group home told the Cadre that they were being ill-treated at the institution. The Cadre reported the incident to AME Minister Brandon, who met with the home's matron. Over the next few days, the girls left the home and were in the company of the Berets. After one attempted to commit suicide at the Cadre headquarters, she was rushed to the hospital. Through "angry exchanges," one Beret castigated J. Perinchief for involving the Cadre in the home's business, resulting in absenteeism in further meetings. When members of the Defense Unit failed to show up for a scheduled meeting, Perinchief called a general meeting to discuss this and other issues. During these talks the Cadre rank-and-file expressed concerns of mistreatment and the "superior attitude" of certain individuals of the Executive Committee. This led to further arguments and threats of resignation. Bassett was informed of the incident, and wrote an address to the Cadre to "remain true to the cause" and "rededicate their lives to the revolution." Nevertheless, in June 1971, the Intelligence Committee reported that there were issues of morale and visible conflict in the Cadre amidst charges of arrogant leadership and the Executive's seeming desire to assist those who asked for help without due investigation or factual evidence about their cases.[72]

On July 10, 1971, Bassett was released due to a successful appeal of his conviction for possession of "seditious literature." His return ended the Cadre's "internal squabbles." He reportedly provided the Cadre with a shotgun to guard Cadre headquarters, and instructed the Berets to form "security patrols" in the areas in which they lived. This would allow them to observe police activity and attack them if they were seen harassing the public. Such patrols could also potentially create incidents to distract the police and then enable the use of guerrilla tactics to eliminate targets representing the establishment.

The Intelligence Committee felt that the security patrols concept was borrowed from the Black Panthers. It also believed that Bassett had long realized that the small size of the Cadre prevented it from effectively confronting the police. However, if security patrols were to engage the latter simultaneously at different junctures, this would be more difficult for the "authorities" to control.

The Cadre soon created a six-member Guerrilla Force, which was to engage in an "intensive training course to condition them for their revolutionary role." The Berets also established a presence in the St. George's

Youth Club, which had recently employed a key Beret as its assistant manager. Nevertheless, Martonmere believed that the Cadre was losing its militancy, and was "turning away from advocating violence to a more constructive attitude," seemingly concurring with the Black Panther Party's (BPP) (United States) position at the time. This was also supposedly reflected in the decreasing "militancy" of the *Beret* and the Cadre's desires to assist in the PLP's 1972 election campaign.[73]

By mid-summer of 1971, the Cadre had become much less visible. Bassett reportedly announced intentions to relax Beret activities for a rest period, followed by a program to reactivate interest and dedication to the revolution. Hence, in August, Cadre meetings had been reduced from three times to once a week, the Liberation School had met only once and had been temporarily suspended, the *Black Beret* was not released, attendance at self-defense classes had dwindled, and four Cadres were "on holiday." The FCO suggested that the Cadre was breaking up; Bassett had obviously "not lost his drive" but had a "lot of work to do to create the fervent activities of 1970." This was "encouraging from a security point of view that the prevailing attitude of the members of the Cadre hardly [accorded] with the image of hard core, dedicated revolutionaries." Nevertheless, Basset launched a Junior Cadre, initially with three youths aged between twelve and sixteen. He also organized a camp at Ferry Reach attended by approximately sixteen Berets.[74]

Martonmere felt that the Cadre had "run out of steam." He had long believed that it would have difficulty in making "any real headway" as long as "Bermuda remained prosperous and the coloured community enjoyed an increasing share of the [island's] wealth." He hoped that Bermuda's "lack of support for militant policies" and firm action taken by the police against "law breakers" had "brought to an end the period of indiscipline which had followed the establishment of the Cadre immediately after the 1969 Black Power Conference."[75]

Indeed, it appeared that the Cadre was collapsing. The Liberation Schools persisted at dwindled attendance. According to the FCO, the Berets were "at a loss" as to how to rejuvenate the group and the UBP hoped that the lack of public support would "destroy the spirit" of the remaining Berets.

However, by December 1971 a small core of Berets continued to meet. At one meeting, it was favorably suggested that the Cadre should form a political party. In addition, Bassett and J. Perinchief reportedly stated that guerrilla warfare was the only way to make change in Bermuda. Furthermore, the Berets were reportedly bringing manuals on the use of arms and other revolutionary literature into the island. Hence, when twenty-four .303 caliber drill rifles were stolen from the Technical Institute,

the security officials could not be sure whether they had been taken for political or criminal purposes, particularly due to the fact that there was a "close relationship between the core of the Black Beret Cadre and the local criminal element." Such relationships would have dramatic consequences in the following year.

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Robin Hood was Black in My Hood: "Erskine" Buck Burrows and the Assassinations (1972–77)

Between 1972 and 1973, Bermuda's British Police Commissioner Duckett and Governor Sharples were both assassinated. The Cadre was implicated in both of these murders, and in response to government repression sought to achieve their aims through other avenues and organizations. This chapter explores this process, and also discusses the relationship between "Buck" Burrows and Larry Tacklyn, two Black males who were eventually convicted, tried, and hung in 1977 for charges related to these killings and also the "Shopping Center" murders.

By the summer of 1972, the Intelligence Committee claimed that the name "Black Beret" was hardly ever heard anymore, and that the Cadre "for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist." However, in addition to a few public meetings, a small collective continued to function covertly. Berets remained under heavy surveillance, particularly Bassett and Simmons.

Meanwhile, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) busied itself with extensively documenting the activities of the expanding Nation of Islam (NOI), which now consisted of between eighty and hundred persons.[1] The Nation continued to smuggle *Muhammad Speaks* into the island. Between March and June 1972, one hundred copies had been seized from persons entering Bermuda via the airport.

As it had done nearly a decade prior, Special Branch collated its intelligence about the NOI in its "Second Basic Paper on the NOI." Since 1960, the NOI went through ebbs and flows of activity. Several members had been affiliated with Kamarakafego since 1967, involved in the 1968 uprisings, and also attended the 1969 Black Power Conference (BPC). In 1966 it formed Mosque No. 1 and in 1968 was relocated to the Bassett building.

Byron Philip had been a long-standing member of the NOI since residing in the United States. He served in the U.S. Air Force, and received American citizenship in 1955. He had unsuccessfully attempted to build up the Bermuda NOI branch in visits in 1961 and 1965. However, after his permanent move back to Bermuda in 1970, he became the head of the NOI and helped develop it into a thriving, well-organized, and financially stable group. Within weeks of his return the NOI created the Standard Bakery. In 1971, it opened the Shabazz bakery, brought a new van, a plot of land to grow and distribute produce, and lots of land worth $120,000 (with the intent to build a new Mosque, a school, and apartments) on Court Street. In 1972, it opened the Shabazz Electrical contractors, two vegetable stands, and two Steak & Take restaurants. The NOI was also involved in interior designing, landscaping, painting, and janitorial services and was attempting to operate Tuck shops in some of the public schools. Philip, "a natural leader," led courses based on Elijah Muhammad's books (such as *How to Eat to Live* and *Message to the Black Man*) and recordings. He also organized a local Fruit of Islam (FOI), having obtained uniforms from a 1970 NOI Convention in Chicago.

The FCO Report stated that those who joined the NOI had "deep-rooted racial feelings" and contained brief biographies (including home addresses, occupations, and vehicle license plate numbers) of a number of members, such as Carlton Burchall, past president of Bermuda's Dockworker's Union and Longshoremen's Division of the BIU (who had joined between 1961 and 1965), and police sergeants, one of whom resigned from the Force to devote his full time to the NOI.[2]

In July 1972, Bassett was linked to the theft of .303 drill rifles from the Technical Institute. Two members of the Junior Cadre admitted to taking (in addition to stealing cylinders of nitric acid from the Saltus School) and giving them to Bassett, who was charged with knowingly receiving stolen goods. Five of the twenty-four rifles were eventually found wrapped in plastic in the Paget Marsh area. The welded portions of the barrels had been cut off (making them usable), but the guns had not been refitted with bolts. However, while Bassett was actually not the recipient of the rifles, he once again was targeted specifically.[3]

Subsequently, in September, Police Commissioner Duckett was killed at his home on Palmetto Road, Devonshire. He was shot with a .38 caliber gun while checking a malfunctioning security light. It was initially believed that the killer had a personal grudge against Duckett or the police or was of unsound mind. However, Martonmere felt that the Cadre had indoctrinated a number of young Black males in violence and though it "stupid to pretend" that this had not "rubbed off on some of them." He felt it more likely "that a small group of the more militant Berets" had gone

underground and that security officials were simply "unaware of their activities." As there was no reason to believe that they had "abandoned" their revolutionary ideals, several Berets were brought in for questioning, and some detained for days.[4]

Regardless, most Berets had given no hint of any possible involvement. Shabazz had recently married, and was planning to take a trip to Africa. The Perinchief brothers had returned abroad to school in the United States and Nova Scotia, respectively. However, Bassett, who was due to appear in court for the rifle charges, fled the island in late September. His escape was cleverly planned; his father, John Bassett Sr., had apparently bought a ticket and checked in at the airport. "Dionne" then boarded the plane as his father. The former Beret Chief of Staff was aware that he would not have gotten a fair trial due to his political activities. In addition, he had been visited and questioned by a Scotland Yard detective about the death of the commissioner and was concerned that he might have been implicated in the murder despite credible witnesses who could testify otherwise.[5]

Of the remaining active Berets in Bermuda, Simmons was identified as most likely to lead the Cadre. Between September and October 1972, he was arrested in Verdmont, New York, for breaking and entering a sports good store. A loaded rifle was found in the area in which he was arrested. However, Simmons jumped bail and returned to Bermuda. He continued to express desires to revive the Cadre and had met informally with a select few of Cadre supporters. When Simmons suggested that funds needed to be raised to "send someone abroad for training in guerrilla warfare," it was reported that he "met with a good deal of apathy."[6]

The police continued to harass Simmons and the remaining Berets. In December 1972, he was arrested "for failing to comply with a Police order to leave the scene of a demonstration" at City Hall organized by the Young Progressives.[7] Emerging from the Spittle Pond area in 1969, FCO officials considered them to be a "gang of youths" who obstructed motorists passing through Devil's Hole and used "insulting and filthy language in public."

However, the Progressives were an interesting sociopolitical group—their "obstruction of motorists" included throwing copies of *Umoja* into passing cars. Led by High Priest Git Gershwyn Smith (Rabbonni Shiloh Gershywn), they were "self-styled on the order of Mahatma Gandhi's peaceful struggles in India." They sought peaceful means to better society, and were organized through a "Priesthood of Righteousness" that included Priests (males), Honorable Sisters (females), and Levites (children at twelve years of age). Open to all races, they used the Bible as their main source of ethics. The Progressives were active; also known as the "Harlem Hole Group," on May 25, 1970 they held a Soul Festival that "accentuated the African image and was attended by Lois Browne-Evans." They had joined

the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) Youth Wing, Bermuda Industrial Union (BSU), and the Black Power Movement (BPM) in a demonstration to decrease Bermuda's voting age to eighteen.[8]

After Simmons's arrest, the police subsequently "recovered" an unregistered pistol at the home of another Beret and friend of Simmons (he was fined $250). Apparently, the weapon was one of nine handguns stolen from a gun store in Nova Scotia, Canada, and it was believed that a small number of Berets were in possession of them. The police searched the Simmons's residence in vain for more weapons.[9]

Simmons and a small group of Berets began to meet at private homes, but Special Branch reported that nothing of a "revolutionary nature" was being discussed. Before leaving the island to attend school in February 1973, J. Perinchief suggested that the Liberation School be reinstituted. After his departure, Simmons actively sought to reorganize the Cadre and create a new headquarters. He reportedly urged other members to gather weapons "in pretion for the struggle." Along with Ben Aaharon, he expressed interested in going to Cuba, Tanzania, or Zaire for guerrilla training, but they lacked the funds. In early March, police raided a house occupied by Simmons's girlfriend, and found two pistols, a quantity of ammunition, and a telephone interception device. Following this incident, Simmons began to get rid of his Cadre literature and attempted to keep a low profile.[10]

Meanwhile, the efforts of Scotland Yard and a $25,000 reward had failed to generate any leads about the murder of Duckett. Furthermore, the stolen rifles had yet to be found. In fact, security officials had little information about Cadre activities.[11]

This was the environment in which newly appointed Governor John Sharples assumed his office. Arriving in October 1972, he kept "a close watch on the internal security situation" through meetings with the head of Special Branch and the commissioner of police. He felt that the small "hard core of militant Black Power," possibly with access to arms, had "withdrawn from the political scene" in "the absence of public support and probably as part of a deliberate strategy." This made "the gathering of intelligence as to their plans and strength much more difficult," but he believed that they would "lie low until an opportunity for action is created by industrial unrest or such similar circumstances."

He believed it critical that "the danger of support of militant action by Coloured youths" amidst the right conditions needed to be taken into account. He was significantly concerned about "attitudes towards individual policemen, the stoning of police vehicles and the lack of co-operation in the investigations into the murder of the Commissioner." The events of 1968 and 1970 demonstrated how quickly a situation could escalate in Bermuda, and things could turn "much more ugly if actively supported by an armed

militant group." Hence, in spite of Bermuda's apparent calm, the possibility of a security situation arising at short notice could not be ruled out.[12]

Approximately three months after this statement, on the night of March 10, 1973, Sharples, his Aide De-Camp, and his Great Dane were shot and killed at the Government House. This was followed by the murders at the Shopping Center. It was reported that a .38 caliber gun was used in all of the killings. The FCO's "murder squad" launched a major "killer hunt" orchestrated by top-ranking detectives from Scotland Yard and the assistance of the FBI and Royal Canadian Military Police (RCMP).[13]

A State of Emergency was declared, and roadblocks set up across the island. Departing flights were delayed for hours due to security checks and searches at the airport. Several homes were searched during the night. Nine Berets were arrested, questioned, and released.[14] In total, over five hundred people were interviewed and at least one hundred placed in temporary custody for questioning. The Bermuda-based American consul, who saw the Cadre as "Che Guevara at his most militant," stated that

> Black Power, anti-colonialism and terrorism are three of the primary motives [of the governor's assassination] being aired at this time. Some attribute the crimes to the Black Beret Cadre, a Black power, anti-colonial organization which has terrorism as one of its main weapons. This organization was broken up by the police and is no longer visible but is believed … to be flourishing underground. … Acting Governor Kinnear has expressed to us his personal opinion that the Black power group or part of it is involved either by being directly connected with the murders or in the advance planning for them.[15]

The "murder squad" linked the Shopping Center murders to a "criminal gang" controlled by a Bobby Greene. Greene was described as "a man with a long criminal record including convictions for armed robbery"; he was reported to not only be "a hardened criminal, but a political animal as well." He was considered to have had substantial influence within the Black community and had the PLP leader, Walter Robinson, "in his pocket." In addition, Greene was believed to have had a longstanding relationship with Simmons, as the Cadre had "always mixed with criminal elements." It thus saw the killings as "criminally and politically motivated."

As part of their investigation, the police raided several premises in the Back-a-Town area. Days later, Greene and four others arrested in the raids complained of police brutality on a local television program. The murder investigation was drawing vast resentment as only Whites had been murdered and police action directed "almost exclusively against members of the coloured community." Indeed, Acting Governor Kinnear felt the need to stress to the police commissioner that greater control was needed

in the searches of homes and more discretion in those conducted at the airport, where Blacks were being offensively and practically exclusively searched.[16]

It was also reported that Ben Aaharon, Simmons, and other "hard-core" Berets were holding meetings at the Greene's Grill, which was run by Greene. Furthermore, Simmons was reportedly sharing an apartment with two "criminals," Larry Tacklyn and Dennis Bean. In an attempt to travel to Canada, Simmons, Tacklyn, and another Beret (Joe Deshields) were detained as "undesirable immigrants." Upon their return to Bermuda, Simmons and Deshields traveled to Jamaica and may have contacted the Cuban and Chinese embassies while there. Meanwhile, Tacklyn and Bean were arrested for the armed robbery of Master's Ltd. Store and Greene was convicted for "riotous behavior." Greene apparently took an amount of "communist literature" with him to prison.[17] Tacklyn was released on bail under sureties of Simmons, Sr.

Meanwhile, the Cadre continued its operations. At one point Shabazz functioned as its minister of defense/finance and information just to keep the Cadre going. They organized meetings at the homes of Ben Aaharon and Louis "Red" Desilva (another Beret) with Wilfred Allen, a founding member of the PLP, to discuss the Cadre's relationship to the Party and the reactivation of its Youth Wing. Ben Aaharon and Jerome Perinchief were also elected as a member and vice chairman of the PLP Central Committee. The group continued to communicate with Bassett; in a trip to Canada, Simmons's girlfriend made contact with him and Simmons himself was said to have reached him. The Cadre also promoted a "Cultural Group" with a Black Family theme at the St. Paul's AME. Furthermore, Ben Aaharon reportedly attempted to import Communist literature into Bermuda from China and a device that could unscramble messages on the police network.[18]

Despite reward offers totaling $300,000, the police were unable to gather much information about the murders. There were initially rumors that "Jamaican Rastafarians" had been involved in the governor's assassination; these proved to be false but gave the police a legitimate excuse to "crack down" on a reportedly Jamaican "crime ring." Though the weapons used in the commissioner's and Shopping Centre murders were both of a .38 caliber, the bullets used in the latter were so damaged that they could not be identified as coming from the same gun. Nevertheless, the police were "reasonably certain"—though without *reasonable proof*—that Tacklyn and Simmons were involved in the governor's assassination (in fact, they claimed that Greene had implicated Tacklyn and Burrows in the governor's murder). The police pointed out that Simmons had acted "uncharacteristically" on the night of the murder, and "went out of his way to be conspicuous," seeking to be seen with non-Berets with whom he normally did not

associate. Special Branch was convinced that Simmons, at the least, knew who was responsible.[19]

On July 15, shots were fired at Police Headquarters barracks with a .38 caliber revolver and a 12-bore shotgun. This was the second occurrence of such shootings; the first also included a .38 pistol. Police subsequently raided Simmons's residence, and found a live 12-bore cartridge that matched those recovered at the barracks. Simmons fought off the searching officer, escaped the premises, and went into hiding. It was expected that he would be smuggled out of the island and all exit points were closely guarded. Evidence indicated that Berets considered conducting robberies to raise funds to meet the defense costs of Simmons and Tacklyn.[20]

However, within the next few weeks, Simmons escaped to the United States disguised as a woman. A former girlfriend of Bassett checked in at the airport and gave her passport to Simmons at the boarding gate. This woman was a frequent traveler and would have been stopped if Special Branch officers had not been distracted by the arrest of another person on the same flight. In addition, Simmons arrived at the last minute, and his immigration card was handed to a police officer after the plane had departed. It was claimed that Simmons was headed to Toronto and, with assistance from other Black Power associates, would then proceed to either Cuba or Algeria. Shabazz, the "self-proclaimed master mind" behind the escape, was "pleased with his ability to thwart the Police" and intended to work behind the scenes to help the cause.[21]

Meanwhile, twenty-nine-year old "Buck" Burrows had become a leading suspect in the murders. Although the FCO considered him to be one of Bermuda's "leading criminals," to many Blacks he was seen as a "Black Robin Hood" who stole from the rich to give to the poor. On September 25, 1973, a man fitting the description of Burrows robbed more than $30,000 from the Bank of Bermuda using a sawn-off shotgun and a stolen mobylette. This instigated a manhunt for Burrows, whose picture was widely broadcast in the media. Until this incident (despite Greene's testimony), Burrows had not been implicated in the murders. In fact, he had even helped officers clean up the blood after the investigation of Duckett's residence, where he had been employed as a caretaker. However, he had not shown up to work (he was also a janitor at the Police Headquarters) since July 1973, and this heightened the FCO's suspicions of him. Though Burrows frequented the Court Street and Parson's Road area, no one had alerted the police of his presence. In fact, since the robbery, Burrows had distributed money weekly to numbers of people along Happy Valley Road. He was always armed, with his unregistered sawn-off shotgun slung over his shoulder. Due to the efforts of Neville Darrell (a former Black local detective) and the help of his informant (who poetically never received a promised $20,000 reward for

information and an extra $5,000 for every gun that Burrows had on him while captured—Burrows had three), Burrows was captured in this very area on October 18, 1973.[22]

Reportedly, a Special Branch agent had "finally" gained the confidence of Burrows and was used by the latter to contact his friends. This agent revealed to police that Burrows was hiding in the forested outskirts of Back-a-Town. He was subsequently ambushed. Searches in the area where Burrows was believed to be hiding recovered personal clothing, several gas masks, and a ransom note buried in the earth. The ransom note demanded $150,000 in cash and air passage to Africa. Apparently, prior to his capture, Burrows had unsuccessfully attempted to leave the island. However, days before he was caught, the informant told Special Branch that Burrows had intended to capture the premier as a hostage and demand air passage to Africa and $150,000 as ransom. Other accounts state that efforts had been made to have Burrows transported to South Africa to help fight in its anti-apartheid Movement.[23]

At the time of his arrest, Burrows was carrying the sawn-off shotgun, a .32 automatic pistol, and $2,500 in cash. He reportedly confessed in a written statement to the armed robberies at the Bank of Bermuda and the Piggly Wiggly Plaza, and other shooting incidents. He was charged with the recent shootings at Police Headquarters and at Duckett's house a year to the date of the latter's murder.[24]

Ballistic tests showed that the shotgun cartridges found at Police Headquarters and Duckett's house matched the gun and other cartridges in Burrows's possession. They were also identical to the one found in Simmons's apartment. The police had expected to find in Burrows's possession the .38 pistol used in the killing of the governor—which, according to newly appointed Governor Hartley Leather, even a "child" could have committed. Another agent, who claimed to have penetrated the hard core of the Cadre, had reported that Burrows and J. Perinchief had argued about the possession of "the gun that killed the governor." Burrows reportedly insisted that he still possessed the gun, and "would not throw it away to please Perinchief." However, the gun was not found on Burrows.[25]

In addition, in the summer of 1973, a taxi driver was robbed by two Black youths also using a .38 revolver. The authorities claimed that the description fit Simmons and Burrows. It was also reported that Simmons, J. Perinchief, and Burrows had maintained a relationship for some time and that Burrows had been in contact with Ben Aaharon and J. Perinchief while hiding.[26]

The FCO debunked claims that the murders were an outside job and was convinced of the Cadre's involvement in the killings.[27] This was also suggested in a statement made by Police Constable Sylvan Musson Jr. during the 1976 trial of Burrows and Tacklyn. Musson, a former Beret, claimed

to have joined the Cadre shortly after it burned the Union Jack. He listed the Central Committee of the Cadre as Bassett (Chairman), Ben Aaharon, Desilva, J. Perinchief (respectively, ministers of information, health, education and welfare and defense), and Shabazz (treasurer). He also stated that Deshields, R. Swan, Knights, and Simmons, Jr. were "prominent" members of the Cadre, whose aims were Marxist Socialism or Communism. Furthermore, it was "common knowledge" within the Cadre that persons of importance "would have to be removed by any means necessary," including killing as a last resort. A list of such "enemies of the people" was kept, and included politicians, police officers, members of the judiciary, the governor, the commissioner of police, and Henry Tucker.

Musson also stated that the Cadre conducted reconnaissance exercises around the houses and premises of such individuals, including Duckett's. He had personally reconnoitered the Police Headquarters twice with Simmons (making note of vehicles, lighting, radio control, fuel pumps, entry and exit points, and personnel) and claimed that Simmons had drawn up a sketch plan of the buildings' layout. He also had reportedly similarly surveyed the governor's house with Simmons on four occasions. In addition, all of this information was to be passed along to Ben Aaharon. Furthermore, Bassett had instructed Berets on the use of firearms and given information on how to make explosives from easily obtainable information.[28]

If Musson is to believed, his statement suggests that at the least, Simmons was capable of helping to organize the murders of Duckett and Sharples. Indeed, Berets were sufficiently trained to have committed the acts, but there was no conclusive evidence to prove that the Berets were directly involved in the actual murders. Furthermore, a number of other informants (such as Dennis Bean and Wayne Jackson, who had criminal backgrounds) did not implicate Simmons at all, and referred only to Tacklyn and Burrows.

Nevertheless, FCO officials felt that Burrows was not completely responsible and was being "used by well-known revolutionaries." Leather publicly stated that the motives for the murders "pointed to Black supremacy" and that those involved "may have been infected with the same [malignant disease] as the Palestinians."[29] True to typical colonial, racist arrogance, he described Burrows as a "single, lone, simple-minded young crook" who tragically lived in a "dream yet nightmarish" world. Furthermore, Burrows, Bean, and Tacklyn were all "long time criminals of low intelligence" but of the "kind of sly cunning that such people often" exhibited. He theorized that, at some point in 1972, these three had all come into contact with the remaining "surreptitious" Cadre "ring leaders"; Tacklyn and Burrows greatly admired and "perhaps worshipped" Simmons, and Leather was convinced that these remaining Berets realized that fate had put a new

weapon in their hands in the form of these easily impressed and not very bright young criminals. They played on them, influenced them, almost certainly inspired some of the violent acts that followed, and very probably planned them.

At the time there was no evidence to sustain these claims, beyond that of undercover agents whose guises could not be blown, and hence such information was inadmissible in court. The only "link in the chain" was the shot gun cartridge found in Simmons's apartment, which could have gotten him, at most, six months to a year if he returned to Bermuda. According to Leather, this disclosure would have done "more harm than good" to Bermuda's internal security.

Hence, the Intelligence Committee sought to encourage Simmons through "psychological warfare" to stay in Canada, where the RCMP "had tabs on him." Stories were placed in the press in attempts to make him believe that the police had more information about his possible involvement with the murders than they actually did. This aimed also to make the other Berets, against whom they had no case whatsoever, as nervous as possible.

FCO officials claimed—without confirmable evidence—that Simmons had begun to take heroin, which, according to Leather, would have been "good news" if true. In addition,

> it was far better that he should drug himself to death up in Canada than come back to Bermuda to do a few months in gaol, and thereafter be a bigger menace to the community than ever before. We must employ skillful propaganda to help worry him to further foolish acts, anything but return to Bermuda, to causing his own death by drugs if possible. This is psychological warfare and the more the enemy can be made to worry, to fear, and if humanly possible start squabbling amongst themselves, the greater our chances of finally clearing out the whole lot of them.[30]

It was also important that Greene had "squealed" about the assassination, whether his claims were correct or not. Hence, it was decided to "encourage speculation that Burrows [was] trying to save his own skin by ratting on his associates." It was hoped that this would force the other Berets to advise Simmons not to return to Bermuda because he was implicated in the murders. In an effort to keep up "the war of nerves" against the Berets, claims, whether true or not, were made that the weapons had several fingerprints on them.

According to Leather, these information "leaks" had promising results. Ben Aaharon and Shabazz were showing signs of "being very worried young gentlemen." In essence, Leather felt that the they had "broken the back" of the Cadre; the gun men were in jail, the intellectuals frightened and dispirited, and the "authorities" would "try to keep them that way."[31]

Leather's position reflects a consistent criminalization of Black protest in Bermuda; he would later state that the murders were "primarily criminal" and only incidentally political. His claims that Tacklyn and Burrows "worshipped" Simmons should be reinterpreted as they had respect for him as a freedom fighter. To assert that Burrows was simply a "cunning crook" is a refusal to admit that he had some degree of political awareness. His assertion that the Berets "used" unintelligent criminals to do their bidding does not accurately speak to the positive relationships that the Cadre possessed with Bermuda's *lumpenproletariat*. Furthermore, many of the island's youth perhaps did not see saw the assassination of the governor as criminal, as opposed to viewing colonialism *in and of itself as criminal*.

The history of the Berets demonstrates that they essentially operated out of love for Black people. In addition, they formed relationships with Bermuda's "criminal element," in an attempt to educate Blacks about the pitfalls of Bermuda's racist society and to encourage them to better their lives and their communities. Their activities while incarcerated also reflected this concern. As shown, they were very much against the sale of narcotics and drug dealers, which were seen as dangers to the Black community. Leather's response toward Simmons's supposed drug addiction speaks for itself.

Burrows's own experiences sheds light on this phenomenon. He was truly a "victim of the system" and surely recognized that it was unjust. By all accounts, Burrows was an associate of the Cadre. He was born on March 15, 1944 in Friswell's Hill (located in the Parson's Road area). As did several Berets, he attended Samaritan's Hall Nursery and Central School. When he was twelve, his mother died while giving birth to another child whose father was White. Burrows left school at the age of thirteen and lived at a host of various abodes, such as the Sunshine League and the Haven. At sixteen years of age he was arrested for stealing, triggering a host of stints in prison for charges relating to burglary, stealing and breaking and entering. In one case he robbed the Bank of Bermuda of £3,000 and escaped on a moped; he committed another robbery disguised as a woman. He had been to jail at least five times since 1960. Leather claimed that, since the age of fifteen, Burrows (unless when incarcerated) had literally lived in the outskirts of Back-a-Town "like an animal, in the open, in and under trees, in dense bush," and after each arrest, various personal items were discovered buried in the area in polythene bags.[32]

While imprisoned Burrows was a model inmate and was often released early for "good behavior." In 1968, he was sentenced to six years imprisonment for burglary and assaulting an officer. It was during this last spell in prison that, as stated, he met Bassett, Ben Aaharon, and Perinchief as they served their own sentences. He was also one of the inmates who

attended their GCE English and Math classes. Due to excellent behavior, he was given a day release job at the Police Headquarters. Here he worked as a janitor and also cleaned the cars of police officers. Burrows was a "real quiet kind of brother but in his mind he felt serious about injustice." Hence, he willingly took letters written by the imprisoned Berets (as did select prison guards) and delivered them to a few specific individuals to be published by the Berets.[33]

Burrows was not an official Beret, but he attended Cadre meetings and was well known by them, but perhaps possessed his own agenda.[34] Shabazz states that Burrows underwent a transformative process from a criminalized youth to a freedom fighter. While he always maintained his independence, he admired the Cadre because of their ability to decipher the system. While studying revolutionary literature (such as Fanon and Mao) he began to understand how his negative treatment in Bermuda's society (e.g., the disrespect he faced while a janitor at the police station) was part of a larger systematic issue. He realized that he had no ideology, but soon determined that everything he had been doing for his individual sake he would do for his community. Like many other Black youth "off the block," Burrows could have become a successful entrepreneur if his environment had been nurturing.[35]

In July 1976 Burrows was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murders of Duckett, Sharples, and Sawyers (Tacklyn was tried setely on these charges but acquitted). In November 1976, he and Tacklyn were tried together and found guilty for murdering Shopping Centere managers Victor Rego and Mark Doe (which the "Murder Squad" claimed was a "fund-raising mission" for the Cadre). Burrows did not seek counsel, and, since April 1976, had remained practically silent whenever he was asked about the trial, so much to the extent that psychiatrists interviewed Burrows to determine whether he had become mute. Psychiatrists were unable to find any "mentally abnormal behavior" in Burrows, and repeatedly noted that his "extraordinary" verbal ability was remarkable "considering his educational background" (he only attended school inconsistently between the ages of five and thirteen). They found that "his use of language would not have been out of place in an institution of higher education." It was found that he was mute by choice and had avoided conversation through an effective and "time honored method of evasion known as the 'number, rank and name' method." He kept his comments to simple "thank yous" and "good mornings." Once when visited by his sister, he stated, "I am doing the will of my Father and must not be distracted. Tell my brother that I love him and also the children." In fact, throughout his arrest, Burrows responded to inquiries about the murders through statements of a religious nature. In one interview, when asked about his involvement in the

murders, Burrows repeatedly stated that he had confessed to God and was at peace.[36]

However, Burrows eventually submitted handwritten testimonies (from pages in his own notebook) admitting to the murders of the commissioner and governor. A quite instructive excerpt from the latter follows:

> I, Erskine Durrant Burrows, as former Commander in Chief of all anti-colonialist forces in the island of Bermuda, wish to willingly reveal the part I played in the assassination and murder of the former Governor of Bermuda Mr. Richard Sharples and his ADC Captain Hugh Sayers. I wish to state, not forgetting that killing is wrong and sinful, that it was upon my direct orders and inspired efforts and determination, that what was done was done, performed with a magnum .357 six-shot hand-gun. I was not alone when I went up to Government House to kill the Governor, but I shall never reveal who or how many others were with me.

The letter also stated his motives:

> The motive for killing the Governor … was to seek to make the people, Black people in particular, become aware of the evilness and wickedness in this island of Bermuda. One of their major evil strategies being to seek and encourage the Black people to hate and fight each other, while those who are putting this evil strategy into effect laugh and pat themselves on their backs saying, yeah look, we have got them, we have got them conquered. Secondly the motive was to show that these colonialists were just ordinary people like ourselves who eat, sleep and die just like anybody else and that we need not stand in fear or awe of them.

It continued:

> Finally the motive was to reveal Black people to themselves. This refers to the revealed reactions of many Black people during the Governor's funeral, when Black people were…standing with tears in their eyes crying for a man who when he was alive didn't care if they lived or died and here they were crying for a White Governor and yet when many of their own people pass away there is sometimes hardly a tear shed for them. This shows clearly the evil effects that the colonialist propaganda has had over the long years they have ruled over this little island. And my beloved brothers and sisters this ought not to be because there is a supreme authority we can all appeal to and pray to free us from suppression, sin and any evil domination we might be under.…[37]

This document is quite revealing. Evidence does not suggest that Burrows was the commander of Bermuda's "anti-colonial forces," but this

asserts that Burrows had an anticolonial mindset. Even if he had not written the letter, he did not challenge its assertions. If Burrows did not commit the murders then why would he have stated that he did? What is certain is that he did not reveal the names of others who may have been involved.

Amidst local and international protest, Burrows and Tacklyn were sentenced to death by hanging. In April 1977, Acting Governor G. Lloyd followed the advice of his Prerogative of Mercy Committee that they should not receive reprieves. However, in May British ministers recommended canceling the 1947 Creech-Jones doctrine, which stated that a secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs (who was currently Dr. David Owens) could not advise the queen to intervene and grant reprieve unless there was a clear breach of law. In fact, in July Owens had accepted this recommendation. In October, FCO officials told Premier David Gibbons that as capital punishment had been abolished in the United Kingdom, any carrying out of the death penalty in its Dependent Territories would be an embarrassment to the U.K. government.[38] Hence, Gibbons, along with Bermuda's Parliament and the police commissioner, were under the impression that a reprieve was likely. Newly appointed Governor Peter Ramsbotham shared this view by the time of his arrival in Bermuda in October. However, the British Cabinet Committee was doubtful about changing the Creech-Jones doctrine while a case was pending, and, while generally feeling that the death penalty should have been abolished, asked the governor's counsel on the case. Ramsbotham then stated that he could find no need to reversing the sentences; shortly afterward it was announced that Owens was unable to advise the queen to intervene, and petitions for the reprieves were rejected.

Days later, Owens told the Parliamentary Labor Party that the decision not to commute rested with the governor and he informed the House of Commons that there were no grounds for changing the decision of the acting governor. This was seen by the FCO as a terrible mistake, as this did not take into account the need to "disassociate the governor as far as possible from the decision not to reprieve." The FCO later concluded that it failed to adequately support the governor in the time surrounding the executions; for example, it had not informed him that the plan to abrogate the 1947 Creech-Jones doctrine and grant reprieve had been abandoned.[39]

As stated, petitions and international demonstrations denounced the hangings. Members of Concerned Bermudians Abroad, a Washington DC-based group, held a demonstration at the British embassy in Washington DC. They protested the hangings on the grounds of "dubious circumstances" including the jury selection (nine out of the twelve jurors were White) and the fact that a law had been passed only weeks before the trial that allowed Tacklyn and Burrows to be tried simultaneously. As this

was a "gross violation of human rights," the group stated, "the executions of these Bermudians can only be recorded by later generations as murder, as an obvious case of contrived and premeditated murder. Britain and the present Government can wash and rewash their hands but the trial of Burrows and Tacklyn will always be present."[40]

Telegrams were sent to Bermuda's Acting Governor G. Lloyd from California-based members of Amnesty International. The London-based Caribbean People's Solidarity Campaign saw the killing as the continued suppression of Bermuda's Black majority by a "handful of English Whites with the support of the Queen and the British Labour Party." It denounced the murder of the "two freedom fighters" and the Party's sending of troops to "suppress the struggle of the Bermudian people." It also held a protest rally in front of the Foreign Office in Trafalgar Square. The Campaign drew parallels between the similar sentencing of Tacklyn and Burrows and that of Desmond Trotter, a Black Power advocate from Dominica.[41]

In the early morning of December 2, 1977, at Casemate's prison, Burrows (age thirty-three) and Tacklyn (age twenty-four) were executed by hanging. Fasting, mourning, and numerous public meetings, prayer vigils, Church services (as held by the New Testament Church of God), and petitions (with approximately six thousand signatures), led by the "People's Parliament" and the National Committee against Capital Punishment (NCACP), had been held and raised in protest of the executions, which no one had received in Bermuda since 1943. Thousands of pamphlets and stickers were produced as well as tee-shirts.[42]

The NCACP was composed of the PLP, the BIU, ABUT, Bermuda for Bermudians, Bermuda Association for social workers, Ministerial Association (namely Black Ministers), and an Association of Clubs (namely Black clubs) held a protest rally at Victoria Park, followed by a People's Parliament meeting (directed by the PLP). About one thousand and six hundred persons attended. The ABUT, in a move that was dubbed "irresponsible" by UBP MP Viera, called for a "stay-at-home" of Bermuda's 700 teachers and other workers to protest in the "strongest possible terms."[43]

In addition, Laurence Scott and Glen Fubler, who were at the time studying in the United Kingdom, went to the FCO Department in London to discuss the executions. Both were identified as PLP members and the FCO believed that they were the leading sources behind articles published in the British press denouncing the executions. Fubler, the "most extreme of the two," complained that the notice of the executions was too short. He felt that the British government should have organized a special sitting of the Bermuda Legislature to debate the issue. He further stressed that Bermuda's government consisted of "White racists" and were in power only because they had "gerry mandered" the island's constituency boundaries." Hence, he

called for the British government to intervene and restore "constitutional government and democracy in Bermuda." In response, an FCO official stated that the British government could not intervene in Bermuda's internal affairs in the manner requested.[44]

Meanwhile, Bermuda's youth responded with fire. The House of Assembly grounds were entered at night, and the building's windows and floodlights smashed. Carrying placards and banners denouncing the hangings, they overturned cars in Hamilton and smashed the windows of a number of buildings. Drumming was also heard as they moved throughout the city.[45]

On the night preceding the execution, police officers fired tear gas on a demonstration outside of Bermuda's Supreme Court. While most of the clashes with the police occurred in Hamilton, arson attacks flared across the island. Protesters caused extensive property damage through the use of "home-made fire bombs." Three Black males (including a police cadet) were found guilty for throwing petrol bombs at two homes in the Devonshire. The Southampton Princess Hotel was seriously set on fire, and three lives (two tourists and one local) were lost. A number of buildings were "completely gutted," such as Gosling's liquor warehouse. Damages supposedly totaled in millions of dollars.[46]

Governor Ramsbotham made a televised statement claiming that all Bermudians were perhaps "fearful that malignant forces" would "spread bitterness and division" in the island and destroy all that Bermuda had gained in promoting prosperity and racial harmony. The "evils of blind passion and hatred" that had "beset other countries in the form of terrorism and violence" were not to be allowed to "infect" Bermuda. Hence, he declared a Stage of Emergency and implemented a dusk-to-dawn curfew. On December 3, the entire Police Force was called out to "deal with" a group of about five hundred youth who had, according to the colonial officials, "assembled with the intention of mounting further attacks." The Bermuda Regiment was also embodied. As the police continued to use tear gas and rubber bullets to subdue crowds, FCO officials believed that local forces were fatiguing and would not be able to contain the protestors. Further clashes with protestors (aged primarily between eighteen and thirty-four) using petrol bombs would "inevitably have led to the Police using firearms with consequential injury and possible loss of life." Hence a company of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (numbering about two hundred and fifty) was flown from Britain in two Royal Air Force VC 10 transports. They joined a small contingent that was brought in from the British garrison in Belize. The State of Emergency was lifted on December 9.[47] Within the week about 30 percent of the island's food stocks had been burned, with most damaged

property belonging to Whites or Blacks known to be members of the UBP.[48]

This sending of troops was also denounced outside of Bermuda. For example, the West Derbyshire Constituency Labor Party felt that this act supported "the continued existence of a colonial system of extreme racial inequality" and called for the United Kingdom to "attempt to create a more egalitarian society" in Bermuda. In addition, Peter Ashdown of the "Society for a Free Belize" questioned how the United Kingdom could justify adherence to the Creech-Jones formula in a dependency where "the government and economy" was "controlled by a white or off-white elite" that sought to only preserve its privileged status and then "bail them out" with a backup military force to protect their loss of property and lives from the consequences of their own "foolish actions." The "Front Street Boys" should have been made to suffer the consequences of their own actions. Furthermore, the U.K. government's actions showed to Black communities in Bermuda, the Commonwealth, and the United Kingdom that it was as intent on "upholding the privilege of white, reactionary regimes" as it had ever been. He also felt that this contradicted the uncompromising verbal stand that Owens had made on the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia.[49]

The racial dynamics of the case are self-evident. Within Bermuda, it was mostly Blacks who condemned the "legal lynching" of Burrows and Tacklyn. In contrast, those supporting their hangings were predominantly White. Through the press, those against the killing expressed that the hanging was barbaric and uncivilized and as it was abolished in England, how could the British government allow it in a British Colony? In contrast, Whites appeared to have been out for revenge and wanted "justice" as five White men had been murdered.[50]

However, as had been shown, outside of Bermuda even Whites denounced the executions on a number of grounds. In fact, FCO officials once again commented on the racism of Bermuda's local White elite. Take for example, the comments of military advisor David Ford, who had been deployed to Bermuda with the British army. Ford made these statements in a report of the PLP's protest campaign against the executions. He felt that Bermuda's Black population had suffered a letdown; the "hard fact" was that it "had been clearly shown that the White Bermudian" still "retained the veto, regardless of the strength of Black opinion." There was "a long way to go to racial equality" and Blacks knew that they had "a struggle on their hands. Thirteen-hour debates in the Assembly" helped to let off some of the steam, but there remained a cause for "hooliganism" in the island. Blacks regarded Front Street as the "citadel" of White Bermuda and, as such, it was an object of attack in most uprisings. This was reflected by the

fact that "the primary aim of the police" had "always been to protect Front Street" and would continue to be so.[51]

In addition, a number of FCO officials who had recently served in Bermuda commented on the "extreme racist attitudes" of some of Bermuda's leading White elite; on the fact that the "life styles of the more affluent Whites was reminiscent of the worst aspects of the colonial era"; and that the consistency and failure by Whites to recognize the underlying racial problems of Bermuda could not be ignored. This confirmed the FCO's emerging view that Bermuda's class and racial divisions and the "relative disparities in personal wealth were greater and more entrenched" than Bermuda's authorities wanted them to believe. However, the United Bermuda Party (UBP) wanted to present the best image possible of the island due to concerns that any other perspectives would damage the island's tourist and international business economies. Hence, the FCO called for an independent assessment of Bermuda.[52] This marked the fifth time in less than a decade that British troops were sent to Bermuda to suppress Black protest (1968, 1969, twice in 1970 and 1977) ; this surely contrasted the international image of Bermuda as a paradise.

It is in this light that perhaps the Royal Commission, into the 1977 Disturbances (otherwise known as the Pitt Commission), should be viewed. The Pitt Commission was conducted in May 1978 under the direction of Lord Pitt of Hempstead. It began with a critique of the 1968 Wooding Commission's finds and suggestions, and raised questions as to whether they had been implemented by the UBP. Among other things, it found that while the Wooding Commission claimed that marijuana and alcohol were causes of the 1968 uprisings, it found that "cannabis [was] not an addictive drug" and was "unlikely to have had the influence ascribed to it by the Wooding Commission."[53]

The Pitt Commission found that many Black Bermudians saw rioting as a "legitimate form of protest" and that civil disorders since the 1960s had functioned as a form of "extra-parliamentary political action." Many Blacks were unable to "identify with the system" and the disorders were a "warning to Whites about the importance of moving more rapidly towards integration." The Commission was also struck by the "relative prevalence among sections of the White population of a belief that drastic forms of corporal punishment could reduce the incidence of crime." This was a "striking lack of realism in their advocacy of a return to the birch or even the cat o' nine tails." It also felt that the government had disappointedly failed to use Race Relations Council and it suggested revisiting the Race Relations Acts of 1969 and 1970.

Interesting to note, it felt that Blacks saw independence as "the final step in a process of emancipation," while that argument had little appeal

to Whites. However, it found that the concept of social integration needed to be connected to a "shared concept of Bermudian nationhood," which could only become a reality when Bermuda took its "rightful placed in the international community as a fully independent nation." It also suggested that a Conference be held in 1978 to discuss independence and to establish a fair electoral system. The Commission would conclude its report by stating, "[O]nly with independence [could] national unity be forged and pride in Bermuda fully develop." As to be expected, the Commission's recommendations would only be adopted to the extent that they supported the UBP's interests.[54]

In the aftermath of the governor's assassinations, the Cadre went even further underground. The experience of Bassett after he left Bermuda perhaps displays this best. Bassett's family was concerned that if he returned to the island, charges related to the governor's murder might have been pressed on him. Hence, he lived in exile via the "underground" throughout the U.S. East Coast and upstate New York. He eventually settled in the Syracuse area, changed his name, and kept a very low profile. Supported financially by his father, he opened a karate school and even managed to travel abroad. Bassett eventually joined the Black Liberation Army.[55]

Bassett's departure had a tremendous affect on his family. Due to his connections with the Cadre and its implications in the murders, his father lost 80 percent of his business contracts practically overnight. The FBI kept a close watch on Bassett, and opened up a file on his father, sister, and younger brother. The family communicated via pay phones and used a coded system while conversing.

Bassett's life on the move eventually caught up with him. Hospitalized after catching pneumonia, he died under "suspect circumstances." His family believes that he was murdered. According to Bassett, Sr., "Dionne" had been successfully recovering. However, one evening doctors suddenly decided to operate on him and he died during the surgery. At the insistence of his father, an autopsy was done and revealed that there was no reason why he should have died. Bassett passed away in 1995, but was due to return to the island as his father had finally secured legal clearance for him to do so.[56]

Several Berets went into other spheres of life and seemed to pursue spiritual or cultural goals. In essence, the Berets continued to exist, because, "once a Beret, always a Beret."[57] Khaldun joined the NOI and moved to the United States, while Ben Aaharon and Simmons joined the African Hebrew Israelite Movement and moved to Israel and Africa; both men have become well-respected leaders in the Movement. Ben Aaharon and the Perinchief brothers all went abroad to school. Others remained on the island, with numbers joining the ranks of the PLP. These Berets would also

become successful independent entrepreneurs and would establish their own businesses.

Several Berets bettered *themselves* through the Cadre. R. Swan stated that the Cadre "tried to educate Black people to do better.... In doing so we changed our own lives. That's how I got to where I am today. The nucleus of my education came from Berets... I came right off the block.... Many positive things that I learned from the Cadre still guide my daily living today. It changed my life for the better permanently."[58]

Berets also raised families that were politically aware. Several gave their children names that reflected their background, such as Che, Chelito, Shaka, Fanon, Jomo, and Cadre and Muslim or Kiswahili names. This was also reflective of the significant cultural shift that was taking place in Bermuda. Black Power encouraged Black people to study history and, in doing so, the cultural acceptance of "things" African became much apparent, through clothing (such as dashikis), spirituality, literature, and music.

The Islamic, World Community Al-Islam in the West (WCIW), Rastafari, and African Hebrew Israelite communities also grew during this era. Reggae exploded on the island; artists such as Peter Tosh and Bob Marley were particularly popular, as well as the music of politically conscious artists such as James Browne, Hugh Masekala, and Nina Simone. Local Black musicians and groups such as Michael Clarke and Ital Foundation, Cal Shabazz, and the Soul Brothers (including Cal Worrell and Keebil Hart) produced culturally and politically conscious music, and a number of Berets also became accomplished independent musicians during this era. Shabazz also published a book of poetry and remained active with the African Liberation Dancers (as did Beret associate Jennifer Smith; both also wrote for *Fame* magazine).[59]

Interesting to note, in January 1973 Special Branch complied a report called "The First Basic Paper on Rastafarians in Bermuda," signifying its close documentation of Rasta's growth in Bermuda. It noted that since July 1972 a number of youths were locking their hair, wearing red, green, and gold hats, and sporting badges with portraits of Haile Sellassie. The report stated that there were about fifty Rastas (including a small number of Whites) aged between sixteen and twenty-five in the island, and that small groups were seen congregating around Bailey's Bay, Harlem, Devil's Hole, and St. Monica's Road. However, Rasta's presence in the island certainly stems before the 1970s (e.g., there were Rastas involved in the 1968 youth uprisings).[60] The relationship between Black Power, culture, and these aforementioned sociopolitical and religious movements warrants further research.

Conclusion

Babylon Give Them a Ride: Blackness in Contemporary Bermuda

Throughout Bermuda's history, Blacks have challenged White oligarchic rule in the island. In doing so, they have been punished by a repressive judicial system that defined Black political protest as criminal and psychologically insane. Hence, the Black voice of dissent has been consistently legally persecuted for speaking the truth. But if this truth was considered an offense, for Blacks it was not a sin. The Black community continued to defend even its very *right* to have a voice with righteous discontent.

A pan-Africanist, anticolonial youth struggle aimed at political independence, Black Power was an extension of Bermuda's Black radical tradition. It was also influenced by Black Power's development in the wider Americas, and liberation struggles across the African Diaspora. The Movement emerged in a late 1960s era of token integration, when the establishment claimed that racism was a thing of the past and Black Power unnecessary. Blacks had once been told not to protest segregation because this would upset the tourist industry. When Blacks demonstrated that integration was disempowering the Black community by eroding Black institutions, they were then warned not to protest *integration* for the same reason.

Nevertheless, several factors deemed Black Power to be a necessity: British colonialism supported the oppression of Bermuda's Black majority by the White oligarchy; Blacks faced systematic discrimination in areas such as voting, the judiciary, employment, and civil service; and judging by the response of Whites to the 1969 Black Power Conference (BPC), Black people could not even congregate to discuss the Black experience without being attacked by the colonial government. Despite attempts to

suppress the BPC, Pauulu Kamarakafego was able to successfully organize the meeting; it would have a major impact on Black Power in the island and signified the Movement's presence in the West Indies. Kamarakafego's international efforts as a pan-Africanist and Black Power advocate and his global work as an engineer among indigenous communities need to be further explored and appropriately placed within the historiography of Black transnational movements.

The revolutionary Black Beret Cadre developed into the island's vanguard of Black Power and rallied behind the cry for political independence from British colonialism. Although facing government persecution, the Cadre contributed to the political education of the island's Black community through a number of social programs, rallies, *the Beret*, protests, and its Liberation schools. The Berets maintained connections with international revolutionary groups such as the Black Panther Party and represented another example of how Blacks in the West Indies identified with Black Power. Indeed, the Movement surged through Bermuda's public education system and reflects another dynamic of the Movement that should be further explored.

For many Blacks, Black Power represented a rising tide that would bring Black self-determination. Whites saw the Movement as a social *tsunami* that would lead Blacks to abuse White people as they had done to Blacks for centuries. It is revealing that Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials consistently expressed that Blacks had legitimate grievances that Bermuda's White elite refused to address. This example of White political obstinacy only confirms what Blacks in Bermuda had historically declared about the conservative right-wing nature of Bermuda's local White population and the absence of a dissenting leftist voice.

Nevertheless, the FCO still sought to destroy the Movement. As such, Black Power activists faced the wrath of an entire (neo)colonialist machine that used overt laws and covert tactics in an attempt to stifle further Black militancy through future generations. The FCO's long-term propaganda campaign centered on the themes of a racial harmony and inclusiveness and was implemented through the likes of Police Cadet schemes; police bus visits to schools; increased recruitment of locals by the police; outward-bound programs; television programs, and government and nongovernment publications. It is notable that these covert tactics have seemingly become mainstream in Bermuda at the dawn of the twenty-first century.[1] The FCO's efforts to contain Black Power in the Caribbean—and its collaboration with U.S. and Canadian intelligence operations—beg for regional analysis. From a comparative perspective, questions can be raised about the parallels between programs such as the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) and the intelligence coalitions of the FCO in the West Indies.

It could be argued that it took the assassination of Duckett, Sharples, and Sawyer for Bermuda's White elite to make the most surface socioeconomic concessions to Blacks in an attempt to diminish further Black protest. Such "concessions to lesser demands" were facilitated under the banner of integration and included increased access to commercial (bank loans) and employment opportunities (Blacks hired on Front Street) for Blacks, the renaming of schools (such as the Churchill to Robert Crawford—the first Black Bermudian to receive an OBE), and holidays (Empire Day was renamed Bermuda Day). However, when contextualized alongside the FCO's propaganda campaign, integration appears as part of a systematic program of social engineering used by Bermuda's White elite to instill in Blacks a sense of a social mission that was conducive to the maintenance of White elite hegemony.

To be certain, Bermuda's White elite invested much financial and social capital into this project of supposed racial inclusion in an effort to maintain structural power. Since the 1960s the United Bermuda Party (UBP) had recognized a need to not only visibly place more Blacks among its ranks but to publicize programs that suggested that it was racially inclusive and addressed the needs of Bermuda's masses. For example, it had long since utilized the services of foreign-based publicity firms to assist it in Bermuda's general elections, not to mention the assistance it received from the FCO.

In October 1977 the UBP hired the consultant firm of African-American psychologist Kenneth Clark to assist it in achieving a "more meaningful integration of the races and a more equitable distribution of the wealth of the community." Clark's work on race relations (e.g., his "doll" test) had been used in the 1954 *Brown vs. Board of Education* case in which the U.S. Supreme Court voted that racial segregation in the public schools was unconstitutional. He had also served as an advisor for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders after the 1967 uprisings in the United States. His "Proposal for a Comprehensive Program toward Racial Integration and Economic Equity" was completed in January 1978, and stated that the "social turbulence and sustained tensions" triggered by the executions of Tacklyn and Burrows "removed the appearance of total tranquility and revealed an underling reality of racial resentments and latent seething unrest which are as much a part of the reality of Bermuda as its idyllic climate and its dependence upon tourism."[2]

Clark further stated that a critical mass of Black Bermudians had "torn away the mask of passivity and acceptance of the past" and were now "expressing an assertive demand for change." Numbers of younger Bermudians were becoming more politically active and assertive in challenging "traditional educational, political and economic practices in

Bermuda." The assassinations were "merely symptoms that the demands for changes in the socially-defined status of the races in Africa, the Caribbean and the United States had infected Bermuda."[3] Interesting to note, his committee was told by a White member of the Bermuda Cabinet that "probably the key problem which you and your staff will face in fulfilling your commitment to the people and the Bermuda Government is that of helping us to educate the White people in Bermuda to understand that the days of unquestioned White supremacy have passed—not only in Africa, but also in Bermuda."[4]

Clark's report recommended a number of methods for a "systematic, comprehensive and holistic program to integrate the races" and redistribute Bermuda's wealth more equitably in the areas of economics, education, criminal justice, housing, health and social services, and youth development. It also called for the implementation of affirmative action programs and the reorganization of the government's Race Relations Council, which in 1969 and 1970 had legislatively been given power to enforce the 1969 Race Relations Act but was yet to prosecute anyone for racial discrimination (recall that this Act had been created to specifically target Black protest during the BPC). By 1977 the Council was "seen by Bermudians, outside observers and even its present leaders and members as pitiably impotent."[5]

As it did with the Wooding and Pitt Commissions, the UBP only adopted suggestions that would further its own interests. Bermuda's education system (which included the Bermuda College and the creation of the Stonington campus) from the late 1970s–80s clearly reflects this phenomenon and served to eliminate the "political assertiveness" that Clark noted among Bermuda's Black youth. According to Eva Hodgson, Black people have probably not appreciated the extent to which the process of education "could be used as an instrument of enslavement" and not simply progress.[6] Indeed, well into the 1990s the education system continued to perpetuate a myth of White privilege without any serious critique of racism, colonialism (and its support of Black oppression) or the Black experience in Bermuda. At the cornerstone of this myth lay the Black progress narrative that begins in Bermuda (as opposed to Africa) with the erroneous notion that slavery in the island was benign, and ends with Blacks having "arrived" via integration. This narrative suggests that Blacks have always "had it good" in Bermuda, and have been treated relatively well by Whites. Further, Blacks reached the promised land of material heaven in Bermuda by appealing hat-in-hand to White consciousness and could only maintain such wealth through colonialism instead of political independence.

The matter of Black identity was at the heart of this narrative, which would not stress any concrete cultural or political relationships between

Black Bermudians, the wider West Indies, and Africa (e.g., explorations of west or central African cultural connections with Black Bermudian culture via language, diet, food preparation, music, and dance—Gombeys). Such an *historicidal* master narrative of Bermudian-ness left a problematic social and historical vacuum about the tradition of Black political and cultural struggle in Bermuda (such as Sally Bassett, Cup Match, and the Black Power Movement).

In fact, emphasis would be placed on Bermuda's "uniqueness" as "another world" through Bermuda's school curricula (e.g., public school civics courses would stress "social responsibility" to the establishment and courses on Bermuda History were given only one out of five years of high school) and through other government-created and government-sponsored materials, social events, literature, film, and media (re)defining what Bermuda culture and history was (e.g., the flying of kites, making of fish cakes, and playing of marbles on Good Friday; weddings underneath moon-gates and overarching politeness toward tourists). In another example, the underlying theme of the UBP's *History of the UBP* (published in 1987) is its commitment to integration while it makes no mention of the fact that many of its social policies were implemented in response to legitimate Black grievances and/or in order to curtail Black protest. Amidst pictures of smiling Black children, it would stress the successes of conservative E.T. Richards and John Swan (the first and second Black premiers of Bermuda, respectively) as tokens of Black progress.[7]

In the aftermath of the 1972–73 assassinations, the FCO called on the UBP to seriously consider political independence from Britain as an avenue of curing the "cancer of Black Power" and Black militancy. However, Bermuda's White elite felt that British military support was necessary to help it maintain power over Bermuda's Black majority. As stated, acting Governor Ian Kinnear suggested that this elite had "duped" Blacks into thinking that colonialism was good for them. Ironically, this led to the second "assassination" of a British governor in Bermuda, Sir Richard Posnett (1981–83). Posnett was a former head of the FCO West Indian Department, and from 1976 to 1979 served as its Dependent Territories advisor. This former governor of British Honduras (1972–77) played a key role in the decolonization of a number of Britain's West Indian territories in the 1970s, when Britain's "official" foreign policy toward the region reflected the United Nation's call for metropolitan powers "to develop self-government" in their dependent territories. Posnett interpreted this policy to mean "any territory which wanted independence could have it—no matter how small." As table C.1 displays, a number of geographically small islands became independent territories during this period.

Table C.1 British overseas territories decolonized since 1970.

Territory	*Independence*	*Inhabitants*	*Sq. miles*
Fiji	1970	505,000	7,083
Tonga	1970	77,000	270
Bahamas	1973	148,000	5,380
Grenada	1974	99,000	133
Seychelles	1976	49,000	107
Dominica	1978	68,000	290
Tuvalu	1978	7,000	10
Solomon I.	1978	147,000	11,500
Kiribati	1979	45,000	264
St. Lucia	1979	100,000	238
St. Vincent	1979	92,000	150
Vanuatu	1980	78,000	6,050
Antigua-Barbuda	1981	54,000	170
Belize	1981	116,000	8,867
St. Kitts-Nevis	1983	53,000	101
Brunei	1983	130,000	2,226

Source: Adapted from Drower, *Britain's Dependent Territories*, xv.

According to Drower, concerns that Posnett would encourage decolonization outraged Bermuda's White elite about his appointment as governor. Posnett had also raised questions about Bermuda's undemocratic voting boundaries in the early 1970s. It was claimed that he wanted to dispense with some of his position's "pomp," and in an attempt to get closer to Blacks sought to turn the Governor's House into "something of a people's palace." Influential Whites raised "trivial allegations" about Posnett's spending on entertainment and forced him to resign in March 1983.[8] Hence, to understand why Bermuda is still a colony while it was financially more "ready" for independence than the aforementioned British colonies requires an examination of the roles that Bermuda's White UBP government played in maintaining its colonial status.

According to Ben Aaharon, the "truth will always be faced with unrighteous opposition." The Black voice of dissent continued to be suppressed after the era of Black Power. In 1985, Minister Louis Farrakhan was invited to the island by the local Nation of Islam (NOI) branch (he had visited in 1973). However, he was prevented from entering Bermuda on grounds that "his remarks were likely to break human rights laws" that had made it illegal to promote hostility among any section of the public distinguished by race, ethnic, or national origins.[9]

In 1994, the National Youth Alliance (NYA) published a newsletter, *The Nationalist*, which raised concerns about British colonialism,



Figure C.1 Tea & Crackers (Reprinted with permission from Black Fist Productions).

Black struggle, and the need to build a strong Black community. When it denounced the effects of systematic racism on Bermuda's Black youth (e.g., Blacks representing 90 percent of Casemate's prison population), it was publicly portrayed as "violently racist"; Special Branch also placed the NYA (which ironically emerged out of students attending the Bermuda College) under surveillance. The *Nationalist* was defined as an "offensive" publication, particularly because it demonstrated the relationship between colonialism and White and Black elites in the suppression of Black people (see figure C.1).

This depiction of a colonial tea party was an intelligent and informed analysis of Bermuda's colonial structure. Queen Elizabeth II is seated at the head of table in control of the tea party, or namely Bermuda, representing the British government. Governor Lord David Waddington is to her left, using Bermuda's second Black Premier, John Swan, as a chair. Despite the fact that Swan was the leader of the UBP, he is not sitting at the table and has been given a bone ("orders") to chase. This is in contrast to UBP MPs Dr. Clarence Terceira and Sir John Sharpe, who are situated to the queen's right. In front of Terceira is a paper entitled "UBP Pocket Manual." This implies that it was they, rather than John Swan, who actually led the Party. A Black Regiment Officer is serving tea to his colonial masters. Finally, the "gnome" is Jerome Dill, a Black UBP MP who was used by the Party as a public figure head to demonstrate its willingness to integrate. For publishing the *Nationalist*, one NYA leader was convicted on charges related to the possession of seditious literature. This is all too reminiscent of the Cadre's experience.

The physical and psychological impact of Black Power remains visible in contemporary Bermuda, partly because a number of concerns (such as issues of racial identity, economic racial disparities, and colonialism) raised by the Movement remain prevalent. The question of decolonization is arguably the most controversial political issue in contemporary Bermuda and is greatly informed by the history and legacy of Black Power. In 1997, a majority of voters in an island-wide referendum rejected decolonization as an immediate political goal. Ironically, the PLP—which historically called for independence—urged its supporters to abstain from the 1997 referendum for at least two reasons. First, because it felt that there was not enough public discussion about the actual conditions of independence. Second, it was wary of the political consequences of allowing Premier John Swan to lead the country to independence since Swan was a notorious comprador of the local White elite.

A year later, the Party won the 1998 national elections for the first time since its 1963 inception. Its National Committee for Independence helped a debate on independence flourish through the island via radio talk shows, newspapers, public forums, Internet chat rooms, schools, barber shops, the apartments of students studying abroad, Parliament, and football games. This raised the independence debate to a magnitude perhaps not seen since the 1960s/70s.

Despite the PLP's tenure, the fundamental White power structure of the island has remained. In fact, the Forty Thieves have been forced to open the oligarchic ring to U.S., Canadian, and other multinational and international firms (such as HSBC) that have codified Bermuda as the financial hub and U.S. tax haven *par excellence*; as such, the island remains in the midst of a critical colonial/neocolonial situation. Tourism is also growing, partly due to the PLP's success in attracting middle-class Blacks to the island. However, while Bermuda's Gross Domestic Product for 2008 stood at $4,359,068, there remain glaring imbalances between Blacks and Whites in terms of income, employment, and ownership. This disproves the historical argument projected by Bermuda's elite that the island would be unable to attract foreign capital under a PLP government (and ironically also under independence) (see table C.2).

The flooding of foreign capital into the island comes with a social price: the cost of living is skyrocketing, particularly in areas of rents, mortgages, and gas (at the time of writing, gas was approximately $8.00 per gallon) and the island faces a housing crisis. This is accentuated by the presence of foreign executives who can afford to pay exorbitant rising rents. Furthermore, Bermuda remains anything but self-sufficient in a number of areas, such as in agriculture, farming, and food production. The island does not produce its own doctors or nurses amidst a medical system in dire

Table C.2 Occupational distribution of employment and average income by race, 2006–07.

	2006				*2007*			
	Black		*White*		*Black*		*White*	
Occupation	*Number*	*Avg. salary*	*Number*	*Avg. salary*	*Number*	*Avg. salary*	*Number*	*Avg. salary*
Total	16,420	$49, 245	10071	$78, 385	16,731	$51,693	9,912	$98,240
Admin. and managerial	1,488	78, 428	2,329	112,015	2,983	70,706	3,064	118,865
Prof. tech. and related	2,847	68,048	3,066	95,057	1,581	88,622	2,374	157,395
Prod. trans. and related	3,133	46,045	1,356	55,108	4,553	45,197	1,322	53,420
Clerical	4,388	43,797	1,384	50,660	958	41,176	551	81,036
Sales	951	38,809	549	70,005	3,409	33,060	1,126	36,107
Services	3,445	34,179	1,147	38,430	179	44,207	217	41,240
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	168	42,119	240	40,575	3,068	48,244	1,258	56,458

Source: Adapted From Government of Bermuda, *National Economic Report of Bermuda 2008* (Bermuda: Ministry of Finance, 2009), 21.

need of restructuring. There is not enough attention surrounding critical issues such as sustainable development and the creation of institutions of higher learning (such as think tanks or a university) centered on the aforementioned areas—ironically these concerns were raised by Kamarakafego decades ago.

Many Bermudians exhibit a noticeable lack of national consciousness, yet many Blacks tend to only identify with the wider West Indies (much less Africa or the United States) when socially convenient. Many Blacks continue to define themselves through White standards of aesthetics. In addition, the island faces growing health concerns, rampant consumerism, and contradictions in the education system.

Such issues of identity and self-sufficiency were core concerns of Black Power. During the Black Power era, a critical mass of Bermuda's youth embraced a culture of resistance and identified with the idea of being a freedom fighter. Black youth culture was driven by a unifying sense of a social mission of Black upliftment. In contrast, today's youth—strongly influenced by the Black progress narrative—are being socialized into a culture of abject materialism with anathema toward political struggle, without an understanding that it was Black political struggle that produced the ability to possess the material things in the first place. This is a community issue, as many adults pride themselves on how many shopping trips abroad they can take a year and unabashedly chuckle when reminded by others that Bermudians have an international reputation for "loving to shop." Many high school students no longer constructively argue over the dynamics of socialism versus capitalism. In fact, there is no longer any debate—capitalism/consumerism has become the daily bread of the grandchildren of Black Power. Indeed, John Swan and Johnny Barnes (as opposed to John and Sally Bassett) are touted as the acceptable icons of Black Bermudians, more specifically as the "spirit of Bermuda."[10]

Nevertheless, Black Power's legacy lives through a number of grassroots organizations, community groups, and projects. This would include the Rasta community, spoken word venues (such as *Neno Letu* and *Chewstick*), the Ethiopian World Federation, Dread and Baha, the Ausar Auset society, alternative media outlets (such as *Fresh TV* and the *Bermy Onion Patch)*, positive Reggae concerts, the Pauulu Kamarakafego Grassroots Collective, African dance companies, Black entrepreneurship, the development of and support for local artists, independent production companies, and a number of individuals focused on sustainable development and alternative living. However, it is extremely difficult for such groups to function in Bermuda without internalizing the contradictions of the constraints of the larger society.

In 2002, the PLP's Constituency Boundaries Commission reconfigured Bermuda's electoral districts and led to the establishment of thirty-six single-seat constituencies that came close to an ideal formula of equal numbers of voters for each constituency. This was a milestone in legislation for Bermuda, and reflected the historic calls of the Committee for Universal Adult Suffrage. The Party was able to win two more successive elections, in 2003 and 2008. But all does not appear so well for the Party under the tenure of Premier Ewart Brown, particularly while the island's print media remains dominated by Bermuda's White elite. The PLP has been blasted via allegations (ranging from the ultra-superficial to the more complex) that the Party is becoming "just like the UBP" and/or is involved in corruption; in fact, one group has called for a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the matter, as is being done in Turks and Caicos.

In fact, in June 2009 Brown allowed four detainees (who were Chinese Uighurs) from Guantanamo Bay to be relocated to Bermuda. The deal was apparently made in secrecy between Brown and the Obama administration without informing the British government, Bermuda Parliament, or Bermuda population until approximately the day before they were due to arrive. In response, Whites organized protests at the Parliament building calling for Brown's resignation under grounds that he was a dictator and had violated Bermuda's colonial constitution because he had not consulted with the British government first. This was a clear reminder of Bermuda's colonial status.

The PLP has implemented a host of programs (such as its CITV broadcast station) geared toward interjecting historical consciousness into Bermuda. This process includes making public education relative to Bermuda's masses, but is not without contradictions (as in the discontinuance of the African-centered *Ashay* middle-school program). As 2009 was the 400th anniversary of the British arrival in Bermuda, the government sponsored a host of public historical events (e.g., lectures, plays, films, and community discussions) about Bermuda history; for many Blacks this was an uncomfortable reminder of 400 years of British colonialism. However, as the celebrations took place around Cup Match weekend and Emancipation Day, there were a number of events that commemorated the abolition of slavery in Bermuda.

Bermuda's African Diaspora Heritage Trial, which has thrived under the rubric of cultural tourism, can potentially help Bermudians to contextualize their experiences in the history of the wider Diaspora but has yet to do so. The National Heroes Day has replaced a holiday celebrating the queen's birthday. The PLP's Race Relations Initiative has hosted a number of multiracial discussions about race relations. In May 2008, the author had the privilege to serve as a panelist at one lecture, ironically on the same

day that the local Voter's Right Association (VRA) called for the British Parliament and FCO to ban the Black Power salute (similar to the PLP's salute) in Bermuda and recommended that the island "adopt the U.K.'s position on the promotion of swastikas, black power salutes, cross burning and other demonstrations of political hatred."[11]

This is just one small example of the enduring negative perception of the Cadre and Black Power—primarily driven by elite media—that remains in the public arena. Bermuda's elite (White and Black) seems alarmed at the sight of former Black Power activists in the island's PLP government, the most noticeable being Ewart Brown, former Premier Jennifer Smith, and former Attorney General Philip Perinchief. There was recently a highly public effort to connect the PLP to the Cadre in an attempt to somehow discredit the Party, facilitated by the release of FCO files about the Cadre in the *Mid-Ocean* (sensationalized as the "Secret File Reports"); one recent blog labeled Brown "a self-appointed dictator, US citizen and 1960's Black Beret Terrorist."

As part of Bermuda's 400th anniversary celebration, the PLP held an unveiling ceremony for a statue of Sally Bassett, an enslaved women who, in 1730, was burned alive at the stake for poisoning her masters. For many, Bassett is seen as a freedom fighter. She is Bermuda's symbolic maroon—the island's Yanga, Zumbi, or Nanny. Amidst protests (the Corporation of Hamilton refused to allow the statue to be placed on the grounds of City Hall), the monument was constructed on the lawn of the Cabinet Office; it is very difficult to imagine that such a monument would have been constructed by the UBP. Quite astonishing were the comments of Governor Richard Gozney, who compared the monument to the Blood River Monument of South Africa (which commemorated Boer settlers), Confederate General Robert E. Lee, and Oliver Cromwell.[12] Blacks denounced this audacious comparison between Bassett and those who defended and were engaged in the enslavement and exploitation of African enslavement. The Corporation has since erected a monument to the Progressive Group on its grounds in an area called Wesley Square.

The implicit connection between Black Power, historical consciousness, and national identity is quite relative in contemporary Bermuda society and raises a number of contradictions. As Bermuda remains a colony, how can those who fought against imperialism truly be considered national heroes by that same colonial government, even as former Black Power advocates now fill the ranks of its local government? What is the relationship between Sally Bassett and Buck Burrows? Have former Black Power activists now in positions of political power lost the sense of their mission, or has it transformed? It remains to be seen whether

these unanswered questions of Black Power will soon be answered, but hopefully this work can provoke a process of *Sankofa* among those who are faced with these challenges. Equipped with a greater knowledge and understanding about this critical period of Bermuda's history, it may be possible to inspire and actualize a vision of Bermuda that is greater than the (neo)colonial quandary that has been left in the shadow of Black Power's legacy.

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Notes

Introduction

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14. Bermuda Archives, *Minutes of the Pembroke Vesey*, January 8, 1921.
15. *Royal Gazette*, August 7, 1920.
16. Bermuda Archives, *Governor's Dispatch*, August 6, 1920, EXCO6/1/32.
17. Robert Hill, *Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Papers* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 2: 520.
18. At the British governor's request, Tobitt, a school headmaster, lost financial support from the Board of Education and was forced to leave the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church for his involvement with the UNIA. See Quito Swan, "Marcus Garvey, the Universal Negro Improvement Association and Bermuda, 1920–1937," M.A. Thesis, Howard University, 2000; Dale Butler, *Dr E.F. Gordon, Hero of Bermuda's Working Class: The Political Career and the Evolution of the Bermuda Workers' Association* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).
19. Hunter, *The People of Bermuda*, 47, 53–57.
20. Dale Butler, *Mazumbo, 100 Facts and Quotes by Dr. E.F Gordon* (Warwick: The Writer's Machine, 1994), 60.
21. *Bermuda Recorder*, June 12, 1959.

22. Eva N. Hodgson, *Storm in a Teacup: the 1959 Bermuda Theatre Boycott and Its Aftermath* (Warwick: The Writer's Machine, 1989), 24, 33.
23. Pauulu Kamarakefego, *Me One: The Autobiography of Pauulu Kamarakefego* (Canada: PK Publishing, 2001), 389; *Recorder*, June 20, 1959; Errol Williams, *When Voices Rise: Dismantling Segregation in a Polite Society* (Canada: Quibo Films, 2002), DVD.
24. Ira Philip, *History of the Bermuda Industrial Union: A Definitive History of the Organized Labour Movement in Bermuda* (Bermuda: Bermuda Industrial Union, 2003), 110–113.
25. Hodgson, *Storm in a Teacup*, 38.
26. See TNA: PRO CO 1031/2805.
27. *Recorder*, June 12, 1959.
28. *Gazette*, June 25–26, 1959.
29. Ibid., July 8, 1959.
30. Hodgson, *Storm in a Teacup*, 95.
31. *Gazette*, June 24, 1959.
32. J. Randolph Williams, *Lois: Bermuda's Grande Dame of Politics* (Bermuda: Camden Editions, 2001), 64.
33. *Recorder*, July 10, August 7, 1963.
34. Ibid., August 10, 28, 31, 1963.
35. Ibid., September 4, 1963.
36. Ibid., August 28, September 7–21, October 2–5, 1963.
37. George Drower, *Britain's Dependent Territories: A Fistful of Islands* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), 199–200.
38. Selwyn Ryan, "Politics in an Artificial Society: The Case of Bermuda," in *Size, Self Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean*, ed. Vaughn Lewis (Kingston: University of West Indies Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1976), 183–184; Bermuda Archives, Bermuda CO 1031/981.
39. Bermuda Government, *Census*, 1961, Bermuda Archives; Dorothy Newman, *Bermuda's Stride toward the Twenty-First Century* (Bermuda: Bermuda Government Department of Statistics, 1994), 27; Kamarakefego, *Me One*, 113; R. Williams, *Lois: Bermuda's Grand Dame of Politics*, 56; "Politics in an Artificial Society," 183; *Recorder*, July 11, 1959.
40. Kamarakefego, *Me One*, 113–122.
41. Ibid., 123; R. Williams, *Lois: Bermuda's Grand Dame of Politics*, 102.
42. Williams, 56, 97, 331.
43. Ibid., 56.
44. G. Renchard, American Consul, to U.S. Department of State, August 3, 1965; POL 12 BER file A-10; Central Foreign Policy File 1964–66; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
45. TNA: PRO CO 1031/4766 Martonmere to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 3, 1965; TNA: PRO FCO 63/946 "Second Basic Paper on Nation of Islam Bermuda," Special Branch, June 23, 1972.

46. TNA: PRO CO 1031/4766 J.M. MacGregor, Superintendent Head, Special Branch to Bermuda Commissioner of Police, August 16, 1963.
47. Hunter, *The People of Bermuda*, 151; Butler, *E.F. Gordon*, 105; *Gazette*, January 25, 1965.
48. Hunter, *The People of Bermuda*, 151–152; Lorraine Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, April 18, 2002.
49. Hunter, *The People of Bermuda*, 152–157.
50. Ibid., 163.
51. British Government, *Report of the Bermuda Constitutional Conference, 1966* (London: Her Majesty's Stationing Office, 1967), 2.
52. British Government, *Report of the Constitutional Conference*, 20–23.
53. *Recorder*, January 27, 1967.
54. Haile Sellassie, *Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haile Sellassie First* (Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information, 1967), 374; Dale Butler, *Haile Selassie I in Bermuda 1963 & 1967* (Warwick: The Writer's Machine, 1989), 6; Hunter, *The People of Bermuda*, 183.
55. *Recorder*, October 12, 1963; S.M. Janney, American Consul, to U.S. Department of State, May 13, 1967; POL 12 BER file A-105; Subject Numeric File 1964–68; RG 59; NACP, MD.
56. R. Williams, Lois: Bermuda's Grand Dame of Politics 137.
57. *Recorder*, May 12, 1967; *Gazette*, May 16, 1969.
58. Renchard/Janney to U.S. Department of State, May 16, 1967; POL 12 BER file A-127; SNF 1964–68; RG 59; NACP: MD; *Recorder*, May 12, 19, 1967.
59. *Gazette*, May 18, 1967.
60. Ibid., May 19, 1967.
61. Ibid., July 20, 1967.
62. R. Williams, *Lois: Bermuda's Grand Dame of Politics*, 137.
63. *Gazette*, May 6, July 22, 1967; Chuck Stone, "The National Conference on Black Power," in *The Black Power Revolt: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Floyd Barbour (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 1968), 189.
64. *Gazette*, July 20, 25, 1967.
65. Stone, "The National Conference on Black Power," 195–196.
66. TNA: PRO FCO 44/195, August 11, 1967 Visitors of Black Power to Bermuda.
67. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968: Report of Commission and Statement by the Government of Bermuda* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969), 10–12; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 141.
68. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 16–18; *Gazette*, April 27, September 7, 1968.
69. *Recorder*, September 13, 1968.
70. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 19–20.
71. *Gazette*, April 27, 1968.
72. Ibid., April 27, 1968; Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 25.
73. Janney to U.S. Department of State, May 21, 1968; POL 12 BER, file A-68; SNF 1964–68; RG-59; MD: NACP.
74. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 21; Hunter, *The People of Bermuda*, 199.

75. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 22–23; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 141.
76. *Gazette*, April 26, 1968.
77. Ibid., April 27, 1968.
78. Ibid.; R. Williams, *Lois: Bermuda's Grand Dame of Politics*, 144.
79. Janney to U.S. Department of State, May 21, 1968, POL 2 BER, file A-68; SNF 1964–68; RG 59; MD: NACP.
80. *Recorder*, July 9, 1968.
81. Ibid., September 6, 1968.
82. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 87.
83. *Recorder*, September 20, 1968; *Gazette*, September 17, 1968.
84. *Recorder*, September 20, 26, 1968; *Gazette*, September 17, 1968.
85. *Gazette*, August 13, 1968.
86. *Recorder*, September 20, 1968; *Gazette*, September 17, 1968.
87. *Gazette*, August 13, 1968; Neville Darrell, *Acel'dama: The Untold Story of the Murder of the Governor of Bermuda, Sir Richard Sharples* (Surrey: Coastline Mountain Press, 1983), 28.
88. *Gazette*, September 17, 1968.
89. *Recorder*, September 26, 1968.
90. *Gazette*, September 7, 1968; Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 78, 146.
91. *Gazette*, September 12, 1968; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1100, October 23, 1973 Ted Leather, Governor of Bermuda, to Duncan Watson, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
92. However, the flooding of foreign capital into Hamilton is seemingly threatening this legacy.
93. TNA: PRO FCO 44/195, Bermuda Intelligence Report January 1969; Kamarakefego, *Me One*, 159–166.
94. *Gazette*, September 7, 1968; Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 146.
95. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 43.
96. *Gazette*, April 27, 1968.
97. Ibid., September 7, 1968.
98. *Recorder*, September 6, 1968; Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968*, 52.
99. *Gazette*, April 30, 1968.
100. *Mid-Ocean News*, April 2, 1968; *Gazette*, September 7, 1968.
101. *Gazette*, April 27, September 7, 1968.
102. Ibid., April 29–30, May 1, 1968.
103. Ibid., September 6, 20, 1968.
104. Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 141.
105. *Gazette*, May 27, 1968.
106. Amos Wilson, *Blueprint for Black Power: A Moral, Political and Economic Imperative for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Afrikan World InfoSystems, 1998), 7.

2 *Another Unknown Soldier*: Pauulu

1. Pauulu Kamarakafego, *Me One: The Autobiography of Pauulu Kamarakefego* (Canada: PK Publishing, 2001), 113–123, 141, 145.
2. Ibid., 157; *Black Power Conference Reports*, *Philadelphia August 30–September 1, 1968*; *Bermuda, July 13, 1969* (New York: Action Library, 1971), 3–4.
3. Pauulu Kamarakafego, interview by author, October 12, 2004, Bermuda, tape recording; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 157–158.
4. *Recorder*, January 3, 1969.
5. Ibid., January 10, 1969; *Gazette*, January 11, 1969.
6. *Gazette*, January 11, 1969, April 5, 1969; *Recorder*, January 10, 1969, April 5, 1969.
7. *Recorder*, January 10, 1969; *Gazette*, January 11, 1969.
8. *Gazette*, April 5, 1969; *Recorder*, April 5, 1969.
9. Randolph Williams, *Lois*, 153; Janney to U.S. Department of State, September 8, 1967; POL 12 BER, file A-11; SNF 1964–68; RG 59, MD: NACP.
10. Ibid.
11. *Gazette*, January 22, 1969.
12. Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 145; *Gazette*, June 4, 1969.
13. TNA: PRO FCO 44/196, March 14, 1969 Bermuda, Black Power Activities in Bermuda.
14. *Gazette*, February 8, 1969; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 145–146.
15. Ibid., 145–146; *Gazette*, February 8, 1969.
16. *Gazette*, February 22, 1969.
17. Ibid., January 14, 1969.
18. Ibid., February 11, 1969.
19. Ibid., April 13, 17, June 12, 23, 25, 1969.
20. Ibid., July 5, 1969.
21. *Gazette*, April 17, 1969.
22. Randolph J. Williams, *Peaceful Warrior: Sir Edward Trenton Richards* (Bermuda: Camden Editions, 1988), 194.
23. Amilcar Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture," *Transition* 45 (1974): 13.
24. *Recorder*, April 1, 1969.
25. Ibid., January–July 1969.
26. Ibid., May 30, 1969.
27. *Gazette*, July 1,1969.
28. Ibid., July 5, 1969.
29. *Recorder*, October 10, 1969.
30. Ibid., April 26, 1969.
31. Ibid., June 9, 1969.
32. *Gazette*, June 17, 1969.
33. Ibid., June 10, 1969.
34. Ibid., June 11, 1969.
35. Ibid.,, April 11–12, 1969.
36. Ibid., June 23, 1969.
37. Ibid.

38. *Recorder*, February 15, 1969.
39. Walter Rodney, *The Groundings with My Brothers* (London: Bogle'Ouverture Publications, 1996), 7–10; Rupert Lewis, 113–114.

3 A Bermuda Triangle of Imperialism

1. Renchard/Janney to U.S. Department of State, May 16, 1967; POL 12 BER, file A-127; SNF1964–68; RG 59; MD: NACP.
2. Aarón Gamaliel Ramos, "Caribbean Territories at the Crossroads," in *Islands at the Crossroads: Politics in the Non-Independent Caribbean*, ed. Aarón Gamaliel Ramos and Angel Israel Rivera (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), xiii.
3. William Zuill, *The Story of Bermuda and Her People* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1999), 176; Butler, *Dr E.F. Gordon, Hero of Bermuda's Working Class: The Political Career and the Evolution of the Bermuda Workers' Association* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 23; Renchard to U.S. Department of State, 25 July 1966; POL 12 BER, file A-10; CFPF 1964–66; RG 59; MD: NACP.
4. Renchard to U.S. Department of State, March 16, 1966; file A-10, July 25, 1966, file A-84 POL 12 BER; CFPF 1964–66; RG 59; MD: NACP; RG 59, MD: NACP; TNA: PRO CO 1031/2051–CO 1031/2052.
5. Renchard to U.S. Department of State, March 16, 1966; POL 12 BER, file A-84; CFPF 1964-–66; RG 59; MD: NACP.
6. Ibid.
7. Renchard to U.S. Department of State, July 22, 1965; POL 12 BER, file A-9; CFPF 1964–66; RG 59; MD: NACP.
8. TNA: PRO CO 1031/2052, 195759 Requirements of U.S. for Military Operations in Bermuda.
9. Renchard to U.S. Department of State, July 25, 1966; POL 12 BER, file A-10; CFPF 1964–66; RG-59; MD: NACP.
10. Renchard to U.S. Department of State, September 14, 1965; file A-24, July 22, 1965; file A-9, 21 August 1967; file A-4; CFPF 1964–66; POL 12 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
11. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, 1970 Discussion Paper: Black Radicalism in the Caribbean.
12. Ibid.
13. Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492–1969* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 498.
14. *Recorder*, March 21, 1969; *Gazette*, February 11, January 4, 1969.
15. Tony Thomas, *Black Power in the Caribbean* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), 7; *Recorder*, February 21, 1969.
16. Ronald Walters, *Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), 303. A Douglas Mossop was prosecuted for his involvement in the demonstrations. The students were led away from the Computer Center at

gunpoint and taken to a broken-windowed room that stood at 25 degrees. One officer pushed a gun in the stomach of one student, stating, "through here you nigger." The students were made to stand with their hands outstretched on a wall for three hours, and were beaten if they could not. One was assaulted, spit in the face, and called a bloody nigger. Another suffered a concussion from a beating. One officer took a blanket from a cold female student, soaked it in water, and gave it back to her. Other females were called "negress sluts" and were subject to "lewd suggestions by policemen." The students were eventually imprisoned where they slept on the ground for a full day before getting their first meal. Students at UWI protested their treatment. *Recorder*, May 23, 1969. For a more recent account of this incident, see Austin, David, "All Roads Led to Montreal."

17. C.N. Manning, American Consul to Bermuda, to U.S. Department of State, Washington DC, May 9, 1969; POL 23 BER, file A-22; CFPF 1967–69; RG 59; NACP: MD; *Gazette*, January 11, 1969.
18. Whites had historically been paranoid about the "radical West Indian" influence on Bermuda's Blacks and in 1931 implemented immigration controls to suppress West Indian migration to Bermuda.
19. Virginia Bernhard, *Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda: 1616–1782* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 142, 282, 284.
20. Manning to U.S. Department of State, May 9, 1969; POL 23 BER, file A-22; CFPF 1967–69; RG 59; MD: NACP; *Recorder*, January 24, 1969.
21. *Gazette*, February 18, 1969.
22. *Recorder*, February 21, 1969; *Gazette*, February 18, 1969.
23. See Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman, "Introduction: Gainers and Losers in the Atlantic Slave Trade," in *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*, ed. Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 1–25.
24. Hodgson, "Bermuda and the Search for Blackness," in *Is Massa Day Dead: Black Moods in the Caribbean*, ed. Orde Coombes (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), 153.
25. TNA: PRO FCO 44/196, March 6, 1969 Governor Martonmere to FCO.
26. TNA: PRO FCO 44/196, March 5, 1969 A.N. Galsworthy to FCO; TNA: PRO PREM 13 2885, June 23, 1969 E. Yarde to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 44/195, January 31, 1969 A.J. Fairclough to FCO.
27. Bermuda: Bermuda Archives, FCO 44/403, Black Power in Bermuda 1969.
28. TNA: PRO, FCO 44/203, March 14, 1969 L.S. Price to Sir Edward Peck; TNA: PRO FCO 44/202, July 1969 West Indies and Caribbean Area, Monthly Intelligence Summary.
29. U.S. State Department to Janney, February 3, 1969; file A-3; POL 23 BER; CFPF 1967–69; RG 59, MD: NACP.
30. Manning to U.S. Department of State, May 23, 1969; file A-23; CFPF 1967–69; May 9, 1969; file A-22, CFPF 1964–66; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.

31. Manning to U.S. Department of State, May 9, 1969; file A-22; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP. Kamarakafego commuted once a month to lecture part-time at Goddard College, Vermont, in the Third World Studies Department. He taught biological science, ecology, and durable, affordable housing. Pauulu Kamarakefego, *Me One: The Autobiography of Pauulu Kamarakefego* (Canada: PK Publishing, 2001), 144.
32. Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 18, 1969; file A-29; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
33. TNA: PRO FCO 44/199, May 16, 1969 Bermuda: Black Power Conference.
34. *Gazette*, May 21, 1969.
35. Ibid., February 20, 1969.
36. *Recorder*, March 14, 1969; *Gazette*, February 8, 1969.
37. *Gazette*, April 15, 1969.
38. *Recorder*, March 28, 1969; *Gazette*, March 29, 1969.
39. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968: Report of Commission and Statement by the Government of Bermuda* (London: Her Majesty's Stationing Office, 1969), 1.
40. *Gazette*, April 17, 1969.
41. Ibid., March 29, 1969.
42. *Recorder*, April 18, 1969.
43. *Gazette*, April 17, 1969.
44. Ibid., April 11, 1969.
45. Ibid., June 3, 1969.
46. Ibid., June 14, June 19, 1969.
47. Ibid., April 11, 1969.
48. Ibid., May 16–17, 1969.
49. Ibid., April 11, 1969.
50. In 1967, under the Race Relations Act of 1965, Trinidadian Black Power leader Michael X was arrested in England for "fomenting violence" through Black Power speeches. He was the first person to be charged and convicted under the Bill. Walters, *Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora*, 184.
51. Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 18, 1969; file A-29; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
52. Pauulu Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 159.
53. Ibid., 159; *Gazette*, April 19, 1969.
54. *Recorder*, April 25, 1969.
55. *Gazette*, May 23, 1969.
56. Ibid., June 19, 26, 28, 1969.
57. Ibid., June 2, 5–6, 1969.
58. Ibid., June 2–3, 5–6, 29, July 16, 1969.
59. Ibid., June 7, 1969.
60. Ibid.
61. Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 18, 1969; file A-29; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23; RG 59; MD: NACP.

62. TNA: PRO PREM 13 2885, July 1, 1969, FCO to Certain Missions; TNA: PRO PREM 13 2885, June 23, 1969, Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee Report: Bermuda Black Power Conference July 10–13, 1969.
63. TNA: PRO PREM 13 2885, July 1, 1969 FCO to Certain Missions.
64. *Gazette*, June 18, 1969.
65. Ibid., June 21, 28, 1969.
66. *Recorder*, July 4, 1969.
67. *Gazette,* July 4, 8–9, 1969.
68. Manning to U.S. Department of State, July 9, 1969; file A-34; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP; *Report on the 1st International Black Power Conference, Bermuda 1969*, reprinted in Kamarakafego, *Me One*; TNA: PRO FCO 44/203, July 4, 1969, J. Sykes to FCO. William Stephenson was senior representative of British intelligence for the western hemisphere during World War II. A Canadian millionaire industrialist, his business contacts were valuable to the British war effort. Winston Churchill dispatched Stephenson to New York to establish a spy network as the representative of the British Secret Intelligence Service. The British Security Coordination Office, headquartered in Rockefeller Center, became an umbrella organization that would eventually include MI5, SIS, Special Operations Executive, and Political Warfare Executive throughout the Americas. He played a key role in the land-lease arrangements between Britain and the United States and was instrumental in British efforts to censor mail departing from Europe through Bermuda. He retired in Bermuda and Jamaica and died in the former in 1989. See Charles C. Kolb, "Review of William S. Stephenson, ed., *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas 1940–1945*," H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, December 1999.
69. *Recorder*, July 11, 1969; *Gazette*, July 9–10, 1969.
70. *Gazette*, July 10, 1969.
71. Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 18, 1969; file A-29, CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; NACP: MD; Bermuda Archives: Bermuda, FCO 44/403, Black Power in Bermuda, 1969.
72. Manning to U.S. Department of State, May 9, 1969; file A-22; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
73. Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 18, 1969; file A-29; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
74. *Recorder*, June 6, 1969.
75. *Gazette*, July 5, 11, 1969; Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 2, 1969; file A-26; July 9, 1969; file A-34; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP; TNA: PRO FCO 44/201, July 9, 1969 Bermuda to FCO.
76. TNA: PRO FCO 44/201, July 12, 1969 Bermuda to FCO; *Gazette*, July 12, 1969; Kamarakafego, interview.
77. *Recorder*, June 6, 1969; *Gazette*, July 9, 1969.
78. Manning to U.S. Department of State, July 9, 1969; file A-34; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
79. Manning to U.S. Department of State, June 18, 1969; file A-29; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG59; MD: NACP.

4 *Blueprint for Freedom*: Bermuda's Black Power Conference of 1969

1. TNA: PRO FCO 44/201, July 9, 1969 Bermuda: Black Power Activities in Bermuda 1968–69; *Recorder*, 4 July 1969; Manning to U.S. Department of State, July 9, 1969; file A-34; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
2. Pauulu Kamarakafego, *Me One: The Autobiography of Pauulu Kamarakefego* (Canada: PK Publishing, 2001), 160.
3. *Gazette*, July 10, 1969.
4. Ibid., July 14, 1969; Until his death in 2007, Kamarakafego continued to refuse to purchase the *Gazette* due to its "hostile and biased reporting."
5. *Programme of the 1st Regional Black Power Conference*, *July 10th to 13th, 1969* (Bermuda: Central Planning Black Power Committee, 1969), 4; *Report on the 1st International Black Power Conference*; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 160.
6. Kamarakafego, interview by author, Bermuda, October 12, 2004.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. *Gazette*, July 11, 1969; *Programme of BPC*; "Bermuda to FCO," July 15, 1969, FCO 44/201, PRO, London.
10. *Recorder*, July 11, 1969; *Gazette*, July 11, 1969; "Bermuda: Black Power Conference," f 334, FCO 44/201, PRO, London.
11. *Programme of BPC*; *Gazette*, July 14, 1969. *Report of BPC*, 54; TNA: PRO FCO 44/201, Bermuda: Black Power Activities in Bermuda 1968–9 G.
12. Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 160, 189.
13. TNA: PRO FCO 63/61, July 10, 1969 Bermuda to FCO.
14. Ram Karran on behalf of the People's Progressive Party, to Roosevelt Brown, July 11, 1969, transcript in the hand of Roosevelt Browne, Bermuda. Reprinted in Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 189; *Gazette*, July 14, 1969.
15. Kwame Nkrumah, to Black Power Conference West Indies, July 11, 1969, transcript in the hand of Roosevelt Browne, Bermuda. Reprinted in Kamarakefego, *Me One*, 190.
16. Stokely Carmichael and Ekwueme Michael Thelwell, *Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael [Kwame Toure]* (Scribner: New York, 2003), 690.
17. Stokely Carmichael, to Black Power Conference West Indies, July 11, 1969, transcript in the hand of Roosevelt Browne, Bermuda. Reprinted in *Kamarakefego*, 191.
18. First International Regional Black Power Conference, Bermuda 1969, *Black Power Conference Reports, Philadelphia Aug. 30—Sept 1, 1968, Bermuda July 13, 1969* (San Diego: University Library of University of California, 1969), 58.
19. "Statement and Resolution by Workshop on Education" (Bermuda: 1st Regional Black Power Conference Workshop on Education, July 13, 1969).
20. BPC, 55–56.
21. *Gazette*, July 11, 14, 1969; BPC, 56–59.

22. BPC, 59, 64–66; Sizzla Kalonji, "Give Dem a Ride," *Black Woman and Child* (Kingston: Greensleeves, 1997), audio CD.
23. BPC, 68–70.
24. Ibid., 72–74; The "authorities" had expected Bright to denounce violence and hoped that he would have a "calming effect" on the Conference. Suffice to say, they were not too pleased with his comments. Manning to U.S. Department of State, July 18, 1969; file A-29; CFPF 1967–69; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
25. BPC, 72–74.
26. BPC, 70–72.
27. *Report on Black Power 1969*, reprinted in the *Recorder*, September 12, 1969.
28. Manning to U.S. State Department, July 9, 1969; file A-34; RG 59; POL 23 BER; MD: NACP.
29. Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 160.
30. TNA: PRO FCO 44/202, August 15, 1969 West Indies and Caribbean Area: Monthly Intelligence Summary.
31. *Gazette*, July 14, 1969.
32. TNA: PRO FCO 44/211, June 11, 1969 Bermuda: Cost of Britain Troops in Bermuda.
33. *Gazette*, July 10–16, 1969.
34. *Recorder*, July 11, 1969.
35. *Gazette*, July 12, 1969.
36. "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean," Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Memorandum, July 6, 1970, 7, MD: NACP.
37. *Gazette*, July 10–11, 1969; TNA: PRO FCO 44/202, August 19, 1969 Record of Meetings in Mr. J.C. Morgan's Room.
38. Kamarakafego, interview.
39. *Gazette*, July 14, 1969.
40. *Recorder*, April 5, 1969; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 160.
41. Kamarakafego, interview. See Gary Foley, "Black Power in Redfern, 1968–1972" [article online] (Melbourne: Gary Foley, 2001); available from http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_1.html, accessed July 15, 2008; *Herald*, August 30, 1969.
42. Kamarakafego, interview; Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 160.
43. TNA: PRO FCO 44/202, August 15, 1969 West Indies and Caribbean Area: Monthly Intelligence Summary; TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, January 15, 1970 Development of Black Power in the Eastern Caribbean, Second Half of 1969; TNA: PRO 63/61, Caribbean General Political Affairs Multilateral Black Power in the Caribbean 1969.
44. "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean."
45. Ibid.
46. Victoria Pasley, "The Black Power Movement in Trinidad: An Exploration of Gender and Cultural Changes and the Development of a Feminist Consciousness," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 3: 1 (2001): 2.
47. *Gazette*, July 14, 1969.
48. Kamarakafego, *Me One*, 161.

49. *Gazette*, July 14, 1969; Williams, *Lois*, 156; TNA: PRO FCO 44/201, July 14, 1969 Bermuda to FCO.
50. *Gazette*, July 15–16, 1969.
51. "Revolutionary People's Communication Network: International News (Bermuda)," *Right On!* (September 1971): 13.
52. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 13, 1970 Attorney General Summersfield to Chief Secretary J.W. Sykes.
53. Selwyn Ryan, "Politics in an Artificial Society: The Case of Bermuda," in *Size, Self Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean*, ed. Vaughn Lewis (Kingston: University of West Indies Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1976), 181; TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, November 13, 1970 E. Wynne, Secretary to Executive Council, to FCO; Manning to U.S. Department of State, October 22, 1971, October 4, 1971; SNF 1970–73; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
54. Ryan, "Politics in an Artificial Society," 180–181; TNA: PRO 44/408 November 13, 1970 Wynne to FCO.
55. Ryan, "Politics in an Artificial Society," 184–186.
56. TNA: PRO FCO 44/546, April 20, 1971 R.N. Posnett, Head of West Indies Department, to D.A. Scott, FCO.
57. Manning to U.S. Department of State, July 24, 1973; SNF 1970–73; POL 23 BER; RG 59; MD: NACP.
58. TNA: PRO FCO 44/456, April 20, 1971 Posnett to Scott.

5 *Wake the Town and Tell the People*: The Black Beret Cadre Emerges

1. Phil Perinchief, interview by Shané Simon, "Bermudian Literature: A Theory; an Evaluation of the Social Laws that Govern the Belated Attention Given to Literature Produced in the British Colony, Bermuda" (M.A. Thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury, 2001), 67; Robin Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 15, 2004; Sinclair Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 14, 2004.
2. The author in question is Mel Ayton, a British writer who has published other books about political assassinations and who is attempting to publish a very biased and problematic work on the Cadre entitled, "Black Beret Cadre: A Conspiracy to Kill."
3. See, e.g., Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, *In Search of the Black Panther Party*: *New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006); Jeffrey Ogbar, *Black Power: Racial Politics and African-American Identity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Robert Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press); Eddie Glaude, *Is It Nation Time? Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); and Peniel Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the*

Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America (New York: Henry Holt, 2006).

4. According to FCO officials, a John Shabazz, an African-American delegate to the BPC, announced in August 1969 his intention to remain in Bermuda and "organize his Black Berets organization." However, the name John Shabazz was perhaps mistaken for John Bassett. In any event, Shabazz did not remain in Bermuda. TNA: PRO FCO 44/202, August 19, 1969 Record of Meetings in Mr. J.C. Morgan's Room; Eliyahtsoor Ben Aaharon, interview by author, Bermuda, May 10, 2002; S. Swan, interview.
5. Ben Aaharon, interview.
6. S. Swan, interview.
7. Calvin Shabazz, interview by author, Bermuda, May 29, 2008; Laureen Bassett, interview by author, Bermuda, October 12, 2004.
8. *Gazette*, November 12, 1970.
9. Bassett, interview; see Wade Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement* (Boston: South End Press, 1998), 64, 74; Michael Clemons and Charles Jones, "Global Solidarity; the Black Panther Party in the International Arena," in *Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and Their Legacy*, ed. Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas (New York: Routledge, 2001), 106.
10. Ben Aaharon, interview; Basset, interview; R. Swan, interview.
11. Michelle Khaldun, interview by author, Bermuda, October 10, 2004.
12. Shabazz, interview.
13. S. Swan, interview.
14. Ben Aaharon, interview; S. Swan, interview.
15. *Recorder*, January 2, 1970; S. Swan, interview.
16. Ben Aaharon, interview; *Recorder*, January 2, 1970.
17. Khaldun, interview by author, Bermuda, October 10, 2004.
18. Ben Aaharon, interview; S. Swan, interview.
19. Khaldun, interview.
20. TNA: PRO FCO 44/202, *Umoja*, Vol. 1., Bermuda: Black Power Activities in Bermuda 1968–1969.
21. On this note, Youth Wingers surely "practiced what they preached"; in a meeting with Henry Tucker, some of them wore the Cadre uniform and gave the "Beret" salute.
22. In 1967 Albert Cleage Jr. launched the Black Christian National Movement that called for Black churches to apply the teachings of Jesus to suit the social, economic, and political needs of Black people. See Joseph, *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour*, 54–57; TNA: PRO, FCO 44/403, April 27, 1970 *Umoja*.
23. Perinchief, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report March 3–April 5, 1971.
24. Khaldun, interview.
25. Ibid.
26. Kamarakafego, interview.

27. *Bermuda Sun*, November 26, 1995; Ben Aaharon, interview; S. Swan, interview; TNA: PRO, BIC Report April 1, 1971–April 29, 1971; R. Swan, interview; Khaldun, interview; Perinchief, interview.
28. "10–10 Program," *The Black Beret: Voice of the Black Community* (June 1971): 39–40.
29. Selwyn Ryan, "Politics in an Artificial Society: The Case of Bermuda," in *Size, Self Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean*, ed. Vaughn Lewis (Kingston: University of West Indies Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1976), 194.
30. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971; Ben Aaharon, interview; in 1968, 184 out of 256 members of the Police Force were expatriates. Forty-six of sixty-seven officers ranked at sergeant or above were White expatriates. Wooding Commission, *Bermuda Civil Disorders, 1968: Report of Commission and Statement by the Government of Bermuda* (London: Her Majesty's Stationing Office, 1969), 43–44.
31. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971; Ben Aaharon, interview; Ryan, "Politics in an Artificial Society," 194; R. Swan, interview.
32. Ben Aaharon, interview; R. Swan, interview; TNA: PRO 63/380.
33. *The Black Beret* (June 1971).
34. George Jackson had formed the Black Panther branch with W.L. Nolan. In January 1970 the latter was killed by a prison guard who was acquitted of the murder. The Soledad Three were later accused of killing a guard in retaliation. Jackson's seventeen-year-old brother, Jonathan Jackson, was subsequently killed after invading a courtroom armed with a machine gun and taking a judge hostage in demand that the Soledad Three be released. George Jackson was gunned down on August 21, 1971, in San Quentin prison at age twenty-nine. This led to one of the largest prison uprisings in U.S. history. See George Jackson, *Blood in My Eye* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1996); Cedric Robinson, *Black Movements in America* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 152.
35. Perinchief, interview; R. Swan, interview.
36. Khaldun, interview; S. Swan, interview; R. Swan, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report December 2, 1970–5 January 1971; Simon, "Bermudian Literature," 67; TNA: PRO FCO 63/936, BIC Report, October 3–November 7, 1972; TNA: PRO 63/1099, BIC Report August 7–September 4, 1973, BIC Report, September 5–October 2, 1973.
37. See Barbara Harris Hunter, *The People of Bermuda: Beyond the Crossroads* (Toronto: Gagné-Best, 1993), 194.
38. Ben Aaharon, interview; R. Swan, interview; *The Black Beret* (June 1970); S. Swan, interview.
39. Khaldun, interview.
40. Perinchief, interview; Ben Aaharon, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 63/380; R. Swan, interview.
41. Khaldun, interview.

42. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, January 6–February 2, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 63/380; Ben Aaharon, interview; Khaldun, interview; R. Swan, interview.
43. TNA: PRO FCO 36/379, BIC Report, March 3–April 7, 1970; Khaldun, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, BIC Report, June 3–July 7, 1970.
44. S. Swan, interview; R. Swan, interview; Ben Aaharon, interview.
45. Simon, "Bermudian Literature," 75; Ben Aaharon, interview; R. Swan, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Report, June 7–July 6, 1971.
46. Clemons and Jones, "Global Solidarity," 25; Perinchief, interview; Ben Aaharon, interview; R. Swan, interview.
47. *The Black Beret* (June 1971); R. Swan, interview; Perinchief, interview; Ben Aaharon, interview.
48. This also helped Berets to identify drug dealers who used similar methods to get drugs into the island. Ben Aaharon, interview.
49. R. Swan, interview; Bassett, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, FCO 63/380.
50. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971; March 3–April 5, 1971; February 3–March 2, 1971.
51. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports March 3–April 5, 1971; April 30–June 1, 1971.
52. Perinchief, interview; Clemons and Jones, "Global Solidarity," 25; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports, April 1–April 29, 1971, December 2, 1970 January 5, 1971; Shabazz, interview.
53. *Black Beret* (June 1971); TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Report February 3–March 2, 1971.
54. *Black Beret* (June 1971).
55. Ban Aaharon, interview; S. Swan, interview; Perinchief, interview; Clemons and Jones, Global Solidarity," 25; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports, April 1–April 29, 1971; December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971.
56. Perinchief, interview.
57. Khaldun, interview.
58. Ben Aaharon, interview.
59. *Gazette*, November 13, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, BIC Report June 3–July 7, 1970.
60. Ben Aaharon, interview.
61. *Gazette*, November 13, 1970.
62. Ben Aaharon, interview; TNA: PRO 63/380; Perinchief, interview.

6 *The Empire Strikes Back*: The Government's War against the Berets

1. *Recorder*, March 26, 1970.
2. *Gazette*, March 30, April 2, 1970.

3. Phil Perinchief, interview by Shané Simon, "Bermudian Literature: A Theory; an Evaluation of the Social Laws that Govern the Belated Attention Given to Literature Produced in the British Colony, Bermuda" (M.A. Thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury, 2001).
4. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, May 22, 1970 D.M. Kerr to Thomas Sewell.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, April 1970 Black Power in the Caribbean.
8. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, April 27, 1970 Draft for PUS's monthly letter, April 1970, Black Power in Trinidad and Tobago and elsewhere in the Caribbean; TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, April 1, 1970 Bermuda to FCO.
9. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, Bermuda Monthly Intelligence Report, January 6–February 2, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, February 5, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
10. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, November 5, 1973 BIC Reports. Sykes, a former colonial officer in Fiji and Cyprus, had been Bermuda's colonial secretary since 1956. Martonmere, born John Roland Robinson, was former vice president of the Britain Conservative Party Commonwealth Affairs Committee and its chairman for over a decade. He had also lectured at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and served in the U.S. Air Force. See Owen Wilson, *Personalities Caribbean: A Guide to the West Indies* (Kingston: Personalities Ltd., 1966), 133, 207.
11. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, March 3–April 7, 1970; R. Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 15, 2004.
12. R. Swan, interview; Khaldun, interview by author, Bermuda, October 10, 2004.
13. Ben Aaharon, interview by author, Bermuda, May 10, 2002.
14. Former Beret Ten, interview by author, Bermuda, October 11, 2004.
15. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, January 6–February 2, 1970.
16. S. Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 14, 2004.
17. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, February 2–March 3, 1970.
18. Ibid.
19. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, March 9, 1970 L. Price to FCO, BIC Report, January 6–February 2, 1970.
20. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, February 2–March 3, 1970.
21. *Recorder*, March 26, 1970; S. Swan, interview.
22. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, March 3–April 7, 1970; *Gazette*, April 1, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, BIC Report, June 3–July 7, 1970.
23. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, March 30–31 Governor Martonmere to FCO; *Gazette*, April 1, 1970.
24. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, March 3–April 7, 1970; TNA: PRO 44/408, April 13, 1970 Attorney General Summersfield to Chief Secretary; Ben Aaharon, interview; R. Swan, interview.
25. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, March 3–April 7, 1970.
26. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, BIC Report, June 3–July 7, 1970.

27. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, March 6, 1970, Governor's Dispatch, Martonmere to FCO; *Recorder*, March 21, 1970.
28. S. Swan, interview.
29. *Gazette*, April 2, 1970.
30. S. Swan, interview. These also included Khaldun, S. Swan, Fubler, and Jerome Perinchief.
31. Khaldun, interview.
32. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Reports, February 2–March 3, 1970; March 3–April 7, 1970.
33. According to Ben Aaharon, the initial idea was to boycott the upcoming island-wide interschool sports competition, but certain students "jumped the gun." Ben Aaharon, interview; Khaldun, interview.
34. *Recorder*, March 21, 1970; Beret One, interview.
35. Khaldun, interview; *Gazette*, April 4, 1970.
36. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, f13.
37. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 17, 1970 A.J. Fairclough to FCO.
38. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, f13; TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, March 25, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
39. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, April 10, 1970 Governor's Dispatch; TNA: PRO FCO 44/405, April 7, 1970 Meeting between the Governor and a Progressive Labour Party Youth Wing Delegation.
40. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 13, 1970 Summersfield to Sykes.
41. See Harriet Washington, *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).
42. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, March 12, 1970 BIC Report; TNA: PRO FCO 44/407, June 22, 1970 Fairclough to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, June 22, 1970 Bermuda to FCO.
43. TNA: PRO FCO 44/407, June 22, 1970 A.J. Fairclough to FCO.
44. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 27, 1970 M.J. Macoun to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, April 12, 1970 Report to FCO.
45. National Archives: Bermuda FCO 44/408, April 14, 1970 Fairclough to FCO.
46. *Gazette*, April 18, 1970.
47. Ibid., April 21, 25, 1970.
48. National Archives (NA): Bermuda FCO 44/406, October 15, 1970 Fairclough to FCO; NA: Bermuda FCO 44/403, June 8, 1970 Summerfield to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, June 5, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
49. NA: Bermuda FCO 44/403, June 2, 1970 J.A. Clewey to FCO; June 8, 1970 Summerfield to FCO; R. Swan, interview.
50. NA: Bermuda FCO 44/403, April 29, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
51. TNA: PRO FCO 44/403, April 17, 1970 St. Vincent to FCO; April 17, 1970 St. Lucia to FCO; May 11, 1970 Bridgetown to FCO.
52. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 22, 1970, June 10, 1970 J. Rayner to Secretary of Executive Council.

53. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 28, 1970 Bermuda Internal Security Situation; May 28, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
54. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, June 10, 1970 Clewley to Price; June 12, 1970 Hugh Mooney to Fairclough.
55. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, June 12, 1970 L. Monsoon to FCO; June 10, 1970 L.S. Price to FCO; *Gazette*, October 31, 1970.
56. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, November 13, 1970 E. Wynne, "A Note on the Structure of Society in Bermuda and Some of Its Peoples."
57. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, August 18, 1970 J.A. Clewey to FCO.
58. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, BIC Report, June 3–July 7, 1970.
59. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, August 5, 1970 E. Wynne to FCO.
60. *Gazette*, November 17, 1970.

7 *We Don't Need No Water*: The Cadre Burns the Union Jack

1. Vejay Steede, *Flag* (Bermuda: LoQuatJam Publishing, 1994).
2. TNA: PRO FCO 45/252; TNA: PRO FCO 45/283.
3. *Recorder*, August 1, 1970; *Gazette*, August 6, 1970.
4. Ben Aaharon, interview by author, Bermuda, May 10, 2002.
5. *Gazette*, August 6, 1970; Manning to U.S. Department of State, February 28, 1966; file A-87; POL 2 BER; CFPF 1964–66; RG 59; MD: NACP.
6. In 1960, White policemen fired on an "unarmed" and "unaggressive crowd" of between 10 and 20,000 people during a demonstration orchestrated by the Pan-African Congress in Sharpeville, South Africa. Seventy-two were killed and 186 wounded, including 40 women and 8 children. This "Sharpeville Massacre" was internationally denounced. See David Chanaiwa, "Southern Africa since 1945," *UNESCO General History of Africa: Africa since 1935*, Vol. 8, ed. Ali Mazrui (Paris: UNESCO, 1999), 260; *Recorder*, August 1, 1970.
7. Ben Aaharon, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, October 19, 1970 Martonemere to FCO; *Gazette*, October 19, 1970.
8. *Gazette*, August 10, 1970; Ben Aaharon, interview.
9. S. Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 14, 2004.
10. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, April 1–April 29, 1971.
11. TNA: PRO FCO 63/380, BIC Report, June 3–July 7, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 44/409, October 20, 1970 Governor to FCO.
12. *Gazette*, July 4, 1970.
13. TNA: PRO FCO 63/379, BIC Report, March 3–April 7, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971.
14. *Gazette*, October 6, August 15, 1970; Shabazz, interview by author, Bermuda, May 29, 2008; Bassett, interview by author, Bermuda, October 12, 2004.
15. TNA: PRO FCO FCO 44/409, September 7, 1970 Governor to FCO, October 8, 1970 A.J. Fairclough to D.A. Scott; TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, October 21, 1970 Governor to FCO; *Gazette*, October 16, 1970.
16. *Gazette*, September 25–26, 1970.

17. Strikes also occurred at the airport and at the Pearman Watlington garage during the demonstration. Security officials felt that the Berets would exploit these industrial disputes, for a "deterioration in labor relations was likely to increase racial tensions." *Gazette*, October 3, 1970.
18. Ibid.
19. TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, October 5, 1970 Governor to FCO; *Gazette*, October 6, 10, 1970.
20. *Gazette*, October 6–7, 1970, November 12, 1970.
21. Ibid., October 7–9, 1970.
22. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 9, 1970 Martonmere to FCO; *Gazette*, October 15, 1970.
23. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 11, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
24. *Gazette*, October 12–14, 1970.
25. One can only assume that this was a reference to the U.S. Civil War. However, Abraham Lincoln's soldiers fought to preserve the Union, not to simply abolish slavery. Lincoln constructed the Emancipation Proclamation to apply only to States that were in rebellion against the Union. The president was a racial separatist and "maintained that inasmuch as there is a physical inequality between the White and Black, that the Blacks must remain inferior." See Lerone Bennett, Jr., *Forced into Glory: Abraham Lincoln's White Dream* (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, 2000), 181.
26. *Gazette*, October 5, 8–10, 12, 1970.
27. Ibid., October 12–14, 1970.
28. Hakim Gordon was the "eccentric" son of Dr. E.F. Gordon. He was an anthropologist, who along with his British wife and young daughters, had hiked across Africa to complete a study about human behavior. Ibid., October 16, 1970.
29. Ibid., October 9, 1970.
30. Ibid., October 10–12, 31, 1970.
31. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 9, 11, 1970 Martonmere to FCO; *Gazette*, October 9–10, 1970.
32. *Gazette*, October 7, 1970.
33. TNA: PRO FCO 44/404, October 13, 1970 Fairclough to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 15, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
34. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 10, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
35. Ben Aaharon, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 13, 1970 Summersfield to Sykes; R. Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 15, 2004; TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 14, 1970, Martonmere to FCO.
36. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, October 15, 1970 Martonmere to FCO; *Gazette*, October 15, 1970.
37. TNA: PRO FCO 44/407, December 10, 1970 Martonmere to FCO.
38. TNA: PRO FCO 44/407, October 30, 1970 A. Maltes to FCO.
39. TNA: PRO FCO 44/407, November 19, 1970 J. Macoun to FCO.
40. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, February 15, 1971 Governor's Dispatch.
41. *Gazette*, October 7, 1970.
42. Ben Aaharon, interview.

43. Ibid.; R. Swan, interview; *Gazette*, November 21, 1970.
44. Ben Aaharon, interview; *Gazette*, November 2, December 3, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, November 3, 1970 Clewley to FCO.
45. TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, November 3, 1970 Reasons for the Demonstration.
46. Those arrested included Perinchief, Simmons, Shabazz, and Jerome Perinchief. R. Swan, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/406, November 3, 1970 Clewley to FCO; Perinchief, interview; Ben Aaharon, interview; *Gazette*, December 3, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971.
47. Ben Aaharon, interview.
48. *Gazette*, November 7, 1970.
49. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports, December 2, 1970February 2, 1971; Shabazz, interview.
50. Perinchief, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, January 8, 1971 Governor's Dispatch.
51. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, December 2, 1970–January 5, 1971.
52. Ben Aaharon, interview; *Gazette*, November 21, 1970.
53. TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 17, 1970 A.J. Fairclough to J.C. Morgan.
54. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, January 5–February 2, 1971; Perinchief, interview.
55. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, January 8, 1971 Governor's Dispatch; BIC Report, January 5–February 2, 1971.
56. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports, December 2, 1970–June 1, 1971.
57. Beret Seven would later implement a select Guerrilla force, which reportedly included intensive training for those involved. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports March 3–April 29, 1971; Governor's Dispatch, September 17, 1971.
58. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Report, April 30–June 1, 1971.
59. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Reports, March 3–July 6, 1971; May 13, June 11, 1971 Governor's Dispatches.
60. *Black Beret* (June 1971).
61. TNA:PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, February 3–March 2, 1971.
62. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Report, April 1–April 29, 1971; FCO 44/542, BIC Report, September 6–October 5, 1971.
63. *Black Beret* (June 1971).
64. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, February 15, 1971 Governor's Dispatch; BIC Reports, March 3–April 5, 1971; April 30–June 1, 1971; April 22, 1971 Posnett to FCO.
65. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Reports, March 3–April 29, 1971.
66. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, July 26, 1971 C. Mortlock to FCO; June 11, July 9, 1971 Governor's Dispatches; *Black Beret* (Summer 1971).
67. TNA: PRO 44/451 BIC Report, June 2–July 6, 1971.
68. *Black Beret* (June 1971).
69. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Reports, March 3–June 1, 1971; Ben Aaharon, interview.
70. *Black Beret* (June 1971).
71. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, April –April 29, 1971.

72. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Report, June 2–July 6, 1971.
73. TNA: PRO FCO 44/451, BIC Report, July 1, 1971–August 3, 1971; August 20, 1971 Governor's Dispatch; August 25, 1971 A.R. Powell to FCO.
74. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, BIC Report, August 4–September 7, 1971.
75. TNA: PRO FCO 44/541, August 20, 1971 Governor's Dispatch.
76. TNA: PRO FCO 44/542, BIC Reports, September–December 1971.

8 *Robin Hood was Black in My Hood*: "Erskine" Buck Burrows and the Assassinations

1. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, BIC Report, August 8–September 5, 1972; September 15, 1972 Governor's Dispatch.
2. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, "Second Basic Paper on NOI Bermuda."
3. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, BIC Report, August 8–September 5, 1972; September 15, 1972 Governor's Dispatch; Shabazz, interview by author, Bermuda, May 29, 2008.
4. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, September 15, 1972 Governor's Dispatch; Neville Darrell, *Acel'dama: The Untold Story of the Murder of the Governor of Bermuda, Sir Richard Sharples* (Surrey: Coastline Mountain Press, 1983), 61.
5. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, BIC Report, October 3–November 7, 972; Basset, interview by author, Bermuda, October 12, 2004.
6. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, BIC Reports, September 6–October 2, 1972; November 6–December 5, 1972.
7. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Report, December 6, 1972–January 8, 1973.
8. *Fame* (October 1974): 33; TNA: PRO FCO 44/408, April 13, 1970 Summerfield to Sykes; BIC Report, June 3–July 7, 1970; TNA: PRO FCO 44/405, Bermuda to FCO.
9. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, January 19, 1973, February 16, 1973 Governor's Dispatches, Richard Sharples to FCO; BIC Report, January 9, 1972–February 6, 1973.
10. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Reports, January 9–April 3, 1973.
11. TNA: PRO FCO 63/946, October 19, 1972 C.G. Mortlock to FCO; November 10, 1972 Governor's Dispatch.
12. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, December 21, 1972 Richard Sharples, Governor of Bermuda, to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
13. Pitt Commission, 4; *Gazette*, March 12, 1973; *Daily Telegraph*, March 22, 1973.
14. *London Times*, September 12, 1973; Darrell, *Acel'dama*, 61; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Report, March 7–April 3, 1973.
15. Donald McCue to U.S. Department of State, March 22, 1973; POL 19 BER; SNF 1970–73; RG 59; NACP: MD.
16. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, April 17, 1973 Governor's Dispatch, Kinnear.
17. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Reports, April 4–June 5, 1973.

18. Shabazz, interview; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Reports, June 6–July 3, 1973; October 3–November 6, 1973.
19. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1102, March 13, 1973 Bermuda Assassination; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Report, June 6–July 3, 1973; July 12, 1973 Governor's Dispatch; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1103, March 20, 1973, Acting Governor Kinnear to Sir Duncan Watson.
20. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Report, July 4August 6, 1973.
21. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, August 15, 1973 Governor's Dispatch; BIC Report, August 7–September 4, 1973.
22. Darrell, *Acel'dama*, 76–83.
23. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1094, October 12, 1973 F. Sedgwick-Jell to FCO; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1100, October 23, 1973 Ted Leather to Duncan Watson, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
24. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Report, October 3–November 6, 1973.
25. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1100, October 23, 1973 Ted Leather to Duncan Watson, Secretary of State for FCO.
26. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1099, BIC Reports, July 4–October 2, 1973.
27. Some asserted that Sharples was wanted by the IRA due to his activities as the former British minister of state for home affairs concerned with Northern Ireland. Before coming to Bermuda, the former Welsh Guard lived on a 3,000-acre estate in Alton, Hampshire and employed twenty-four-hour security guards. Ben Aaharon, interview; *London Times*, September 12, 1973.
28. TNA: PRO MEOP 26/233/1, May 23, 1976 Bermuda Police Statement of Witness, Sylan Musson Jnr.
29. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1094, December 20, 1973 Record of a conversation between the minister of state and the premier of Bermuda held at the FCO; *Gazette*, September 25, 1973.
30. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1100, 23 October 23, 1973 Ted Leather to Duncan Watson, Secretary of State for FCO.
31. Ibid.
32. Darrell, *Acel'dama*, 31–32; TNA: PRO FCO 63/1100, October 23, 1973 Leather to Watson.
33. Darrell, *Acel'dama*, 31–32; Ben Aaharon, interview by author, Bermuda, May 10, 2002. This is similar to the relationship between the California BPP and Alprentice "Bunchy" Carter, a former Los Angeles gang leader who joined the BPP after meeting Eldridge Cleaver while incarcerated in California's Soledad State Prison. Akinyele Omowale Umoja, "Repression Breeds Resistance: The Black Liberation Army and the Radical Legacy of the Black Panther Party," in *Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and Their Legacy*, ed. Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas (New York: Routledge, 2001), 6–7.
34. S. Swan, interview by author, Bermuda, October 14, 2004.
35. Shabazz, interview.
36. TNA: PRO MEPO 26/223/1, October 28, 1981 Philip Corbett, Metropolitan Training School Document; May 26, 1976 Report to the Court Re: Erskine

Buck Burrows, P.G. Eames; May 1976 28, Davis Thomas Morgan. Bermuda Police Statement of Witness; The following interview between Burrows and a Scotland Yard Detective, W. Wright, perhaps explains this phenomenon best:

WRIGHT: You are looking very fit Buck, how are you keeping?

BURROWS: Very good thank you, and I thank the Lord too…

WRIGHT: Now Buck is there anything you would like to tell me [about the murders]?

BURROWS: I am at peace with my maker, and he has forgiven me. It took me a long time to see the light and to make my peace for all the things I've done wrong.

WRIGHT: I am happy that you have made your peace with God. Would you now like to tell me all you know about the murders I am investigating?

BURROWS: (Grinned). The light has told me I need not confess to my fellow man as I have confessed them all to God. He has forgiven me, man.

WRIGHT: Murders are a very serious offense Buck, and it is my job to seek out the truth.

BURROWS: Brother, my fellow man cannot forgive. Brother, we are all sinners and so I only have to make my peace with the Lord, or his son, Jesus Christ.

WRIGHT: If you want to confess to your part in these murders Buck, I will only be too pleased to listen to you.

BURROWS: About these murders I have confessed to God, and I've made my peace with him. He acknowledged my confession, so I don't have to confess to my fellow man. We are all equal in God's eye.

WRIGHT: Have you confessed about the murders Buck?

BURROWS: Yes, I have made my peace with the Good Lord. He has forgiven me and I am pleased brother. My friends, it feels so good to be at peace with the maker.

WRIGHT: Buck, as I've said before, I believe you can help me with these murders.

BURROWS: Brother, nobody is damned. I believe in the hereafter and now I've confessed, I am happy in mind and body.

WRIGHT: Buck, have you ever thought about confessing these murders to me?

BURROWS: (Grinned). I have made my confession to God, and I don't have to think about it anymore.

WRIGHT: Buck, do you regret being involved in these murders and that five men are now dead?

BURROWS: (Long pause)—(Grin) With some people it takes longer to see the light than others. No man can judge another.

WRIGHT: Do you want to tell me about it or not Buck?

BURROWS: I've told you brother, I've made my peace with God.

WRIGHT: Buck, if you want me to come and see you again just ask for me. Do you understand?

BURROWS: Yes, before I go can I wish you all a Merry Christmas. (TNA: PRO MEPO 26/223/3, December 11, 1974, Basil Haddrell, Bermuda Police Statement of Witness).

37. TNA: PRO MEPO 26 223 1. June 13, 27, 1976, Note for Mr. Marriage, who is Crown Prosecutor for my case, signed Erskine Burrows.
38. In July 1977 Jack Sharpe resigned under pressure from "dissidents" with the UBP under grounds that a Black premier would present a better image in competing with the PLP. However Sir David Gibbons (White) was elected over Jim Woolridge (Black) in a 14–10 vote. Woolridge had been minister of labor and immigration since 1971. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1467, August 31, 1977 C.C Long, Brief for meeting with Sir Ramsbotham.
39. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1465, Bermuda Execution of Burrows and Tacklyn; December 21, 1977 Michael Palliser to Secretary of State; December 30, 1977 Executions in Bermuda; TNA: PRO FCO 44/1467 August 31, 1977 C.C Long, Brief for meeting with Sir Ramsbotham.
40. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1463, November 30, 1977 Members of Concerned Bermudians to Queen of England.
41. Trotter, or Ras Kabinda, was sentenced to death for the killing of a White American tourist, but this sentence was changed to life imprisonment. Many believed that Dominica's government framed him due to his political activism. His lawyer was Grenada's Maurice Bishop. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1464, December 8, 1977, Caribbean People's Solidarity Campaign Letter.
42. Pitt Commission, 4, 5; TNA: PRO 44/1465, December 10, 1977 Military Advisor David Ford to FCO; *Gazette*, November 29, December 1, 1977.
43. *Gazette*, December 1, 1977.
44. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1464, December 5, 1977 Owen to Hamilton.
45. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1464, December 5, 1977 Dr. David Owen Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to House of Commons; *Gazette*, December 2, 1977.
46. Pitt Commission, 4–5; *Gazette*, December 3, 1977; TNA: PRO FCO 44/1464, December 5, 1977 Owen to House of Commons.

47. TNA: PRO 44/1464, December 3, 1977 Governor Peter Ramsbotham to David Owen; Pitt Commission, 5–6; TNA: FCO 44/1466 December 13, 1977, M.J. Macoun, "The Bermuda Police."
48. TNA: PRO 44/1464, December 8, 1977 FCO telegram; December 5, 1977 FCO telegram to Washington.
49. TNA: PRO 44/1465, December 11, 1977 Angus Watson to Secretary of State Owen; December 12, 1977 Peter Ashdown to FCO.
50. *Gazette*, December 1, 1977.
51. TNA: PRO 44/1465, December 10, 1977 David Ford to FCO.
52. TNA: PRO FCO 44/1465, December 21, 1977 P.C. Duff to FCO.
53. . Pitt Commission, 27, 35.
54. Ibid.
55. Bassett, interview; Ben Aaharon, interview.
56. Bassett, interview.
57. Ben Aaharon, interview; Khaldun, interview; S. Swan, interview; Perinchief, interview; R. Swan, interview.
58. R. Swan, interview.
59. *Fame* (October 1974).
60. TNA: PRO FCO 63/1090, January 9, 1973 First Basic Paper on Rastafarians in Bermuda. The criminalization of marijuana was also connected with the establishment's concern with Rasta. For example, in 1976 there were 217, 238, 17, and 4 convictions for importation of cannabis, possession of cannabis, possession of cannabis for intent to supply, and cultivation of cannabis, respectively. In contrast, paralleling convictions for importation and possession of cocaine were 11 and 10, and LSD 6 and 5. TNA: PRO 44/1466, Report of the Bermuda Police Force for the year 1976.

Conclusion

1. In 1975 the Bermuda Police implemented a Public Relations Section, which was proving to be of value to the establishment. A government bus was converted into a Mobile Road Safety classroom, which made visits to all of Bermuda's primary schools. It was expected that by 1977 "every child in every school" would have been "contacted" by the police through Road Safety lectures. Visits to the Police Headquarters by school groups were also facilitated. In 1973 the Junior Cadet scheme and Outward Bound programs (on Paget Island) were formed. By 1976, the Cadets formed units across a number of schools in Bermuda, including known spots of Black Power militancy—Robert Crawford, Berkeley, and Whitney. Locals also attended a Junior Criminal Investigations Division course in the UKTNA; PRO 44/1466, Report of the Bermuda Police Force for the year 1976.
2. Clark, Phipps, Clark & Harris, Inc. *A Proposal for a Comprehensive Program toward Racial Integration and Economic Equity*, (Bermuda: Government Stationary Office, 1978), 1.
3. Ibid., 1,5.

4. Ibid., 1.
5. Ibid., 16, 17.
6. Eva N. Hodgson, "Bermuda and the Search for Blackness." *In Is Massa Day Dead: Black Moods in the Caribbean*, ed. Orde Coombes (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), 144.
7. United Bermuda Party, *History of the United Bermuda Party* (Bermuda: United Bermuda Party, 1978).
8. George Drower, *Britain's Dependent Territories: A Fistful of Islands* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), 42, 201; TNA: PRO FCO 44/546, April 20, 1971 R.N. Posnett to D.A. Scott; *New York Times*, March 5, 1983.
9. *New York Times*, December 20, 1985.
10. Johnny Barnes (born in 1924) is a Black man who every morning from Monday to Friday greets travelers entering Hamilton city alongside East Broadway road with hand waves, smiles, and blows kisses while proclaiming "I love you." While Barnes was simply seeking to "spread love to passers by" when he started this trend in 1983, his public persona reflects the image of "happy-go-lucky" colonized native who welcomes tourists to Bermuda and also the UBP's project of social engineering. Ironically, history suggests that Sally Bassett (an elderly enslaved Black woman) was burned alive in 1730 for poisoning her masters in the same area where Barnes stands. Even more ironic is that a statue of Barnes was erected in that same location with the caption, "The Spirit of Bermuda."
11. *Gazette*, May 23, 2008.
12. *Gazette*, February 10–11, 2008.

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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold denote figures and tables.